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TREATISE ON THE LAST THINGS

THE “SUMMA THEOLOGICA”

THIRD PART (SUPPLEMENT)

QUESTION LXXXVII.

OF THE KNOWLEDGE WHICH, AFTER RISING AGAIN, MEN WILL HAVE AT THE JUDGMENT CONCERNING MERITS AND DEMERITS.

(In Three Articles.)

IN the next place we must treat of those things which follow the resurrection. The first of these to be considered will be the knowledge, which after rising again, men will have at the judgment, concerning merits and demerits; the second will be the general judgment itself, as also the time and place at which it will be; thirdly we shall consider who will judge and who will be judged; fourthly we shall treat of the form wherein the judge will come to judge; and fifthly we shall consider what will be after the judgment, the state of the world and of those who will have risen again.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether at the judgment every man will know all his sins? (2) Whether every one will be able to read all that is on another's conscience? (3) Whether one will be able at one glance to see all merits and demerits?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER AFTER THE RESURRECTION EVERY ONE WILL
KNOW WHAT SINS HE HAS COMMITTED?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that after the resurrection everyone will not be able to know all the sins he has committed. For whatever we know, either we receive it anew through the senses, or we draw it from the treasure house of the

memory. Now after the resurrection men will be unable to perceive their sins by means of sense, because they will be things of the past, while sense perceives only the present: and many sins will have escaped the sinner's memory, and he will be unable to recall them from the treasure house of his memory. Therefore after rising again one will not be cognizant of all the sins one has committed.

Obj. 2. Further, It is stated in the text (iv *Sent.* D. 43). that *there are certain books of the conscience, wherein each one's merits are inscribed.* Now one cannot read a thing in a book, unless it be marked down in the book: and sin leaves its mark upon the conscience according to a gloss of Origen on Rom. ii. 15, *Their conscience bearing witness,* etc., which mark, seemingly, is nothing else than the guilt or stain. Since then in many persons the guilt or stain of many sins is blotted out by grace, it would seem that one cannot read in one's conscience all the sins one has committed: and thus the same conclusion follows as before.

Obj. 3. Further, The greater the cause the greater the effect. Now the cause which makes us grieve for the sins which we recall to memory is charity. Since then charity is perfect in the saints after the resurrection, they will grieve exceedingly for their sins, if they recall them to memory: yet this is impossible, seeing that according to Apoc. xxi. 4, *Sorrow and mourning shall flee away from them.** Therefore they will not recall their own sins to memory.

Obj. 4. Further, At the resurrection the damned will be to the good they once did as the blessed to the sins they once committed. Now seemingly the damned after rising again will have no knowledge of the good they once did, since this would alleviate their pain considerably. Neither therefore will the blessed have any knowledge of the sins they had committed.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei*, xx.) that *a kind of Divine energy will come to our aid, so that we shall recall all our sins to mind.*

* The quotation is from Isa. xxxv. 10. The text of the Apocalypse has: *Not mourning, nor crying, nor sorrow shall be any more.*

Further, As human judgment is to external evidence, so is the Divine judgment to the witness of the conscience, according to 1 Kings xvi. 7, *Man seeth those things that appear, but the Lord beholdeth the heart.* Now man cannot pass a perfect judgment on a matter unless evidence be taken on all the points that need to be judged. Therefore, since the Divine judgment is most perfect, it is necessary for the conscience to witness to everything that has to be judged. But all works, both good and evil, will have to be judged (2 Cor. v. 10): *We must all be manifested before the judgment seat of Christ, that every one may receive the proper things of the body, according as he hath done, whether it be good or evil.* Therefore each one's conscience must needs retain all the works he has done, whether good or evil.

I answer that, According to Rom. ii. 15, 16, *In the day when God shall judge* each one's conscience will bear witness to him, and his thoughts will accuse and defend him. And since in every judicial hearing, the witness, the accuser, and the defendant need to be acquainted with the matter on which judgment has to be pronounced, and since at the general judgment all the works of men will be submitted to judgment, it will behove every man to be cognizant then of all his works. Wherefore each man's conscience will be as a book containing his deeds on which judgment will be pronounced, even as in the human court of law we make use of records. Of these books it is written in the Apocalypse (xx. 12): *The books were opened: and another book was opened, which is the book of life; and the dead were judged by those things which were written in the books* (Vulg.,—book) *according to their works.* According to Augustine's exposition (*De Civ. Dei*, xx.) the books which are here said to be opened denote the saints of the New and Old Testaments in whom God's commandments are exemplified. Hence Richard of S. Victor (*De judic. potest.*) says: *Their hearts will be like the code of law.* But the book of life, of which the text goes on to speak, signifies each one's conscience, which is said to be one single book, because the one Divine power will cause all to recall their deeds, and this energy,

in so far as it reminds a man of his deeds, is called the *book of life*.* Or else we may refer the first books to the conscience, and by the second book we may understand the Judge's sentence as expressed in His providence.

Reply Obj. 1. Although many merits and demerits will have escaped our memory, yet there will be none of them but will remain somewhat in its effect, because those merits which are not deadened will remain in the reward accorded to them, while those that are deadened remain in the guilt of ingratitude, which is increased through the fact that a man sinned after receiving grace. In like manner those demerits which are not blotted out by repentance remain in the debt of punishment due to them, while those which have been blotted out by repentance remain in the remembrance of repentance, which they will recall together with their other merits. Hence in each man there will be something whereby he will be able to recollect his deeds. Nevertheless, as Augustine says (*loc. cit.*), the Divine energy will especially conduce to this.

Reply Obj. 2. Each one's conscience will bear certain marks of the deeds done by him; and it does not follow that these marks are the guilt alone, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3. Although charity is now the cause of sorrow for sin, yet the saints in heaven will be so full of joy, that they will have no room for sorrow; and so they will not grieve for their sins, but rather will they rejoice in the Divine mercy, whereby their sins are forgiven them. Even so do the angels rejoice now in the Divine justice whereby those whom they guard fall headlong into sin through being abandoned by grace; and whose salvation none the less they eagerly watch over.

Reply Obj. 4. The wicked will know all the good they have done, and this will not diminish their pain; indeed, it will increase it, because the greatest sorrow is to have lost many goods: for which reason Boëthius says (*De Consol.* ii.) that *the greatest misfortune is to have been happy*.

* Cf. P. I., Q. XXIV., A. I., *ad* I.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER EVERY ONE WILL BE ABLE TO READ ALL THAT IS IN
ANOTHER'S CONSCIENCE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that it will be impossible for every one to read all that is in another's conscience. For the knowledge of those who rise again will not be clearer than that of the angels, equality with whom is promised us after the resurrection (Matth. xxii. 30). Now angels cannot read one another's thoughts in matters dependent on the free-will, wherefore they need to speak in order to notify such things to one another.* Therefore after rising again we shall be unable to read what is contained in another's conscience.

Obj. 2. Further, Whatever is known is known either in itself, or in its cause, or in its effect. Now the merits or demerits contained in a person's conscience cannot be known by another in themselves, because God alone enters the heart and reads its secrets. Neither will it be possible for them to be known in their cause, since all will not see God Who alone can act on the will, whence merits and demerits proceed. Nor again will it be possible to know them from their effect, since there will be many demerits, which through being wholly blotted out by repentance will leave no effect remaining. Therefore it will not be possible for every one to know all that is in another's conscience.

Obj. 3. Further, Chrysostom says (*Hom. xxxi. in Ep. ad Hebr.*), as we have quoted before (iv. *Sent. D. 17*): *If thou remember thy sins now, and frequently confess them before God and beg pardon for them, thou wilt very soon blot them out; but if thou forget them, thou wilt then remember them unwillingly, when they will be made public, and declared before all thy friends and foes, and in the presence of the holy angels.* Hence it follows that this publication will be the punishment of man's neglect in omitting to confess his sins. Therefore the sins which a man has confessed will not be made known to others.

Obj. 4. Further, It is a relief to know that one has had

* Cf. P. I., Q. CVII.

many associates in sin, so that one is less ashamed thereof. If therefore every one were to know the sin of another, each sinner's shame would be much diminished, which is unlikely. Therefore every one will not know the sins of all.

On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Cor. iv. 5, will . . . bring to light the hidden things of darkness, says: *Deeds and thoughts both good and evil will then be revealed and made known to all.*

Further, The past sins of all the good will be equally blotted out. Yet we know the sins of some saints, for instance of Magdalen, Peter, and David. Therefore in like manner the sins of the other elect will be known, and much more those of the damned.

I answer that, At the last and general judgment it behoves the Divine justice, which now is in many ways hidden, to appear evidently to all. Now the sentence of one who condemns or rewards cannot be just, unless it be delivered according to merits and demerits. Therefore just as it behoves both judge and jury to know the merits of a case, in order to deliver a just verdict, so is it necessary, in order that the sentence appear to be just, that all who know the sentence should be acquainted with the merits. Hence, since every one will know of his reward or condemnation, so will every one else know of it, and consequently as each one will recall his own merits or demerits, so will he be cognizant of those of others. This is the more probable and more common opinion, although the Master (iv. *Sent.* D. 43) says the contrary, namely that a man's sins blotted out by repentance will not be made known to others at the judgment. But it would follow from this that neither would his repentance for these sins be perfectly known, which would detract considerably from the glory of the saints and the praise due to God for having so mercifully delivered them.

Reply Obj. 1. All the preceding merits or demerits will come to a certain amount in the glory or unhappiness of each one rising again. Consequently through eternal things being seen all things in their consciences will be visible, especially as the Divine power will conduce to this so that the Judge's sentence may appear just to all.

Reply Obj. 2. It will be possible for a man's merits or demerits to be made known by their effects as stated above (A. 1, *ad* 1), or by the power of God, although the power of the created intellect is not sufficient for this.

Reply Obj. 3. The manifestation of his sins to the confusion of the sinner is a result of his neglect in omitting to confess them. But that the sins of the saints be revealed cannot be to their confusion or shame, as neither does it bring confusion to Mary Magdalen that her sins are publicly recalled in the Church, because shame is *fear of disgrace*, as Damascene says (*De Fide Orthodox.* ii.), and this will be impossible in the blessed. But this manifestation will bring them great glory on account of the penance they did, even as the confessor hails a man who courageously confesses great crimes. Sins are said to be blotted out because God sees them not for the purpose of punishing them.

Reply Obj. 4. The sinner's confusion will not be diminished, but on the contrary increased, through his seeing the sins of others, for in seeing that others are blameworthy he will all the more acknowledge himself to be blamed. For that confusion be diminished by a cause of this kind is owing to the fact that shame regards the esteem of men, who esteem more lightly that which is customary. But then confusion will regard the esteem of God, which weighs every sin according to the truth, whether it be the sin of one man or of many.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL MERITS AND DEMERITS, ONE'S OWN AS WELL AS THOSE OF OTHERS, WILL BE SEEN BY ANYONE AT A SINGLE GLANCE?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that not all merits and demerits, one's own as well as those of others, will be seen by anyone at a single glance. For things considered singly are not seen at one glance. Now the damned will consider their sins singly and will bewail them, wherefore they say

(Wis. v. 8): *What hath pride profited us?* Therefore they will not see them all at a glance.

Obj. 2. Further, The Philosopher says (*Topic. ii.*) that *we do not arrive at understanding several things at the same time.* Now merits and demerits, both our own and those of others, will not be visible save to the intellect. Therefore it will be impossible for them all to be seen at the same time.

Obj. 3. Further, The intellect of the damned after the resurrection will not be clearer than the intellect of the blessed and of the angels is now, as to the natural knowledge whereby they know things by innate species. Now by such knowledge the angels do not see several things at the same time. Therefore neither will the damned be able then to see all their deeds at the same time.

On the contrary, A gloss on Job viii. 22, *They . . . shall be clothed with confusion,* says: *As soon as they shall see the Judge, all their evil deeds will stand before their eyes.* Now they will see the Judge suddenly. Therefore in like manner will they see the evil they have done, and for the same reason all others.

Further, Augustine (*De Civ. Dei*, xx.) considers it unfitting that at the judgment a material book should be read containing the deeds of each individual written therein, for the reason that it would be impossible to measure the size of such a book, or the time it would take to read. But in like manner it would be impossible to estimate the length of time one would require in order to consider all one's merits and demerits and those of others, if one saw these various things one after the other. Therefore we must admit that each one sees them all at the same time.

I answer that, There are two opinions on this question. For some say that one will see all merits and demerits, both one's own and those of others, at the same time in an instant. This is easily credible with regard to the blessed, since they will see all things in the Word: and consequently it is not unreasonable that they should see several things at the same time. But with regard to the damned, a difficulty presents itself, since their intellect is not raised so

that they can see God and all else in Him. Wherefore others say that the wicked will see all their sins and those of others generically at the same time: and this suffices for the accusation or absolution necessary for the judgment; but that they will not see them all down to each single one at the same time. But neither does this seem consonant with the words of Augustine (*De Civ. Dei*, xx.), who says that they will count them all with one glance of the mind; and what is known generically is not counted. Hence we may choose a middle way, by holding that they will consider each sin not instantaneously, but in a very short time, the Divine power coming to their aid. This agrees with the saying of Augustine (*ibid.*) that *they will be discerned with wondrous rapidity*. Nor is this impossible, since in a space of time, however short, is potentially an infinite number of instants. This suffices for the replies to the objections on either side of the question.

QUESTION LXXXVIII.

OF THE GENERAL JUDGMENT, AS TO THE TIME AND PLACE AT WHICH IT WILL BE.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE must next consider the general judgment, as to the time and place at which it will be. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether there will be a general judgment? (2) Whether as regards the debate it will be conducted by word of mouth? (3) Whether it will take place at an unknown time? (4) Whether it will take place in the valley of Josaphat?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE WILL BE A GENERAL JUDGMENT?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that there will not be a general judgment. For according to Nahum i. 9, following the Septuagint version, *God will not judge the same thing a second time.* But God judges now of man's every work, by assigning punishments and rewards to each one after death, and also by rewarding and punishing certain ones in this life for their good or evil deeds. Therefore it would seem that there will be no other judgment.

Obj. 2. Further, In no judicial inquiry is the sentence carried out before judgment is pronounced. But the sentence of the Divine judgment on man regards the acquisition of the kingdom or exclusion from the kingdom (Matth. xxv. 34, 41). Therefore since some obtain posses-

sion of the kingdom now, and some are excluded from it for ever, it would seem that there will be no other judgment.

Obj. 3. Further, The reason why certain things are submitted to judgment is that we may come to a decision about them. Now before the end of the world each of the damned is awarded his damnation, and each of the blessed his beatitude. Therefore, etc.

On the contrary, It is written (Matth. xii. 41): *The men of Nineve shall rise in judgment with this generation, and shall condemn it.* Therefore there will be a judgment after the resurrection.

Further, It is written (Jo. v. 29): *They that have done good things shall come forth unto the resurrection of life, but they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of judgment.* Therefore it would seem that after the resurrection there will be a judgment.

I answer that, Just as operation refers to the beginning wherefrom things receive their being, so judgment belongs to the term, wherein they are brought to their end. Now we distinguish a twofold operation in God. One is that whereby He first gave things their being, by fashioning their nature and by establishing the distinctions which contribute to the perfection thereof: from this work God is stated to have rested (Gen. ii. 2). His other operation is that whereby He works in governing creatures; and of this it is written (Jo. v. 17): *My Father worketh until now; and I work.* Hence we distinguish in Him a twofold judgment, but in the reverse order. One corresponds to the work of governance which cannot be without judgment: and by this judgment each one is judged individually according to his works, not only as adapted to himself, but also as adapted to the government of the universe. Hence one man's reward is delayed for the good of others (Heb. xi. 13, 39, 40), and the punishment of one conduces to the profit of another. Consequently it is necessary that there should be another, and that a general judgment corresponding on the other hand with the first formation of things in being, in order that, to wit, just as then all things proceeded immediately from

God, so at length the world will receive its ultimate complement, by each one receiving finally his own personal due. Hence at this judgment the Divine justice will be made manifest in all things, whereas now it remains hidden, for as much as at times some persons are dealt with for the profit of others, otherwise than their manifest works would seem to require. For this same reason there will then be a general separation of the good from the wicked, because there will be no further motive for the good to profit by the wicked, or the wicked by the good: for the sake of which profit the good are meanwhile mingled with the wicked, so long as this state of life is governed by Divine providence.

Reply Obj. 1. Each man is both an individual person and a part of the whole human race: wherefore a twofold judgment is due to him. One, the particular judgment, is that to which he will be subjected after death, when he will receive according as he hath done in the body*, not indeed entirely but only in part, since he will receive not in the body but only in the soul. The other judgment will be passed on him as a part of the human race: thus a man is said to be judged according to human justice, even when judgment is pronounced on the community of which he is a part. Hence at the general judgment of the whole human race by the general separation of the good from the wicked, it follows that each one will be judged. And yet God will not judge *the same thing a second time*, since He will not inflict two punishments for one sin, and the punishment which before the judgment was not inflicted completely will be completed at the last judgment, after which the wicked will be tormented at the same time in body and soul.

Reply Obj. 2. The sentence proper to this general judgment is the general separation of the good from the wicked, which will not precede this judgment. Yet even now, as regards the particular sentence on each individual, the judgment does not at once take full effect, since even the good will receive an increase of reward after the judgment,

* Cf. 2 Cor. v. 10.

both from the added glory of the body and from the completion of the number of the saints. The wicked also will receive an increase of torment from the added punishment of the body and from the completion of the number of damned to be punished, because the more numerous those with whom they will burn, the more will they themselves burn.

Reply Obj. 3. The general judgment will regard more directly the generality of men than each individual to be judged, as stated above. Wherefore although before that judgment each one will be certain of his condemnation or reward, he will not be cognizant of the condemnation or reward of everyone else. Hence the necessity of the general judgment.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE JUDGMENT WILL TAKE PLACE BY WORD
OF MOUTH ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that this judgment, as regards the inquiry and sentence, will take place by word of mouth. For according to Augustine (*De Civ. Dei*, xx.) *it is uncertain how many days this judgment will last.* But it would not be uncertain if the things we are told will take place at the judgment were to be accomplished only in the mind. Therefore this judgment will take place by word of mouth and not only in the mind.

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says (*Moral.* xxvi.): *Those at least will hear the words of the Judge, who have confessed their faith in Him by words.* Now this cannot be understood as referring to the inner word, because thus all will hear the Judge's words, since all the deeds of other men will be known to all both good and wicked. Therefore it seems that this judgment will take place by word of mouth.

Obj. 3. Further, Christ will judge according to His human form, so as to be visible in the body to all. Therefore in like manner it seems that He will speak with the voice of the body, so as to be heard by all.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei*, xx.) that the book of life which is mentioned Apoc. xx. 12, 15 is a kind of Divine energy enabling each one to remember all his good or evil works, and to discern them with the gaze of the mind, with wondrous rapidity, his knowledge accusing or defending his conscience, so that all and each will be judged at the same moment. But if each one's merits were discussed by word of mouth, all and each could not be judged at the same moment. Therefore it would seem that this judgment will not take place by word of mouth.

Further, The sentence should correspond proportionately to the evidence. Now the evidence both of accusation and of defence will be mental, according to Rom. ii. 15, 16, *Their conscience bearing witness to them, and their thoughts between themselves accusing or also defending one another in the day when God shall judge the secrets of men.* Therefore, seemingly, this sentence and the entire judgment will take place mentally.

I answer that, It is not possible to come to any certain conclusion about the truth of this question. It is, however, the more probable opinion that the whole of this judgment, whether as regards the inquiry, or as regards the accusation of the wicked and the approval of the good, or again as regards the sentence on both, will take place mentally. For if the deeds of each individual were to be related by word of mouth, this would require an inconceivable length of time. Thus Augustine says (*loc. cit.*) that *if we suppose the book, from the pages of which all will be judged according to Apoc. xx., to be a material book, who will be able to conceive its size and length? or the length of time required for the reading of a book that contains the entire life of every individual?* Nor is less time requisite for telling by word of mouth the deeds of each individual, than for reading them if they were written in a material book. Hence, probably we should understand that the details set forth in Matth. xxv. will be fulfilled not by word of mouth but mentally.

Reply Obj. 1. The reason why Augustine says that *it is uncertain how many days this judgment will last* is precisely

because it is not certain whether it will take place mentally or by word of mouth. For if it were to take place by word of mouth, a considerable time would be necessary; but if mentally, it is possible for it to be accomplished in an instant.

Reply Obj. 2. Even if the judgment is accomplished solely in the mind, the saying of Gregory stands, since though all will be cognizant of their own and of others' deeds, as a result of the Divine energy which the Gospel describes as speech (Matth. xxv. 34-46), nevertheless those who have had the faith which they received through God's words will be judged from those very words, for it is written (Rom. ii. 12): *Whosoever have sinned in the Law shall be judged by the Law.* Hence in a special way something will be said to those who had been believers, which will not be said to unbelievers.

Reply Obj. 3. Christ will appear in body, so that the Judge may be recognized in the body by all, and it is possible for this to take place suddenly. But speech which is measured by time would require an immense length of time, if the judgment took place by word of mouth.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE TIME OF THE FUTURE JUDGMENT IS UNKNOWN ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the time of the future judgment is not unknown. For just as the holy Fathers looked forward to the first coming, so do we look forward to the second. But the holy Fathers knew the time of the first coming, as proved by the number of weeks mentioned in Dan. ix.: wherefore the Jews are reproached for not knowing the time of Christ's coming (Luke xii. 56): *You hypocrites, you know how to discern the face of the heaven and of the earth, but how is it that you do not discern this time?* Therefore it would seem that the time of the second coming when God will come to judgment should also be certified to us.

Obj. 2. Further, We arrive by means of signs at the knowledge of the things signified. Now many signs of the coming judgment are declared to us in Scripture (Matth. xxiv., Mark xiii., Luke xxi.). Therefore we can arrive at the knowledge of that time.

Obj. 3. Further, The Apostle says (1 Cor. x. 11): *It is on us* that the ends of the world are come*, and (1 Jo. ii. 18): *Little children, it is the last hour*, etc. Since then it is a long time since these things were said, it would seem that now at least we can know that the last judgment is nigh.

Obj. 4. Further, There is no need for the time of the judgment to be hidden, except that each one may be careful to prepare himself for judgment, being in ignorance of the appointed time. Yet the same care would still be necessary even were the time known for certain, because each one is uncertain about the time of his death, of which Augustine says (*Ep. ad Hesych.* cxcix.) that *as each one's last day finds him, so will the world's last day find him*. Therefore there is no necessity for the time of the judgment to be uncertain.

On the contrary, It is written (Mark xiii. 32): *Of that day or hour no man knoweth, neither the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but the Father*. The Son, however, is said not to know in so far as He does not impart the knowledge to us.

Further, It is written (1 Thess. v. 2): *The day of the Lord shall so come as a thief in the night*. Therefore seemingly, as the coming of a thief in the night is altogether uncertain, the day of the last judgment is altogether uncertain.

I answer that, God is the cause of things by His knowledge.† Now He communicates both these things to His creatures, since He both endows some with the power of action on others whereof they are the cause, and bestows on some the knowledge of things. But in both cases He reserves something to Himself, for He operates certain things wherein no creature co-operates with Him, and again He knows certain things which are unknown to any

* *These things . . . are written for our correction, upon whom the ends of the world are come.*

† Cf. P. I., Q. XIV., A. 8.

mere creature. Now this should apply to none more than to those things which are subject to the Divine power alone, and in which no creature co-operates with Him. Such is the end of the world when the day of judgment will come. For the world will come to an end by no created cause, even as it derived its existence immediately from God. Wherefore the knowledge of the end of the world is fittingly reserved to God. Indeed our Lord seems to assign this very reason when He said (Acts i. 7): *It is not for you to know the times or moments which the Father hath put in His own power*, as though He were to say, *which are reserved to His power alone*.

Reply Obj. 1. At His first coming Christ came secretly according to Isa. xlv. 15, *Verily Thou art a hidden God, the God of Israel, the Saviour*. Hence, that He might be recognized by believers, it was necessary for the time to be fixed beforehand with certainty. On the other hand, at the second coming, He will come openly, according to Ps. xlix. 3, *God shall come manifestly*. Consequently there can be no error affecting the knowledge of His coming. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says, in his letter to Hesychius concerning the day of judgment (*Ep. cxcix.*), *the signs mentioned in the Gospels do not all refer to the second advent which will happen at the end of the world, but some of them belong to the time of the sack of Jerusalem, which is now a thing of the past, while some, in fact many of them, refer to the advent whereby He comes daily to the Church, whom He visits spiritually when He dwells in us by faith and love*. Moreover, the details mentioned in the Gospels and Epistles in connexion with the last advent are not sufficient to enable us to determine the time of the judgment, for the trials that are foretold as announcing the proximity of Christ's coming occurred even at the time of the Early Church, in a degree sometimes more sometimes less marked; so that even the days of the apostles were called the last days (Acts ii. 17) when Peter expounded the saying of Joel ii. 28, *It shall come to pass in the last days*, etc., as referring to that time. Yet it was already a long time since then: and sometimes there were more and some-

times less afflictions in the Church. Consequently it is impossible to decide after how long a time it will take place, nor fix the month, year, century, or thousand years as Augustine says in the same book (*loc. cit.*). And even if we are to believe that at the end these calamities will be more frequent, it is impossible to fix what amount of such calamities will immediately precede the judgment day or the coming of Antichrist, since even at the time of the Early Church persecutions were so bitter, and the corruptions of error were so numerous, that some looked forward to the coming of Antichrist as being near or imminent; as related in Eusebius' *History of the Church* (vi. 6) and in Jerome's book *De Viris Illustribus* (Cap. *Judex de septuaginta*).

Reply Obj. 3. The statement, *It is the last hour* and similar expressions that are to be found in Scripture do not enable us to know the exact length of time. For they are not intended to indicate a short length of time, but to signify the last state of the world, which is the last age of all, and it is not stated definitely how long this will last. Thus neither is fixed duration appointed to old age, which is the last age of man, since sometimes it is seen to last as long as or even longer than all the previous ages, as Augustine remarks (*Qq. 83, qu. lviii.*). Hence also the Apostle (2 Thess. ii. 2) disclaims the false signification which some had given to his words, by believing that the day of the Lord was already at hand.

Reply Obj. 4. Notwithstanding the uncertainty of death, the uncertainty of the judgment conduces to watchfulness in two ways. First, as regards the thing ignored, since its delay is equal to the length of man's life, so that on either side uncertainty provokes him to greater care. Secondly, for the reason that a man is careful not only of his own person, but also of his family, or of his city or kingdom, or of the whole Church, the length of whose duration is not dependent on the length of man's life. And yet it behoves each of these to be so ordered that the day of the Lord find us not unprepared.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE JUDGMENT WILL TAKE PLACE IN THE VALLEY
OF JOSAPHAT ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the judgment will not take place in the valley of Josaphat or in the surrounding locality. For at least it will be necessary for those to be judged to stand on the ground, and those alone to be raised aloft whose business it will be to judge. But the whole land of promise would not be able to contain the multitude of those who are to be judged. Therefore it is impossible for the judgment to take place in the neighbourhood of that valley.

Obj. 2. Further, To Christ in His human form judgment is given that He may judge justly, since He was judged unjustly in the court of Pilate, and bore the sentence of an unjust judgment on Golgotha. Therefore these places would be more suitably appointed for the judgment.

Obj. 3. Further, Clouds result from the exhalation of vapours. But then there will be no evaporation or exhalation. Therefore it will be impossible for the just to be *taken up . . . in the clouds to meet Christ, into the air* : and consequently it will be necessary for both good and wicked to be on the earth, so that a much larger place than this valley will be required.

On the contrary, It is written (Joel iii. 2): *I will gather together all nations and will bring them down into the valley of Josaphat, and I will plead with them there.*

Further, It is written (Acts i. 11): *(This Jesus) . . . shall so come as you have seen Him going into heaven.* Now He ascended into heaven from Mount Olivet which overlooks the valley of Josaphat. Therefore He will come to judge in the neighbourhood of that place.

I answer that, We cannot know with any great certainty the manner in which this judgment will take place, nor how men will gather together to the place of judgment; but it may be gathered from Scripture that in all probability He will descend in the neighbourhood of Mount Olivet, even as

He ascended from there, so as to show that He who descends is the same as He who ascended.

Reply Obj. 1. A great multitude can be enclosed in a small space. And all that is required is that in the neighbourhood of that locality there be a space, however great, to contain the multitude of those who are to be judged, provided that Christ can be seen thence, since being raised in the air, and shining with exceeding glory, He will be visible from a great distance.

Reply Obj. 2. Although through being sentenced unjustly Christ merited His judiciary power, He will not judge with the appearance of infirmity wherein He was judged unjustly, but under the appearance of glory wherein He ascended to the Father. Hence the place of His ascension is more suitable to the judgment than the place where He was condemned.

Reply Obj. 3. In the opinion of some the name of clouds is here given to certain condensations of the light shining from the bodies of the saints, and not to evaporations from earth and water. Or we may say that those clouds will be produced by Divine power in order to show the parallel between His coming to judge and His ascension; so that He Who ascended in a cloud may come to judgment in a cloud.

Again the cloud on account of its refreshing influence indicates the mercy of the Judge.

QUESTION LXXXIX.

OF THOSE WHO WILL JUDGE AND OF THOSE WHO
WILL BE JUDGED AT THE GENERAL JUDGMENT.

(In Eight Articles.)

WE must next consider who will judge and who will be judged at the general judgment. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether any men will judge together with Christ? (2) Whether the judicial power corresponds to voluntary poverty? (3) Whether the angels also will judge? (4) Whether the demons will carry out the Judge's sentence on the damned? (5) Whether all men will come up for judgment? (6) Whether any of the good will be judged? (7) Whether any of the wicked will be judged? (8) Whether the angels also will be judged?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANY MEN WILL JUDGE TOGETHER WITH CHRIST?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that no men will judge with Christ. For it is written (Jo. v. 22, 23): *The Father . . . hath given all judgment to the Son, that all men may honour the Son.* Therefore, etc.

Obj. 2. Further, Whoever judges has authority over that which he judges. Now those things about which the coming judgment will have to be, such as human merits and demerits, are subject to Divine authority alone. Therefore no one is competent to judge of those things.

Obj. 3. Further, This judgment will take place not vocally but mentally. Now the publication of merits and demerits

in the hearts of all men (which is like an accusation or approval), or the repayment of punishment and reward (which is like the pronouncement of the sentence) will be the work of God alone. Therefore none but Christ Who is God will judge.

On the contrary, It is written (Matth. xix. 28): *You also shall sit on twelve seats judging the twelve tribes of Israel.* Therefore, etc.

Further, *The Lord will enter into judgment with the ancients of His people* (Isa. iii. 14). Therefore it would seem that others also will judge together with Christ.

I answer that, To judge has several significations. First it is used causally as it were, when we say it of that which proves that some person ought to be judged. In this sense the expression is used of certain people in comparison, in so far as some are shown to be deserving of judgment through being compared with others: for instance (Matth. xii. 41): *The men of Nineve shall rise in judgment with this generation, and shall condemn it.* To rise in judgment thus is common to the good and the wicked. Secondly, the expression *to judge* is used equivalently, so to say; for consent to an action is considered equivalent to doing it. Wherefore those who will consent with Christ the Judge, by approving His sentence, will be said to judge. In this sense it will belong to all the elect to judge: wherefore it is written (Wis. iii. 7, 8): *The just . . . shall judge nations.* Thirdly, a person is said to judge assessorially and by similitude, because he is like the judge in that his seat* is raised above the others: and thus assessors are said to judge. Some say that the perfect to whom judiciary power is promised (Matth. xix. 28) will judge in this sense, namely that they will be raised to the dignity of assessors, because they will appear above others at the judgment, and go forth *to meet Christ, into the air.* But this apparently does not suffice for the fulfilment of our Lord's promise (*ibid.*): *You shall sit . . . judging*, for He would seem to make *judging* something additional to *sitting*. Hence there

* An assessor is one who *sits by* the judge.

is a fourth way of judging, which will be competent to perfect men as containing the decrees of Divine justice according to which men will be judged: thus a book containing the law might be said to judge: wherefore it is written (Apoc. xx. 12): (*Judgment took her seat*)* and the books were opened. Richard of S. Victor expounds this judging in this way (*De judic. potest.*), wherefore he says: *Those who persevere in Divine contemplation, who read every day the book of wisdom, transcribe, so to speak, in their hearts whatever they grasp by their clear insight of the truth; and further on: What else are the hearts of those who judge, divinely instructed in all truth, but a codex of the law?* Since, however, judging denotes an action exercised on another person, it follows that, properly speaking, he is said to judge who pronounces judgment on another. But this happens in two ways. First, by his own authority: and this belongs to the one who has dominion and power over others, and to whose ruling those who are judged are subject, wherefore it belongs to him to pass judgment on them. In this sense to judge belongs to God alone. Secondly, to judge is to acquaint others of the sentence delivered by another's authority, that is to announce the verdict already given. In this way perfect men will judge, because they will lead others to the knowledge of Divine justice, that these may know what is due to them on account of their merits: so that this very revelation of justice is called judgment. Hence Richard of S. Victor says (*loc. cit.*) that for the judges to open the books of their decree in the presence of those who are to be judged signifies that they open their hearts to the gaze of all those who are below them, and that they reveal their knowledge in whatever pertains to the judgment.

Reply Obj. 1. This objection considers the judgment of authority which belongs to Christ alone: and the same answer applies to the *Second Objection*.

Reply Obj. 3. There is no reason why some of the saints

* The words in brackets are not in the Vulgate. Verse 4 we find: *I saw seats, and they sat upon them and judgment was given to them.*

should not reveal certain things to others, either by way of enlightenment, as the higher angels enlighten the lower,* or by way of speech as the lower angels speak to the higher.†

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE JUDICIAL POWER CORRESPONDS TO VOLUNTARY POVERTY?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the judicial power does not correspond to voluntary poverty. For it was promised to none but the twelve apostles (Matth. xix. 28): *You shall sit on twelve seats, judging*, etc. Since then those who are voluntarily poor are not all apostles, it would seem that the judicial power is not competent to all.

Obj. 2. Further, To offer sacrifice to God of one's own body is more than to do so of outward things. Now martyrs and also virgins offer sacrifice to God of their own body; whereas the voluntarily poor offer sacrifice of outward things. Therefore the sublimity of the judicial power is more in keeping with martyrs and virgins than with those who are voluntarily poor.

Obj. 3. Further, It is written (Jo. v. 45): *There is one that accuseth you, Moses in whom you trust:—because you believe not his voice*, according to a gloss, and (*ibid.* xii. 48): *The word that I have spoken shall judge him in the last day*. Therefore the fact that a man propounds a law, or exhorts men by word to lead a good life, gives him the right to judge those who scorn his utterances. But this belongs to doctors. Therefore it is more competent to doctors than to those who are poor voluntarily.

Obj. 4. Further, Christ through being judged unjustly merited as man to be judge of all in His human nature,‡ according to Jo. v. 27, *He hath given Him power to do judgment, because He is the Son of man*. Now those who suffer persecution for justice' sake are judged unjustly.

* Cf. P. I., Q. CVI.

† Cf. P. I., Q. CVII., A. 2.

‡ Cf. P. III., Q. LIX., A. 6.

Therefore the judicial power is competent to them rather than to the voluntarily poor.

Obj. 5. Further, A superior is not judged by his inferior. Now many who will have made lawful use of riches will have greater merit than many of the voluntarily poor. Therefore the voluntarily poor will not judge where those are to be judged.

On the contrary, It is written (Job xxxvi. 6): *He saveth not the wicked, and He giveth judgment to the poor.*

Further, A gloss on Matth. xix. 28, *You who have left all things** says: *Those who left all things and followed God will be the judges; those who made right use of what they had lawfully will be judged*, and thus the same conclusion follows as before.

I answer that, The judicial power is due especially to poverty on three counts. First, by reason of congruity, since voluntary poverty belongs to those who despise all the things of the world and cleave to Christ alone. Consequently there is nothing in them to turn away their judgment from justice, so that they are rendered competent to be judges as loving the truth of justice above all things. Secondly, by reason of merit, since exaltation corresponds by way of merit to humility. Now of all the things that make man contemptible in this world humility is the chief: and for this reason the excellence of judicial power is promised to the poor, so that he who humbles himself for Christ's sake shall be exalted. Thirdly, because poverty disposes a man to the aforesaid manner of judging. For the reason why one of the saints will be said to judge, as stated above (A. 1), is that he will have the heart instructed in all Divine truth which he will be thus able to make known to others. Now in the advancement to perfection, the first thing that occurs to be renounced is external wealth, because this is the last thing of all to be acquired. And that which is last in the order of generation is the first in the order of destruction: wherefore among the beatitudes whereby we advance to perfection, the first place is given to poverty.

* Vulg.,—*You who have followed Me.*

Thus judicial power corresponds to poverty, in so far as this is the first disposition to the aforesaid perfection. Hence also it is that this same power is not promised to all who are voluntarily poor, but to those who leave all and follow Christ in accordance with the perfection of life.

Reply Obj. 1. According to Augustine (*De Civ. Dei*, xx.), we must not imagine that because He says that they will sit on twelve seats, only twelve men will judge with Him; else since we read that Matthias was appointed apostle in the place of the traitor Judas, Paul who worked more than the rest will have nowhere to sit as judge. Hence the number twelve, as he states (*ibid.*), signifies the whole multitude of those who will judge, because the two parts of seven, namely three and four, being multiplied together make twelve. Moreover twelve is a perfect number, being the double of six, which is a perfect number.

Or, speaking literally, He spoke to the twelve apostles in whose person he made this promise to all who follow them.

Reply Obj. 2. Virginity and martyrdom do not dispose man to retain the precepts of Divine justice in his heart in the same degree as poverty does: even so, on the other hand, outward riches choke the word of God by the cares which they entail (Luke viii. 14). Or we may reply that poverty does not suffice alone to merit judicial power, but is the fundamental part of that perfection to which the judicial power corresponds. Wherefore among those things regarding perfection which follow after poverty we may reckon both virginity and martyrdom and all the works of perfection: yet they do not rank as high as poverty, since the beginning of a thing is its chief part.

Reply Obj. 3. He who propounded the law or urged men to good will judge, in the causal* sense, because others will be judged in reference to the words he has uttered or propounded. Hence the judicial power does not properly correspond to preaching or teaching. Or we may reply that, as some say, three things are requisite for the judicial power: first that one renounce temporal cares, lest the mind be

* Cf. A. 1.

hindered from the contemplation of wisdom; secondly that one possess Divine justice by way of habit both as to knowledge and as to observance; thirdly that one should have taught others this same justice; and this teaching will be the perfection whereby a man merits to have judicial power.

Reply Obj. 4. Christ humbled Himself in that He was judged unjustly; for *He was offered because it was His own will* (Isa. liii. 7): and by His humility He merited His exaltation to judicial power, since all things are made subject to Him (Philip. ii. 8, 9). Hence, judicial power is more due to them who humble themselves of their own will by renouncing temporal goods, on account of which men are honoured by worldlings, than to those who are humbled by others.

Reply Obj. 5. An inferior cannot judge a superior by his own authority, but he can do so by the authority of a superior, as in the case of a judge-delegate. Hence it is not unfitting that it be granted to the poor as an accidental reward to judge others, even those who have higher merit in respect of the essential reward.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ANGELS WILL JUDGE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the angels will judge. For it is written (Matth. xxv. 81): *When the Son of man shall come in His majesty, and all the angels with Him.* Now He is speaking of His coming to judgment. Therefore it would seem that also the angels will judge.

Obj. 2. Further, The orders of the angels take their names from the offices which they fulfil. Now one of the angelic orders is that of the Thrones, which would seem to pertain to the judicial power, since a throne is the *judicial bench, a royal seat, a professor's chair*.* Therefore some of the angels will judge.

Obj. 3. Further, Equality with the angels is promised the

* S. Isidore, *Etym.* vii. 5.

saints after this life (Matth. xxii. 30). If then men will have this power of judging, much more will the angels have it.

On the contrary, It is written (Jo. v. 27): *He hath given Him power to do judgment, because He is the Son of man.* But the angels have not the human nature in common with Him. Neither therefore do they share with Him in the judicial power.

Further, The same person is not judge and judge's minister. Now in this judgment the angels will act as ministers of the Judge and, according to Matth. xiii. 41: *The Son of man shall send His angels and they shall gather out of His kingdom all scandals.* Therefore the angels will not judge.

I answer that, The judge's assessors must be conformed to the judge. Now judgment is ascribed to the Son of man because He will appear to all, both good and wicked, in His human nature, although the whole Trinity will judge by authority. Consequently it behoves also the Judge's assessors to have the human nature, so as to be visible to all, both good and wicked. Hence it is not fitting for the angels to judge, although in a certain sense we may say that the angels will judge, namely by approving the sentence.*

Reply Obj. 1. As a gloss on this passage observes, the angels will come with Christ, not to judge, but *as witnesses of men's deeds, because it was under their guardianship that men did well or ill.*

Reply Obj. 2. The name of Thrones is given to angels in reference to the judgment which God is ever pronouncing, by governing all things with supreme justice: of which judgment angels are in a way the executors and promulgators. On the other hand, the judgment of men by the man Christ will require human assessors.

Reply Obj. 3. Equality with angels is promised to men as regards the essential reward. But nothing hinders an accidental reward from being bestowed on men to the exclusion of the angels, as in the case of the virgins' and martyrs' crowns: and the same may be said of the judicial power.

* Cf. A. 1.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE DEMONS WILL CARRY OUT THE SENTENCE
OF THE JUDGE ON THE DAMNED ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the demons will not carry out the sentence of the Judge on the damned after the day of judgment. For, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. xv. 24): *He will then bring to nought* all principality, and power, and virtue.* Therefore all supremacy will cease then. But the carrying out of the Judge's sentence implies some kind of supremacy. Therefore after the judgment day the demons will not carry out the Judge's sentence.

Obj. 2. Further, The demons sinned more grievously than men. Therefore it is not just that men should be tortured by demons.

Obj. 3. Further, Just as the demons suggest evil things to men, so good angels suggest good things. Now it will not be the duty of the good angels to reward the good, but this will be done by God, immediately by Himself. Therefore neither will it be the duty of the demons to punish the wicked.

On the contrary, Sinners have subjected themselves to the devil by sinning. Therefore it is just that they should be subjected to him in their punishments, and punished by him as it were.

I answer that, The Master in the text of iv. *Sent. D. 47* mentions two opinions on this question, both of which seem consistent with Divine justice, because it is just for man to be subjected to the devil for having sinned, and yet it is unjust for the demon to be over him. Accordingly the opinion which holds that after the judgment day the demons will not be placed over men to punish them, regards the order of Divine justice on the part of the demons punishing; while the contrary opinion regards the order of Divine justice on the part of the men punished.

Which of these opinions is nearer the truth we cannot

* Vulg.,—*When He shall have brought to nought, etc.*

know for certain. Yet I think it truer to say that just as, among the saved, order will be observed so that some will be enlightened and perfected by others (because all the orders of the heavenly hierarchies will continue for ever),* so, too, will order be observed in punishments, men being punished by demons, lest the Divine order, whereby the angels are placed between the human nature and the Divine, be entirely set aside. Wherefore just as the Divine illuminations are conveyed to men by the good angels, so too the demons execute the Divine justice on the wicked. Nor does this in any way diminish the punishment of the demons, since even in torturing others they are themselves tortured, because then the fellowship of the unhappy will not lessen but will increase unhappiness.

Reply Obj. 1. The supremacy which, it is declared, will be brought to nought by Christ in the time to come must be taken in the sense of the supremacy which is in keeping with the state of this world: wherein men are placed over men, angels over men, angels over angels, demons over demons, and demons over men; in every case so as either to lead towards the end or to lead astray from the end. But then, when all things will have attained to that end, there will be no supremacy to lead astray from the end or to lead to it, but only that which maintains in the end, good or evil.

Reply Obj. 2. Although the demerit of the demons does not require that they be placed over men, since they made men subject to them unjustly, yet this is required by the order of their nature in relation to human nature: since *natural goods remain in them unimpaired* as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. iv.*).

Reply Obj. 3. The good angels are not the cause of the principal reward in the elect, because all receive this immediately from God. Nevertheless the angels are the cause of certain accidental rewards in men, in so far as the higher angels enlighten those beneath them, both angels and men, concerning certain hidden things of God, which do not

* Cf. P. I., Q. CVIII., AA. 7, 8.

belong to the essence of beatitude. In like manner the damned will receive their principal punishment immediately from God, namely the everlasting banishment from the Divine vision: but there is no reason why the demons should not torture men with other sensible punishments. There is, however, this difference: that merit exalts, whereas sin debases. Wherefore since the angelic nature is higher than the human, some on account of the excellence of their merit will be so far exalted as to be raised above the angels both in nature and reward,* so that some angels will be enlightened by some men. On the other hand, no human sinners will, on account of a certain degree of virtue, attain to the eminence that attaches to the nature of the demons.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL MEN WILL BE PRESENT AT THE JUDGMENT ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that men will not all be present at the judgment. For it is written (Matth. xix. 28): *You . . . shall sit on twelve seats, judging the twelve tribes of Israel.* But all men do not belong to those twelve tribes. Therefore it would seem that men will not all be present at the judgment.

Obj. 2. Further, The same apparently is to be gathered from Ps. i. 5, *The wicked shall not rise again in judgment.*

Obj. 3. Further, A man is brought to judgment that his merits may be discussed. But some there are who have acquired no merits, such as children who died before reaching the perfect age. Therefore they need not be present at the judgment. Now there are many such. Therefore it would seem that not all will be present.

On the contrary, It is written (Acts x. 42) that Christ *was appointed by God to be judge of the living and of the dead.* Now this division comprises all men, no matter how the

* Cf. P. I., Q. CVIII., A. 8.

living be distinct from the dead. Therefore all men will be present at the judgment.

Further, It is written (Apoc. i. 7): *Behold He cometh with the clouds, and every eye shall see Him.* Now this would not be so unless all were present at the judgment. Therefore, etc.

I answer that, The judicial power was bestowed on Christ as man, in reward for the humility which He showed forth in His passion. Now in His passion He shed His blood for all in point of sufficiency, although through meeting with an obstacle in some, it had not its effect in all. Therefore it is fitting that all men should assemble at the judgment, to see His exaltation in His human nature, in respect of which *He was appointed by God to be judge of the living and of the dead.*

Reply Obj. 1. As Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei*, xx. 5), *it does not follow from the saying, 'Judging the twelve tribes of Israel,' that the tribe of Levi, which is the thirteenth, is not to be judged, or that they will judge that people alone, and not other nations.* The reason why all other nations are denoted by the twelve tribes is because they were called by Christ to take the place of the twelve tribes.

Reply Obj. 2. The words, *The wicked shall not rise in judgment*, if referred to all sinners, mean that they will not arise to judge. But if the wicked denote unbelievers, the sense is that they will not arise to be judged, because they are *already judged* (Jo. iii. 18). All, however, will rise again to assemble at the judgment and witness the glory of the Judge.

Reply Obj. 3. Even children who have died before reaching the perfect age will be present at the judgment, not to be judged, but to see the Judge's glory.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE GOOD WILL BE JUDGED AT THE JUDGMENT?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that none of the good will be judged at the judgment. For it is declared (Jo. iii. 18) that

he that believeth in Him is not judged. Now all the good believed in Him. Therefore they will not be judged.

Obj. 2. Further, Those who are uncertain of their bliss are not blessed: whence Augustine proves (*Gen. ad Lit.* xi.) that the demons were never blessed. But the saints are now blessed. Therefore they are certain of their bliss. Now what is certain is not submitted to judgment. Therefore the good will not be judged.

Obj. 3. Further, Fear is incompatible with bliss. But the last judgment, which above all is described as terrible, cannot take place without inspiring fear into those who are to be judged. Hence Gregory observes on Job. xli. 16 *When he shall raise him up, the angels shall fear*, etc. (*Moral.* xxxiv.): *Consider how the conscience of the wicked will then be troubled, when even the just are disturbed about their life.* Therefore the blessed will not be judged.

On the contrary, It would seem that all the good will be judged, since it is written (2 Cor. v. 10): *We must all be manifested before the judgment seat of Christ, that every one may receive the proper things of the body, according as he hath done, whether it be good or evil.* Now there is nothing else to be judged. Therefore all, even the good, will be judged.

Further, The *general* includes all. Now this is called the general judgment. Therefore all will be judged.

I answer that, The judgment comprises two things, namely the discussion of merits and the payment of rewards. As regards the payment of rewards, all will be judged, even the good, since the Divine sentence will appoint to each one the reward corresponding to his merit. But there is no discussion of merits save where good and evil merits are mingled together. Now those who build on the foundation of faith, *gold, silver, and precious stones* (1 Cor. iii. 12), by devoting themselves wholly to the Divine service, and who have no notable admixture of evil merit, are not subjected to a discussion of their merits. Such are those who have entirely renounced the things of the world and are solicitously thoughtful of the things that are of God: wherefore they will be saved but will not be judged. Others, however, build on the founda-

tion of faith, wood, hay, stubble*; they, in fact, love worldly things and are busy about earthly concerns, yet so as to prefer nothing to Christ, but strive to redeem their sins with alms, and these have an admixture of good with evil merits. Hence they are subjected to a discussion of their merits, and consequently in this account will be judged, and yet they will be saved.

Reply Obj. 1. Since punishment is the effect of justice, while reward is the effect of mercy, it follows that punishment is more especially ascribed antonomastically to judgment which is the act of justice; so that judgment is sometimes used to express condemnation. It is thus that we are to understand the words quoted, as a gloss on the passage remarks.

Reply Obj. 2. The merits of the elect will be discussed, not to remove the uncertainty of their beatitude from the hearts of those who are to be judged, but that it may be made manifest to us that their good merits outweigh their evil merits, and thus God's justice be proved.

Reply Obj. 3. Gregory is speaking of the just who will still be in mortal flesh, wherefore he had already said: *Those who will still be in the body, although already brave and perfect, yet through being still in the flesh must needs be troubled with fear in the midst of such a whirlwind of terror.* Hence it is clear that this fear refers to the time immediately before the judgment, most terrible indeed to the wicked, but not to the good, who will have no apprehension of evil.

The arguments in the contrary sense consider judgment as regards the payment of rewards.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WICKED WILL BE JUDGED?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that none of the wicked will be judged. For even as damnation is certain in the case of unbelievers, so is it in the case of those who die in mortal

* Cf. I.-II., Q. LXXXIX., A. 2.

sin. Now it is declared because of the certainty of damnation (Jo. iii. 18): *He that believeth not is already judged.* Therefore in like manner neither will other sinners be judged.

Obj. 2. Further, The voice of the Judge is most terrible to those who are condemned by His judgment. Now according to the text of iv. *Sent. D. 47* and in the words of Gregory (*Moral. xxvi.*) *the Judge will not address Himself to unbelievers.* If therefore He were to address Himself to the believers about to be condemned, the unbelievers would reap a benefit from their unbelief, which is absurd.

On the contrary, It would seem that all the wicked are to be judged, because all the wicked will be sentenced to punishment according to the degree of their guilt. But this cannot be done without a judicial pronouncement. Therefore all the wicked will be judged.

I answer that, The judgment as regards the sentencing to punishment for sin concerns all the wicked; whereas the judgment as regards the discussion of merits concerns only believers. Because in unbelievers the foundation of faith is lacking, without which all subsequent works are deprived of the perfection of a right intention, so that in them there is no admixture of good and evil works or merits requiring discussion. But believers in whom the foundation of faith remains, have at least a praiseworthy act of faith, which though it is not meritorious without charity, yet is in itself directed to merit, and consequently they will be subjected to the discussion of merits. Consequently, believers who were at least counted as citizens of the City of God will be judged as citizens, and sentence of death will not be passed on them without a discussion of their merits; whereas unbelievers will be condemned as foes, who are wont among men to be exterminated without their merits being discussed.

Reply Obj. 1. Although it is certain that those who die in mortal sin will be damned, nevertheless since they have an admixture of certain things connected with meriting well, it behoves, for the manifestation of Divine justice, that their merits be subjected to discussion, in order to make it clear

that they are justly banished from the city of the saints, of which they appeared outwardly to be citizens.

Reply Obj. 2. Considered under this special aspect the words addressed to the believers about to be condemned will not be terrible, because they will reveal in them certain things pleasing to them, which it will be impossible to find in unbelievers, since *without faith it is impossible to please God* (Heb. xi. 6). But the sentence of condemnation which will be passed on them all will be terrible to all of them.

The argument in the contrary sense considered the judgment of retribution.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER AT THE COMING JUDGMENT THE ANGELS WILL BE JUDGED?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the angels will be judged at the coming judgment. For it is written (1 Cor. vi. 3): *Know you not that we shall judge angels?* But this cannot refer to the state of the present time. Therefore it should refer to the judgment to come.

Obj. 2. Further, It is written concerning Behemoth or Leviathan, whereby the devil is signified (Job xl. 28): *In the sight of all he shall be cast down*; and (Mark i. 24)* the demon cried out to Christ: *Why art Thou come to destroy us before the time?* for, according to a gloss, *the demons seeing our Lord on earth thought they were to be judged forthwith.* Therefore it would seem that a final judgment is in store for them.

Obj. 3. Further, It is written (2 Pet. ii. 4): *God spared not the angels that sinned, but delivered them drawn down by infernal ropes to the lower hell, unto torments, to be reserved unto judgment.* Therefore it seems that the angels will be judged.

On the contrary, It is written (Nahum i. 9) according to the Septuagint version: *God will not judge the same thing a*

* The reference should be Matth. viii. 29: *Art Thou come hither to torment us before the time?* The text of Mark reads: *Art Thou come to destroy us?*

second time. But the wicked angels are already judged, wherefore it is written (Jo. xvi. 11): *The prince of this world is already judged.* Therefore the angels will not be judged in the time to come.

Further, Goodness and wickedness are more perfect in the angels than in men who are wayfarers. Now some men, good and wicked, will not be judged as stated in the text of iv. *Sent. D.* 47. Therefore neither will good or wicked angels be judged.

I answer that, The judgment of discussion nowise concerns either the good or the wicked angels, since neither is any evil to be found in the good angels, nor is any good liable to judgment to be found in the wicked angels. But if we speak of the judgment of retribution, we must distinguish a twofold retribution. One corresponds to the angels' personal merits and was made to both from the beginning, when some were raised to bliss, and others plunged into the depths of woe. The other corresponds to the merits, good or evil, procured through the angels, and this retribution will be made in the judgment to come, because the good angels will have an increased joy in the salvation of those whom they have prompted to deeds of merit, while the wicked will have an increase of torment through the manifold downfall of those whom they have incited to evil deeds. Consequently the judgment will not regard the angels directly, neither as judging nor as judged, but only men; but it will regard the angels indirectly somewhat, in so far as they were concerned in men's deeds.

Reply Obj. 1. This saying of the Apostle refers to the judgment of comparison, because certain men will be found to be placed higher than the angels.

Reply Obj. 2. The demons will then be cast down in the sight of all because they will be imprisoned for ever in the dungeon of hell, so that they will no more be free to go out, since this was permitted to them only in so far as they were directed by Divine providence to try the life of man.

The same answer applies to the *Third Objection.*

QUESTION XC.

OF THE FORM OF THE JUDGE IN COMING TO THE
JUDGMENT.

(*In Three Articles.*)

WE must now consider the form of the Judge in coming to the judgment. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether Christ will judge under the form of His humanity? (2) Whether He will appear under the form of His glorified humanity? (3) Whether His Godhead can be seen without joy?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER CHRIST WILL JUDGE UNDER THE FORM OF
HIS HUMANITY?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ will not judge under the form of His humanity. For judgment requires authority in the judge. Now Christ has authority over the quick and the dead as God, for thus is He the Lord and Creator of all. Therefore He will judge under the form of His Godhead.

Obj. 2. Further, Invincible power is requisite in a judge; wherefore it is written (Eccles. vii. 6): *Seek not to be made a judge, unless thou have strength enough to extirpate iniquities.* Now invincible power belongs to Christ as God. Therefore He will judge under the form of the Godhead.

Obj. 3. Further, It is written (John v. 22, 23): *The Father . . . hath given all judgment to the Son, that all men may honour the Son, as they honour the Father.* Now equal honour to that of the Father is not due to the Son in respect

of His human nature. Therefore He will not judge under His human form.

Obj. 4. Further, It is written (Dan. vii. 9): *I beheld till thrones were placed and the Ancient of days sat.* Now the thrones signify judicial power, and God is called the Ancient by reason of His eternity, according to Dionysius (*Div. Nom. x.*). Therefore it becomes the Son to judge as being eternal; and consequently not as man.

Obj. 5. Further, Augustine says (*Tract. xix. in Joan.*) that *the resurrection of the soul is the work of the Word the Son of God, and the resurrection of the body is the work of the Word made the Son of man in the flesh.* Now that last judgment regards the soul rather than the body. Therefore it becomes Christ to judge as God rather than as man.

On the contrary, It is written (Jo. v. 27): *He hath given Him power to do judgment, because He is the Son of man.*

Further, It is written (Job xxxvi. 17): *Thy cause hath been judged as that of the wicked,—by Pilate according to a gloss—therefore, cause and judgment thou shalt recover,—that thou mayest judge justly,* according to the gloss. Now Christ was judged by Pilate with regard to His human nature. Therefore He will judge under the human nature.

Further, To Him it belongs to judge who made the law. Now Christ gave us the law of the Gospel while appearing in the human nature. Therefore He will judge under that same nature.

I answer that, Judgment requires a certain authority in the judge. Wherefore it is written (Rom. xiv. 4): *Who art thou that judgest another man's servant?* Hence it is becoming that Christ should judge in respect of His having authority over men to whom chiefly the last judgment will be directed. Now He is our Lord, not only by reason of the Creation, since *the Lord He is God, He made us and not we ourselves* (Ps. xcix. 3), but also by reason of the Redemption, which pertains to Him in respect of His human nature. Wherefore *to this end Christ died and rose again, that He might be Lord both of the dead and of the living* (Rom. xiv. 9). But the goods

of the Creation would not suffice us to obtain the reward of eternal life, without the addition of the boon of the Redemption, on account of the obstacle accruing to created nature through the sin of our first parent. Hence, since the last judgment is directed to the admission of some to the kingdom, and the exclusion of others therefrom, it is becoming that Christ should preside at that judgment under the form of His human nature, since it is by favour of that same nature's Redemption that man is admitted to the kingdom. In this sense it is stated (Acts x. 42) that *He . . . was appointed by God to be Judge of the living and of the dead*. And forasmuch as by redeeming mankind He restored not only man but all creatures without exception,—inasmuch as all creatures are bettered through man's restoration, according to Coloss. i. 20, *Making peace through the blood of His cross, both as to things on earth, and the things that are in heaven*,—it follows that through His Passion Christ merited lordship and judicial power not over man alone, but over all creatures, according to Matth. xxviii. 18, *All power is given to Me, in heaven and in earth*.*

Reply Obj. 1. Christ, in respect of His Divine nature, has authority of lordship over all creatures by right of creation; but in respect of His human nature He has authority of lordship merited through His Passion. The latter is secondary so to speak and acquired, while the former is natural and eternal.

Reply Obj. 2. Although Christ as man has not of Himself invincible power resulting from the natural power of the human species, nevertheless there is also in His human nature an invincible power derived from His Godhead, whereby all things are subjected under His feet (1 Cor. xv. 25-28; Heb. ii. 8, 9). Hence He will judge in His human nature indeed, but by the power of His Godhead.

Reply Obj. 3. Christ would not have sufficed for the redemption of mankind, had He been a mere man. Wherefore from the very fact that He was able as man to redeem mankind, and thereby obtained judicial power, it is evident that

* Cf. P. III., Q. LIX.

He is God, and consequently is to be honoured equally with the Father, not as man but as God.

Reply Obj. 4. In that vision of Daniel the whole order of the judicial power is clearly expressed. This power is in God Himself as its first origin, and more especially in the Father Who is the fount of the entire Godhead; wherefore it is stated in the first place that the *Ancient of days sat*. But the judicial power was transmitted from the Father to the Son, not only from eternity in respect of the Divine nature, but also in time in respect of the human nature wherein He merited it. Hence in the aforesaid vision it is further stated (*verses 13, 14*): *Lo, one like the Son of man came with the clouds of heaven, and He came even to the Ancient of days. . . . And He gave Him power and glory, and a kingdom.*

Reply Obj. 5. Augustine is speaking by a kind of appropriation, so as to trace the effects which Christ wrought in the human nature to causes somewhat similar to them. And since we are made to the image and likeness of God in respect of our soul, and are of the same species as the man Christ in respect of our body, he ascribes to the Godhead the effects wrought by Christ in our souls, and those which He wrought or will work in our bodies he ascribes to His flesh; although His flesh, as being the instrument of His Godhead, has also its effect on our souls as Damascene asserts (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 15), according to the saying of Heb. ix. 14, that His *blood hath cleansed our conscience from dead works*. And thus that *the Word was made flesh* is the cause of the resurrection of souls; wherefore also according to His human nature He is becomingly the Judge not only of bodily but also of spiritual goods.*

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER AT THE JUDGMENT CHRIST WILL APPEAR IN
HIS GLORIFIED HUMANITY ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that at the judgment Christ

* Cf. P. III., Q. LVI., A. 2, *ad 1.*

will not appear in His glorified humanity. For a gloss* on Jo. xix. 37, *They shall look on him whom they pierced*, says: *Because He will come in the flesh wherein He was crucified*. Now He was crucified in the form of weakness. Therefore He will appear in the form of weakness and not in the form of glory.

Obj. 2. Further, It is stated (Matth. xxiv. 30) that *the sign of the Son of man shall appear in heaven*, namely, *the sign of the cross*, as Chrysostom says (*Hom. lxxvii. in Matth.*), for *Christ when coming to the judgment will show not only the scars of His wounds but even His most shameful death*. Therefore it seems that He will not appear in the form of glory.

Obj. 3. Further, Christ will appear at the judgment under that form which can be gazed upon by all. Now Christ will not be visible to all, good and wicked, under the form of His glorified humanity: because the eye that is not glorified is seemingly unproportionate to see the clarity of a glorified body. Therefore He will not appear under a glorified form.

Obj. 4. Further, That which is promised as a reward to the righteous is not granted to the unrighteous. Now it is promised as a reward to the righteous that they shall see the glory of His humanity (Jo. x. 9): *He shall go in, and go out, and shall find pastures, i.e. refreshment in His Godhead and humanity*, according to the commentary of Augustine,† and Isa. xxxiii. 17: *His eyes shall see the King in his beauty*. Therefore He will not appear to all in His glorified form.

Obj. 5. Further, Christ will judge in the form wherein He was judged: wherefore a gloss‡ on Jo. v. 21, *So the Son also giveth life to whom He will*, says: *He will judge justly in the form wherein He was judged unjustly, that He may be visible to the wicked*. Now He was judged in the form of weakness. Therefore He will appear in the same form at the judgment.

* S. Augustine (*Tract. cxx. in Joan.*).

† *De Spiritu et Anima*, work of an unknown author. S. Thomas (*De Anima*) ascribes it to Alcherus, a Cistercian monk; see above, Q. LXX., A. 2, ad 1.

‡ S. Augustine (*Tract. xix. in Joan.*).

On the contrary, It is written (Luke xxi. 27): *Then they shall see the Son of man coming in a cloud with great power and majesty.* Now majesty and power pertain to glory. Therefore He will appear in the form of glory.

Further, He who judges should be more conspicuous than those who are judged. Now the elect who will be judged by Christ will have a glorified body. Much more therefore will the Judge appear in a glorified form.

Further, As to be judged pertains to weakness, so to judge pertains to authority and glory. Now at His first coming when Christ came to be judged, He appeared in the form of weakness. Therefore at the second coming, when He will come to judge, He will appear in the form of glory.

I answer that, Christ is called the mediator of God and men (1 Tim. ii. 5) inasmuch as He satisfies for men and intercedes for them to the Father, and confers on men things which belong to the Father, according to Jo. xvii. 22, *The glory which Thou hast given Me, I have given to them.* Accordingly then both these things belong to Him in that He communicates with both extremes: for in that He communicates with men, He takes their part with the Father, and in that He communicates with the Father, He bestows the Father's gifts on men. Since then at His first coming He came in order to make satisfaction for us to the Father, He came in the form of our weakness. But since at His second coming He will come in order to execute the Father's justice on men, He will have to show forth His glory which is in Him by reason of His communication with the Father: and therefore He will appear in the form of glory.

Reply Obj. 1. He will appear in the same flesh, but not under the same form.

Reply Obj. 2. The sign of the cross will appear at the judgment, to denote not a present but a past weakness: so as to show how justly those were condemned who scorned so great mercy, especially those who persecuted Christ unjustly. The scars which will appear in His body will not be due to weakness, but will indicate the exceeding power whereby Christ overcame His enemies by His Passion and

infirmity. He will also show forth His most shameful death, not by bringing it sensibly before the eye, as though He suffered it there; but by the things which will appear then, namely the signs of His past Passion, He will recall men to the thought of His past death.

Reply Obj. 3. A glorified body has it in its power to show itself or not to show itself to an eye that is not glorified, as stated above (Q. LXXXV., A. 2, *ad* 3). Hence Christ will be visible to all in His glorified form.

Reply Obj. 4. Even as our friend's glory gives us pleasure, so the glory and power of one we hate is most displeasing to us. Hence as the sight of the glory of Christ's humanity will be a reward to the righteous, so will it be a torment to Christ's enemies: wherefore it is written (Isa. xxvi. 11): *Let the envious people see and be confounded and let fire (i.e. envy) devour Thy enemies.*

Reply Obj. 5. Form is taken there for human nature wherein He was judged and likewise will judge; but not for a quality of nature, namely of weakness, which will not be the same in Him when judging as when judged (Cf. *ad* 2).

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE GODHEAD CAN BE SEEN BY THE WICKED
WITHOUT JOY?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the Godhead can be seen by the wicked without joy. For there can be no doubt that the wicked will know with the greatest certainty that Christ is God. Therefore they will see His Godhead, and yet they will not rejoice in seeing Christ. Therefore it will be possible to see it without joy.

Obj. 2. Further, The perverse will of the wicked is not more adverse to Christ's humanity than to His Godhead. Now the fact that they will see the glory of His humanity will conduce to their punishment, as stated above (A. 2, *ad* 4). Therefore if they were to see His Godhead, there would be much more reason for them to grieve rather than rejoice.

Obj. 3. Further, The course of the affections is not a necessary sequel to that which is in the intellect: wherefore Augustine says (*In Ps. cxviii: conc. 8*): *The intellect precedes, the affections follow slowly or not at all.* Now vision regards the intellect, whereas joy regards the affections. Therefore it will be possible to see the Godhead without joy.

Obj. 4. Further, *Whatever is received into a thing is received according to the mode of the receiver and not of the received.* But whatever is seen is, in a way, received into the seer. Therefore although the Godhead is in itself supremely enjoyable, nevertheless when seen by those who are plunged in grief, it will give no joy but rather displeasure.

Obj. 5. Further, As sense is to the sensible object, so is the intellect to the intelligible object. Now in the senses, *to the unhealthy palate bread is painful, to the healthy palate sweet*, as Augustine says (*Conf. vii.*), and the same happens with the other senses. Therefore since the damned have the intellect indisposed, it would seem that the vision of the uncreated light will give them pain rather than joy.

On the contrary, It is written (*Jo. xvii. 3*): *This is eternal life: That they may know Thee, the . . . true God.* Wherefore it is clear that the essence of bliss consists in seeing God. Now joy is essential to bliss. Therefore the Godhead cannot be seen without joy.

Further, The essence of the Godhead is the essence of truth. Now it is delightful to every one to see the truth, wherefore *all naturally desire to know*, as stated at the beginning of the *Metaphysics*. Therefore it is impossible to see the Godhead without joy.

Further, If a certain vision is not always delightful, it happens sometimes to be painful. But intellective vision is never painful since *the pleasure we take in objects of understanding has no grief opposed to it*, according to the Philosopher (*Top. ii.*). Since then the Godhead cannot be seen save by the intellect, it seems that the Godhead cannot be seen without joy.

I answer that, In every object of appetite or of pleasure two things may be considered, namely the thing which is

desired or which gives pleasure, and the aspect of appetibility or pleasurable in that thing. Now according to Boëthius (*De Hebdom.*) *that which is can have something besides what it is, but 'being' itself has no admixture of aught else beside itself.* Hence that which is desirable or pleasant can have an admixture of something rendering it undesirable or unpleasant; but the very aspect of pleasurable has not and cannot have anything mixed with it rendering it unpleasant or undesirable. Now it is possible for things that are pleasurable, by participation of goodness which is the aspect of appetibility or pleasurable, not to give pleasure when they are apprehended, but it is impossible for that which is good by its essence not to give pleasure when it is apprehended. Therefore since God is essentially His own goodness, it is impossible for the Godhead to be seen without joy.

Reply Obj. 1. The wicked will know most clearly that Christ is God, not through seeing His Godhead, but on account of the most manifest signs of His Godhead.

Reply Obj. 2. No one can hate the Godhead considered in itself, as neither can one hate goodness itself. But God is said to be hated by certain persons in respect of some of the effects of the Godhead, in so far as He does or commands something contrary to their will.* Therefore the vision of the Godhead can be painful to no one.

Reply Obj. 3. The saying of Augustine applies when the thing apprehended previously by the intellect is good by participation and not essentially, such as all creatures are; wherefore there may be something in them by reason of which the affections are not moved. In like manner God is known by wayfarers through His effects, and their intellect does not attain to the very essence of His goodness. Hence it is not necessary that the affections follow the intellect, as they would if the intellect saw God's essence which is His goodness.

Reply Obj. 4. Grief denotes not a disposition but a passion. Now every passion is removed if a stronger contrary cause

* Cf. II.-II., Q. XXXIV., A. 1.

supervene, and does not remove that cause. Accordingly the grief of the damned would be done away if they saw God in His essence.

Reply Obj. 5. The indisposition of an organ removes the natural proportion of the organ to the object that has a natural aptitude to please, wherefore the pleasure is hindered. But the indisposition which is in the damned does not remove the natural proportion whereby they are directed to the Divine goodness, since its image ever remains in them. Hence the comparison fails.

QUESTION XCI.

OF THE QUALITY OF THE WORLD AFTER THE JUDGMENT.

(*In Five Articles.*)

WE must next discuss the quality which the world and those who rise again will have after the judgment. Here a three-fold matter offers itself to our consideration: (1) The state and quality of the world. (2) The state of the blessed. (3) The state of the wicked.

Under the first head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether there will be a renewal of the world? (2) Whether the movement of the heavenly bodies will cease? (3) Whether the heavenly bodies will be more brilliant? (4) Whether the elements will receive an additional clarity? (5) Whether the animals and plants will remain?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WORLD WILL BE RENEWED?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the world will never be renewed. For nothing will be but what was at some time as to its species: *What is it that hath been? the same thing that shall be* (Eccles. i. 9). Now the world never had any disposition other than it has now as to essential parts, both genera and species. Therefore it will never be renewed.

Obj. 2. Further, Renewal is a kind of alteration. But it is impossible for the universe to be altered; because whatever is altered argues some alterant that is not altered, which nevertheless is a subject of local movement: and it is

impossible to place such a thing outside the universe. Therefore it is impossible for the world to be renewed.

Obj. 3. Further, It is stated (Gen. ii. 2) that *God . . . rested on the seventh day from all His work which He had done*, and holy men explain that *He rested from forming new creatures*. Now when things were first established, the mode imposed upon them was the same as they have now in the natural order. Therefore they will never have any other.

Obj. 4. Further, The disposition which things have now is natural to them. Therefore if they be altered to another disposition, this disposition will be unnatural to them. Now whatever is unnatural and accidental cannot last for ever (*De Cælo et Mundo*, i.). Therefore this disposition acquired by being renewed will be taken away from them; and thus there will be a cycle of changes in the world as Empedocles and Origen (*Peri Archon.* ii. 3) maintained, and after this world there will be another, and after that again another.

Obj. 5. Further, Newness of glory is given to the rational creature as a reward. Now where there is no merit, there can be no reward. Since then insensible creatures have merited nothing, it would seem that they will not be renewed.

On the contrary, It is written (Isa. lxxv. 17): *Behold I create new heavens and a new earth, and the former things shall not be in remembrance*; and (Apoc. xxi. 1): *I saw a new heaven and a new earth. For the first heaven and the first earth was gone.*

Further, The dwelling should befit the dweller. But the world was made to be man's dwelling. Therefore it should befit man. Now man will be renewed. Therefore the world will be likewise.

Further, *Every beast loveth its like* (Ecclus. xiii. 19), wherefore it is evident that likeness is the reason of love. Now man has some likeness to the universe, wherefore he is called *a little world*. Hence man loves the whole world naturally and consequently desires its good. Therefore, that man's desire be satisfied the universe must needs also be made better.

I answer that, We believe all corporeal things to have been made for man's sake, wherefore all things are stated to

be subject to him.* Now they serve man in two ways, first, as sustenance to his bodily life, secondly, as helping him to know God, inasmuch as man sees the invisible things of God by the things that are made (Rom. i. 20). Accordingly glorified man will nowise need creatures to render him the first of these services, since his body will be altogether incorruptible, the Divine power effecting this through the soul which it will glorify immediately. Again man will not need the second service as to intellective knowledge, since by that knowledge he will see God immediately in His essence. The carnal eye, however, will be unable to attain to this vision of the Essence; wherefore that it may be fittingly comforted in the vision of God, it will see the Godhead in Its corporeal effects, wherein manifest proofs of the Divine majesty will appear, especially in Christ's flesh, and secondarily in the bodies of the blessed, and afterwards in all other bodies. Hence those bodies also will need to receive a greater inflow from the Divine goodness than now, not indeed so as to change their species, but so as to add a certain perfection of glory: and such will be the renewal of the world. Wherefore at the one same time, the world will be renewed, and man will be glorified.

Reply Obj. 1. Solomon is speaking there of the natural course: this is evident from his adding: *Nothing under the sun is new*. For since the movement of the sun follows a circle, those things which are subject to the sun's power must needs have some kind of circular movement. This consists in the fact that things which were before return the same in species but different in the individual (*De Generat. i.*). But things belonging to the state of glory are not *under the sun*.

Reply Obj. 2. This argument considers natural alteration which proceeds from a natural agent, which acts from natural necessity. For such an agent cannot produce different dispositions, unless it be itself disposed differently. But things done by God proceed from freedom of will, wherefore it is possible, without any change in God Who

* Ps. viii. 5 *seq.*

wills it, for the universe to have at one time one disposition, and another at another time. Thus this renewal will not be reduced to a cause that is moved, but to an immovable principle, namely God.

Reply Obj. 3. God is stated to have ceased on the seventh day forming new creatures, for as much as nothing was made afterwards that was not previously in some likeness* either generically, or specifically, or at least as in a seminal principle, or even as in an obediential potentiality.† I say then that the future renewal of the world preceded in the works of the six days by way of a remote likeness, namely in the glory and grace of the angels. Moreover it preceded in the obediential potentiality which was then bestowed on the creature to the effect of its receiving this same renewal by the Divine agency.

Reply Obj. 4. This disposition of newness will be neither natural nor contrary to nature, but above nature (just as grace and glory are above the nature of the soul): and it will proceed from an everlasting agent which will preserve it for ever.

Reply Obj. 5. Although, properly speaking, insensible bodies will not have merited this glory, yet man merited that this glory should be bestowed on the whole universe, in so far as this conduces to man's increase of glory. Thus a man merits to be clothed in more splendid robes, which splendour the robes nowise merited themselves.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE MOVEMENT OF THE HEAVENLY BODIES
WILL CEASE?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that when the world is thus renewed the movement of the heavenly bodies will not cease. For it is written (Gen. viii. 22): *All the days of the earth . . . cold and heat, summer and winter, night and day shall not*

* Cf. P. I., Q. LXXIII., A. 1.

† Cf. P. I., Q. CXV., A. 2, *ad 4*; P. III., Q. XI., A. 1.

cease. Now night and day, summer and winter result from the movement of the sun. Therefore the movement of the sun will never cease.

Obj. 2. Further, It is written (Jerem. xxxi. 35, 36): *Thus saith the Lord Who giveth the sun for the light of the day, the order of the moon and of the stars for the light of the night: Who stirreth up the sea, and the waves thereof roar If these ordinances shall fail before Me . . . then also the seed of Israel shall fail, so as not to be a nation before Me for ever.* Now the seed of Israel shall never fail, but will remain for ever. Therefore the laws of day and of the sea waves, which result from the heavenly movement, will remain for ever. Therefore the movement of the heaven will never cease.

Obj. 3. Further, The substance of the heavenly bodies will remain for ever. Now it is useless to admit the existence of a thing unless you admit the purpose for which it was made: and the heavenly bodies were made in order *to divide the day and the night; and to be for signs, and for seasons, and for days and for years* (Gen. i. 14). But they cannot do this except by movement. Therefore their movement will remain for ever, else those bodies would remain without a purpose.

Obj. 4. Further, In this renewal of the world the whole world will be bettered. Therefore no body will be deprived of what pertains to its perfection. Now movement belongs to the perfection of a heavenly body, because, as stated in *De Cælo et Mundo*, ii., *those bodies participate of the Divine goodness by their movement.* Therefore the movement of the heaven will not cease.

Obj. 5. Further, The sun successively gives light to the various parts of the world, by reason of its circular movement. Therefore if the circular movement of the heaven ceases, it follows that in some part of the earth's surface there will be perpetual darkness, which is unbecoming to the aforesaid renewal.

Obj. 6. Further, If the movement were to cease, this could only be because movement causes some imperfection in the heaven, for instance wear and tear, which is impossible,

since this movement is natural, and the heavenly bodies are impassible, wherefore they are not worn out by movement (*De Cælo et Mundo*, ii.). Therefore the movement of the heaven will never cease.

Obj. 7. Further, A potentiality is useless if it be not reduced to act. Now in whatever position the heavenly body is placed it is in potentiality to another position. Therefore unless this potentiality be reduced to act, it would remain useless, and would always be imperfect. But it cannot be reduced to act save by local movement. Therefore it will always be in motion.

Obj. 8. Further, If a thing is indifferent in relation to more than one alternation, either both are ascribed to it, or neither. Now the sun is indifferent to being in the east or in the west, else its movement would not be uniform throughout, since it would move more rapidly to the place which is more natural to it. Therefore either neither position is ascribed to the sun, or both. But neither both nor neither can be ascribed to it, except successively by movement; for if it stand still, it must needs stand in some position. Therefore the solar body will always be in motion, and in like manner all other heavenly bodies.

Obj. 9. Further, The movement of the heaven is the cause of time. Therefore if the movement of the heaven fail, time must needs fail: and if this were to fail, it would fail in an instant. Now an instant is defined (*Phys.* viii.) *the beginning of the future and the end of the past*. Consequently there would be time after the last instant of time, which is impossible. Therefore the movement of the heavens will never cease.

Obj. 10. Further, Glory does not remove nature. But the movement of the heaven is natural. Therefore it is not deprived thereof by glory.

On the contrary, It is stated (Apoc. x. 6) that the angel who appeared, *swore by him that liveth for ever and ever . . . that time shall be no longer*, namely after the seventh angel shall have sounded the trumpet, at the sound of which *the dead shall rise again* (1 Cor. xv. 52). Now if time be not, there

is no movement of the heaven. Therefore the movement of the heaven will cease.

Further: *Thy sun shall go down no more, and thy moon shall not decrease* (Isa. lx. 20). Now the setting of the sun and the phases of the moon are caused by the movement of the heavens. Therefore the heavenly movement will cease at length.

Further, It is shown in *De Gener.* ii. that *the movement of the heaven is for the sake of continual generation in this lower world*. But generation will cease when the number of the elect is complete. Therefore the movement of the heaven will cease.

Further, All movement is for some end (*Met.* ii.). But all movement for an end ceases when the end is obtained. Therefore either the movement of the heaven will never obtain its end, and thus it would be useless, or it will cease at length.

Further, Rest is more noble than movement, because things are more likened to God, Who is supremely immovable, by being themselves unmoved. Now the movement of lower bodies terminates naturally in rest. Therefore since the heavenly bodies are far nobler, their movement terminates naturally in rest.

I answer that, There are three opinions touching this question. The first is of the philosophers who assert that the movement of the heaven will last for ever. But this is not in keeping with our faith, which holds that the elect are in a certain number preordained by God, so that the begetting of men will not last for ever, and for the same reason, neither will other things that are directed to the begetting of men, such as the movement of the heaven and the variations of the elements. Others say that the movement of the heaven will cease naturally. But this again is false, since every body that is moved naturally has a place wherein it rests naturally, whereto it is moved naturally, and whence it is not moved except by violence. Now no such place can be assigned to the heavenly body, since it is not more natural to the sun to move towards a point in the east than to move

away from it, wherefore either its movement would not be altogether natural, or its movement would not naturally terminate in rest. Hence we must agree with others who say that the movement of the heaven will cease at this renewal of the world, not indeed by any natural cause, but as a result of the will of God. For the body in question, like other bodies, was made to serve man in the two ways above mentioned (A. 1): and hereafter in the state of glory man will no longer need one of these services, that namely in respect of which the heavenly bodies serve man for the sustenance of his bodily life. Now in this way the heavenly bodies serve man by their movement, in so far as by the heavenly movement the human race is multiplied, plants and animals needful for man's use generated, and the temperature of the atmosphere rendered conducive to health. Therefore the movement of the heavenly body will cease as soon as man is glorified.

Reply Obj. 1. These words refer to the earth in its present state, when it is able to be the principle of the generation and corruption of plants. This is evident from its being said there: *All the days of the earth, seed time and harvest*, etc. And it is simply to be granted that as long as the earth is fit for seed time and harvest, the movement of the heaven will not cease.

We reply in like manner to *Obj. 2* that the Lord is speaking there of the duration of the seed of Israel with regard to the present state. This is evident from the words: *Then also the seed of Israel shall fail, so as not to be a nation before Me for ever*. For after this state there will be no succession of days: wherefore the laws also which He had mentioned will cease after this state.

Reply Obj. 3. The end which is there assigned to the heavenly bodies is their proximate end, because it is their proper act. But this act is directed further to another end, namely the service of man, which is shown by the words of Deut. iv. 19: *Lest perhaps lifting up thy eyes to heaven, thou see the sun and the moon and all the stars of heaven, and being deceived by error thou adore and serve them, which the Lord*

thy God created for the service of all the nations, that are under heaven. Therefore we should form our judgment of the heavenly bodies from the service of man, rather than from the end assigned to them in Genesis. Moreover the heavenly bodies, as stated above, will serve glorified man in another way; hence it does not follow that they will remain without a purpose.

Reply Obj. 4. Movement does not belong to the perfection of a heavenly body, except in so far as thereby it is the cause of generation and corruption in this lower world: and in that respect also this movement makes the heavenly body participate the Divine goodness by way of a certain likeness of causality. But movement does not belong to the perfection the substance of the heaven, which substance will remain. Wherefore it does not follow that, when this movement ceases, the substance of the heaven will lose something of its perfection.

Reply Obj. 5. All the elemental bodies will have in themselves a certain clarity of glory. Hence though part of the surface of the earth be not lit up by the sun, there will by no means be any darkness there.

Reply Obj. 6. A gloss of Ambrose on Rom. viii. 22, *Every creature groaneth*, etc. says explicitly that *all the elements labour to fulfil their offices: thus the sun and moon fill the places appointed to them not without work: this is for our sake, wherefore they will rest when we are taken up to heaven.* This work, in my opinion, does not signify that any stress or passion occurs to these bodies from their movement, since this movement is natural to them and nowise violent, as is proved in *De Cælo et Mundo*, i. But work here denotes a defect in relation to the term to which a thing tends. Hence since this movement is ordained by Divine providence to the completion of the number of the elect, it follows that as long as the latter is incomplete, this movement has not reached the term whereto it was ordained: hence it is said metaphorically to labour, as a man who has not what he intends to have. This defect will be removed from the heaven when the number of the elect is complete. Or it may

refer to the desire of the future renewal, which it awaits from the Divine disposal.

Reply Obj. 7. In a heavenly body there is no potentiality that can be perfected by place, or that is made for this end which is to be in such and such a place. But potentiality to situation in a place is related to a heavenly body, as the craftsman's potentiality to construct various houses of one kind: for if he construct one of these he is not said to have the potentiality uselessly, and in like manner in whatever situation a heavenly body be placed, its potentiality to be in a place will not remain incomplete or without a purpose.

Reply Obj. 8. Although a heavenly body, so far as regards its nature, is equally inclined to every situation that it can possibly occupy, nevertheless in comparison with things outside it, it is not equally inclined to every situation: but in respect of one situation it has a more noble disposition in comparison with certain things than in respect of another situation; thus in our regard the sun has a more noble disposition at daytime than at night-time. Hence it is probable, since the entire renewal of the world is directed to man, that the heaven will have in this renewal the most noble situation possible in relation to our dwelling there. Or, according to some, the heaven will rest in that situation wherein it was made, else one of its revolutions would remain incomplete. But this argument seems improbable, for since a revolution of the heaven takes no less than 36,000 years to complete, it would follow that the world must last that length of time, which does not seem probable. Moreover according to this it would be possible to know when the world will come to an end. For we may conclude with probability from astronomers in what position the heavenly bodies were made, by taking into consideration the number of years that have elapsed since the beginning of the world: and in the same way it would be possible to know the exact number of years it would take them to return to a like position: whereas the time of the world's end is stated to be unknown.

Reply Obj. 9. Time will at length cease, when the heavenly movement ceases. Yet that last *now* will not be the begin-

ning of the future. For the definition quoted applies to the *now* only as continuous with the parts of time, not as terminating the whole of time.

Reply Obj. 10. The movement of the heaven is said to be natural, not as though it were part of nature in the same way as we speak of natural principles; but because it has its principle in the nature of a body, not indeed its active but its receptive principle. Its active principle is a spiritual substance, as the Commentator says on *De Cælo et Mundo*; and consequently it is not unreasonable for this movement to be done away by the renewal of glory, since the nature of the heavenly body will not alter through the cessation of that movement.

We grant the other objections which argue in the contrary sense, namely the first three, because they conclude in due manner. But since the remaining two seem to conclude that the movement of the heaven will cease naturally, we must reply to them.

To the first, then, we reply that movement ceases when its purpose is attained, provided this is a sequel to, and does not accompany the movement. Now the purpose of the heavenly movement, according to philosophers, accompanies that movement, namely the imitation of the Divine goodness in the causality of that movement with respect to this lower world. Hence it does not follow that this movement ceases naturally.

To the second we reply that although immobility is simply nobler than movement, yet movement in a subject which thereby can acquire a perfect participation of the Divine goodness is nobler than rest in a subject which is altogether unable to acquire that perfection by movement. For this reason the earth which is the lowest of the elements is without movement: although God Who is exalted above all things is without movement, by Whom the more noble bodies are moved. Hence also it is that the movements of the higher bodies might be held to be perpetual, so far as their natural power is concerned, and never to terminate in rest, although the movement of lower bodies terminates in rest.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE BRIGHTNESS OF THE HEAVENLY BODIES WILL
BE INCREASED AT THIS RENEWAL ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the brightness of the heavenly bodies will not be increased at this renewal. For this renewal as regards the lower bodies will be caused by the cleansing fire. But the cleansing fire will not reach the heavenly bodies. Therefore the heavenly bodies will not be renewed by receiving an increase of brightness.

Obj. 2. Further, Just as the heavenly bodies are the cause of generation in this lower world by their movement, so are they by their light. But, when generation ceases, movement will cease as stated above (A. 2). Therefore in like manner the light of the heavenly bodies will cease rather than increase.

Obj. 3. Further, If the heavenly bodies will be renewed when man is renewed, it follows that when man deteriorated they deteriorated likewise. But this does not seem probable, since these bodies are unalterable as to their substance. Therefore neither will they be renewed when man is renewed.

Obj. 4. Further, If they deteriorated then, it follows that their deterioration was on a par with the amelioration which, it is said, will accrue to them at man's renewal. Now it is written (Isa. xxx. 26) that *the light of the moon shall be as the light of the sun*. Therefore in the original state before sin the moon shone as much as the sun does now. Therefore whenever the moon was over the earth, it made it to be day as the sun does now: which is proved manifestly to be false from the statement of Gen. i. 16 that the moon was made *to rule the night*. Therefore when man sinned, the heavenly bodies were not deprived of their light; and so their light will not be increased, so it seems, when man is glorified.

Obj. 5. Further, The brightness of the heavenly bodies, like other creatures, is directed to the use of man. Now, after the resurrection, the brightness of the sun will be of

no use to man: for it is written (Isa. lx. 19): *Thou shalt no more have the sun for thy light by day, neither shall the brightness of the moon enlighten thee*, and (Apoc. xxi. 23): *The city hath no need of the sun, nor of the moon to shine in it*. Therefore their brightness will not be increased.

Obj. 6. Further, It were not a wise craftsman who would make very great instruments for the making of a small work. Now man is a very small thing in comparison with the heavenly bodies, which by their huge bulk surpass the size of man almost beyond comparison: in fact the size of the whole earth in comparison with the heaven is as a point compared with a sphere, as astronomers say. Since then God is most wise it would seem that man is not the end of the creation of the heavens, and so it is unseemly that the heaven should deteriorate when he sinned, or that it should be bettered when he is glorified.

On the contrary, It is written (Isa. xxx. 26): *The light of the moon shall be as the light of the sun, and the light of the sun shall be sevenfold*.

Further, The whole world will be renewed for the better. But the heaven is the more noble part of the corporeal world. Therefore it will be altered for the better. But this cannot be unless it shine out with greater brightness. Therefore its brightness will be bettered and will increase.

Further, *Every creature that groaneth and travaileth in pain, awaiteth the revelation of the glory of the children of God* (Rom. viii. 21, 22).^{*} Now such are the heavenly bodies, as a gloss says on the same passage. Therefore they await the glory of the saints. But they would not await it unless they were to gain something by it. Therefore their brightness will increase thereby, since it is their chief beauty.

I answer that, The renewal of the world is directed to the end that, after this renewal has taken place, God may become visible to man by signs so manifest as to be perceived as it were by his senses. Now creatures lead to the knowledge

^{*} *The creature also itself shall be delivered from the servitude of corruption, into the liberty of the children of God. For we know that every creature groaneth and travaileth in pain, etc.*

of God chiefly by their comeliness and beauty, which show forth the wisdom of their Maker and Governor; wherefore it is written (Wis. xiii. 5): *By the greatness of the beauty and of the creature, the Creator of them may be seen, so as to be known thereby.* And the beauty of the heavenly bodies consists chiefly in light; wherefore it is written (Ecclus. xliii. 10): *The glory of the stars is the beauty of heaven, the Lord enlighteneth the world on high.* Hence the heavenly bodies will be bettered, especially as regards their brightness. But to what degree and in what way this betterment will take place is known to Him alone Who will bring it about.

Reply Obj. 1. The cleansing fire will not cause the form of the renewal, but will only dispose thereto, by cleansing from the vileness of sin and the impurity resulting from the mingling of bodies, and this is not to be found in the heavenly bodies. Hence although the heavenly bodies are not to be cleansed by fire, they are nevertheless to be Divinely renewed.

Reply Obj. 2. Movement does not denote perfection in the thing moved, considered in itself, since movement is the act of that which is imperfect: although it may pertain to the perfection of a body in so far as the latter is the cause of something. But light belongs to the perfection of a light-some body, even considered in its substance: and consequently after the heavenly body has ceased to be the cause of generation, its brightness will remain, while its movement will cease.

Reply Obj. 3. A gloss on Isa. xxx. 26, *The light of the moon shall be as the light of the sun*, says: *All things made for man's sake deteriorated at his fall, and sun and moon diminished in light.* This diminishment is understood by some to mean a real lessening of light. Nor does it matter that the heavenly bodies are by nature unalterable, because this alteration was brought about by the Divine power. Others, however, with greater probability, take this diminishment to mean, not a real lessening of light, but a lessening in reference to man's use; because after sin man did not receive as much benefit from the light of the heavenly bodies as

before. In the same sense we read (Gen. iii. 17, 18): *Cursed is the earth in thy work. . . . Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee*; although it would have brought forth thorns and thistles before sin, but not as a punishment to man. Nor does it follow that, supposing the light of the heavenly bodies not to have been lessened essentially through man sinning, it will not really be increased at man's glorification, because man's sin wrought no change upon the state of the universe, since both before and after sin man had an animal life, which needs the movement and generation of a corporeal creature; whereas man's glorification will bring a change upon the state of all corporeal creatures, as stated above (Q. LXXVI., A. 7). Hence there is no comparison.

Reply Obj. 4. This diminution, according to the more probable opinion, refers not to the substance but to the effect. Hence it does not follow that the moon while over the earth would have made it to be day, but that man would have derived as much benefit from the light of the moon then as now from the light of the sun. After the resurrection, however, when the light of the moon will be increased in very truth, there will be night nowhere on earth but only in the centre of the earth, where hell will be, because then, as stated, the moon will shine as brightly as the sun does now; the sun seven times as much as now, and the bodies of the blessed seven times more than the sun, although there be no authority or reason to prove this.

Reply Obj. 5. A thing may be useful to man in two ways. First, by reason of necessity, and thus no creature will be useful to man because he will have complete sufficiency from God. This is signified (Apoc. xxi. 23) by the words quoted, according to which that *city hath no need of the sun, nor of the moon*. Secondly, on account of a greater perfection, and thus man will make use of other creatures, yet not as needful to him in order to obtain his end, in which way he makes use of them now.

Reply Obj. 6. This is the argument of Rabbi Moses who endeavours to prove (*Dux errantium* iii.) that the world was

by no means made for man's use. Wherefore he maintains that what we read in the Old Testament about the renewal of the world, as instanced by the quotations from Isaias, is said metaphorically: and that even as the sun is said to be darkened in reference to a person when he encounters a great sorrow so as not to know what to do (which way of speaking is customary to Scripture), so on the other hand the sun is said to shine brighter for a person, and the whole world to be renewed, when he is brought from a state of sorrow to one of very great joy. But this is not in harmony with the authority and commentaries of holy men. Consequently we must answer this argument by saying that although the heavenly bodies far surpass the human body, yet the rational soul surpasses the heavenly bodies far more than these surpass the human body. Hence it is not unreasonable to say that the heavenly bodies were made for man's sake; not, however, as though this were the principal end, since the principal end of all things is God.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ELEMENTS WILL BE RENEWED BY AN
ADDITION OF BRIGHTNESS?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the elements will not be renewed by receiving some kind of brightness. For just as light is a quality proper to a heavenly body, so are hot and cold, wet and dry, qualities proper to the elements. Therefore as the heaven is renewed by an increase of brightness, so ought the elements to be renewed by an increase of active and passive qualities.

Obj. 2. Further, Rarity and density are qualities of the elements, and the elements will not be deprived of them at this renewal. Now the rarity and density of the elements would seem to be an obstacle to brightness, since a bright body needs to be condensed, for which reason the rarity of the air seems incompatible with brightness, and in like manner the density of the earth which is an obstacle to

transparency. Therefore it is impossible for the elements to be renewed by the addition of brightness.

Obj. 3. Further, It is agreed that the damned will be in the earth. Yet they will be in darkness not only internal but also external. Therefore the earth will not be endowed with brightness in this renewal, nor for the same reason will the other elements.

Obj. 4. Further, Increase of brightness in the elements implies an increase of heat. If therefore at this renewal the brightness of the elements be greater than it is now, their heat will likewise be greater; and thus it would seem that they will be changed from their natural qualities, which are in them according to a fixed measure: and this is absurd.

Obj. 5. Further, The good of the universe which consists in the order and harmony of the parts is more excellent than the good of any individual creature. But if one creature be bettered, the good of the universe is done away, since there will no longer be the same harmony. Therefore if the elemental bodies, which according to their natural degree in the universe should be devoid of brightness, were to be endowed with brightness, the perfection of the universe would be diminished thereby rather than increased.

On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. xxi. 1): *I saw a new heaven and a new earth.* Now the heaven will be renewed by an increase of brightness. Therefore the earth and likewise the other elements will also.

Further, The lower bodies, like the higher, are for man's use. Now the corporeal creature will be rewarded for its services to man, as a gloss of Ambrose seems to say on Rom. viii. 22, *Every creature groaneth*, and a gloss of Jerome on Isa. xxx. 26, *And the light of the moon shall be*, etc. Therefore the elements will be glorified as well as the heavenly bodies.

Further, Man's body is composed of the elements. Therefore the elemental particles that are in man's body will be glorified by the addition of brightness when man is glorified. Now it is fitting that whole and part should have the same disposition. Therefore it is fitting that the elements themselves should be endowed with brightness.

I answer that, Just as there is a certain order between the heavenly spirits and the earthly or human spirits, so is there an order between heavenly bodies and earthly bodies. Since then the corporeal creature was made for the sake of the spiritual and is ruled thereby, it follows that corporeal things are dealt with similarly to spiritual things. Now in this final consummation of things the lower spirits will receive the properties of the higher spirits, because men will be as the angels in heaven (Matth. xxii. 30): and this will be accomplished by conferring the highest degree of perfection on that in which the human spirit agrees with the angelic. Wherefore, in like manner, since the lower bodies do not agree with the heavenly bodies except in the nature of light and transparency (*De Anima*, ii.), it follows that the lower bodies are to be perfected chiefly as regards brightness. Hence all the elements will be clothed with a certain brightness, not equally, however, but according to their mode: for it is said that the earth on its outward surface will be as transparent as glass, water as crystal, the air as heaven, fire as the lights of heaven.

Reply Obj. 1. As stated above (A. 1), the renewal of the world is directed to the effect that man even by his senses may as it were see the Godhead by manifest signs. Now the most spiritual and subtle of our senses is the sight. Consequently all the lower bodies need to be bettered, chiefly as regards the visible qualities the principle of which is light. On the other hand, the elemental qualities regard the touch, which is the most material of the senses, and the excess of their contrariety is more displeasing than pleasant; whereas excess of light will be pleasant, since it has no contrariety, except on account of a weakness in the organ, such as will not be then.

Reply Obj. 2. The air will be bright, not as casting forth rays, but as an enlightened transparency; while the earth, although it is opaque through lack of light, yet by the Divine power its surface will be clothed with the glory of brightness, without prejudice to its density.

Reply Obj. 3. The earth will not be glorified with bright-

ness in the infernal regions; but instead of this glory, that part of the earth will have the rational spirits of men and demons, who though weak by reason of sin are nevertheless superior to any corporeal quality by the dignity of their nature. Or we may say that, though the whole earth be glorified, the wicked will nevertheless be in exterior darkness, since even the fire of hell, while shining for them in one respect, will be unable to enlighten them in another.

Reply Obj. 4. This brightness will be in these bodies even as it is in the heavenly bodies, in which it causes no heat, because these bodies will then be unalterable, as the heavenly bodies are now.

Reply Obj. 5. The order of the universe will not be done away by the betterment of the elements, because all the other parts will also be bettered, and so the same harmony will remain.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE PLANTS AND ANIMALS WILL REMAIN IN THIS RENEWAL ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the plants and animals will remain in this renewal. For the elements should be deprived of nothing that belongs to their adornment. Now the elements are said to be adorned by the animals and plants.* Therefore they will not be removed in this renewal.

Obj. 2. Further, Just as the elements served man, so also did animals, plants, and mineral bodies. But on account of this service the elements will be glorified. Therefore both animals and plants and mineral bodies will be glorified likewise.

Obj. 3. Further, The universe will remain imperfect if anything belonging to its perfection be removed. Now the species of animals, plants, and mineral bodies belong to the perfection of the universe. Since then we must not say that the world will remain imperfect when it is renewed, it seems that we should assert that the plants and animals will remain.

* Cf. Gen. i. 11, 12, 20, 21, 24, 25.

Obj. 4. Further, Animals and plants have a more noble form than the elements. Now the world, at this final renewal, will be changed for the better. Therefore animals and plants should remain rather than the elements, since they are nobler.

Obj. 5. Further, It is unseemly to assert that the natural appetite will be frustrated. But by their natural appetite animals and plants desire to be for ever, if indeed not as regards the individual, at least as regards the species: and to this end their continual generation is directed (*De Generat.* ii.). Therefore it is unseemly to say that these species will at length cease to be.

On the contrary, If plants and animals are to remain, either all of them will, or some of them. If all of them, then dumb animals, which had previously died, will have to rise again, just as men will rise again. But this cannot be asserted, for since their form comes to nothing, they cannot resume the same identical form. On the other hand if not all but some of them remain, since there is no more reason for one of them remaining for ever rather than another, it would seem that none of them will. But whatever remains after the world has been renewed will remain for ever, generation and corruption being done away. Therefore plants and animals will altogether cease after the renewal of the world.

Further, According to the Philosopher (*De Generat.* ii.) the species of animals, plants, and suchlike corruptible things, are not perpetuated except by the continuance of the heavenly movement. Now this will cease then. Therefore it will be impossible for those species to be perpetuated.

Further, If the end cease, those things which are directed to the end should cease. Now animals and plants were made for the upkeep of human life; wherefore it is written (*Gen.* ix. 3): *Even as the green herbs have I delivered all flesh* to you.* Therefore when man's animal life ceases, animals and plants should cease. But after this renewal animal life will cease in man. Therefore neither plants nor animals ought to remain.

* Vulg.,—*have I delivered them all to you.*

I answer that, Since the renewal of the world will be for man's sake it follows that it should be conformed to the renewal of man. Now by being renewed man will pass from the state of corruption to incorruptibility and to a state of everlasting rest, wherefore it is written (1 Cor. xv. 53): *This corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality*; and consequently the world will be renewed in such a way as to throw off all corruption and remain for ever at rest. Therefore it will be impossible for anything to be the subject of that renewal, unless it be a subject of incorruption. Now such are the heavenly bodies, the elements, and man. For the heavenly bodies are by their very nature incorruptible both as to their whole and as to their part: the elements are corruptible as to their parts but incorruptible as a whole: while men are corruptible both in whole and in part, but this is on the part of their matter not on the part of their form, the rational soul to wit, which will remain incorrupt after the corruption of man. On the other hand, dumb animals, plants, and minerals, and all mixed bodies, are corruptible both in their whole and in their parts, both on the part of their matter which loses its form, and on the part of their form which does not remain actually; and thus they are in no way subjects of incorruption. Hence they will not remain in this renewal, but those things alone which we have mentioned above.

Reply Obj. 1. These bodies are said to adorn the elements, inasmuch as the general active and passive forces which are in the elements are applied to specific actions: hence they adorn the elements in their active and passive state. But this state will not remain in the elements: wherefore there is no need for animals or plants to remain.

Reply Obj. 2. Neither animals nor plants nor any other bodies merited anything by their services to man, since they lack free-will. However, certain bodies are said to be rewarded in so far as man merited that those things should be renewed which are adapted to be renewed. But plants and animals are not adapted to the renewal of incorruption, as stated above. Wherefore for this very reason man did

not merit that they should be renewed, since no one can merit for another, or even for himself, that which another or himself is incapable of receiving. Hence, granted even that dumb animals merited by serving man, it would not follow that they are to be renewed.

Reply Obj. 3. Just as several kinds of perfection are ascribed to man (for there is the perfection of created nature and the perfection of glorified nature), so also there is a twofold perfection of the universe, one corresponding to this state of changeableness, the other corresponding to the state of a future renewal. Now plants and animals belong to its perfection according to the present state, and not according to the state of this renewal, since they are not capable thereof.

Reply Obj. 4. Although animals and plants as to certain other respects are more noble than the elements, the elements are more noble in relation to incorruption, as explained above.*

Reply Obj. 5. The natural desire to be for ever that is in animals and plants must be understood in reference to the movement of the heaven, so that they may continue in being as long as the movement of the heaven lasts: since there cannot be an appetite for an effect to last longer than its cause. Wherefore if at the cessation of movement in the first movable body, plants and animals cease as to their species, it does not follow that the natural appetite is frustrated.

* Cf. Q. LXXIV., A. 1, *ad* 3.

QUESTION XCII.

OF THE VISION OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE IN REFERENCE TO THE BLESSED.*

(In Three Articles.)

IN the next place we must consider matters concerning the blessed after the general judgment. We shall consider: (1) Their vision of the Divine essence, wherein their bliss consists chiefly. (2) Their bliss and their mansions. (3) Their relations with the damned. (4) Their gifts, which are contained in their bliss. (5) The crowns which perfect and adorn their happiness.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether the saints will see God in His essence? (2) Whether they will see Him with the eyes of the body? (3) Whether in seeing God they will see all that God sees?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE HUMAN INTELLECT CAN ATTAIN TO THE VISION
OF GOD IN HIS ESSENCE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the human intellect cannot attain to the vision of God in His essence. For it is written (Jo. i. 18): *No man hath seen God at any time*; and Chrysostom in his commentary says (*Hom. xiv. in Joan.*) that *not even the heavenly essences, namely the Cherubim and Seraphim, have ever been able to see Him as He is*. Now, only equality with the angels is promised to men (Matth. xxii. 30): *They . . . shall be as the angels of God in heaven*. There-

* Cf. P. I., Q. XII.

fore neither will the saints in heaven see God in His essence.

Obj. 2. Further, Dionysius argues thus (*Div. Nom. i.*): Knowledge is only of existing things. Now whatever exists is finite, since it is confined to a certain genus: and therefore God, since He is infinite, is above all existing things. Therefore there is no knowledge of Him, and He is above all knowledge.

Obj. 3. Further, Dionysius (*De Myst. Theol. i.*) shows that the most perfect way in which our intellect can be united to God is when it is united to Him as to something unknown. Now that which is seen in its essence is not unknown. Therefore it is impossible for our intellect to see God in His essence.

Obj. 4. Further, Dionysius says (*Ep. ad Caium Monach.*) that *the darkness,—for thus he calls the abundance of light, —which screens God is impervious to all illuminations, and hidden from all knowledge : and if anyone in seeing God understood what he saw, he saw not God Himself, but one of those things that are His.* Therefore no created intellect will be able to see God in His essence.

Obj. 5. Further, According to Dionysius (*Ep. ad Dorothe.*) *God is invisible on account of His surpassing glory.* Now His glory surpasses the human intellect in heaven even as on the way. Therefore since He is invisible on the way, so will He be in heaven.

Obj. 6. Further, Since the intelligible object is the perfection of the intellect, there must needs be proportion between intelligible and intellect, as between the visible object and the sight. But there is no possible proportion between our intellect and the Divine essence, since an infinite distance separates them. Therefore our intellect will be unable to attain to the vision of the Divine essence.

Obj. 7. Further, God is more distant from our intellect than the created intelligible is from our senses. But the senses can nowise attain to the sight of a spiritual creature. Therefore neither will our intellect be able to attain to the vision of the Divine essence.

Obj. 8. Further, Whenever the intellect understands

something actually it needs to be informed with the likeness of the object understood, which likeness is the principle of the intellectual operation terminating in that object, even as heat is the principle of heating. Accordingly if our intellect understands God, this must be by means of some likeness informing the intellect itself. Now this cannot be the very essence of God, since form and thing informed must needs have one being, while the Divine essence differs from our intellect in essence and being. Therefore the form whereby our intellect is informed in understanding God must needs be a likeness impressed by God on our intellect. But this likeness, being something created, cannot lead to the knowledge of God, except as an effect leads to the knowledge of its cause. Therefore it is impossible for our intellect to see God except through His effect. But to see God through His effect is not to see Him in His essence. Therefore our intellect will be unable to see God in His essence.

Obj. 9. Further, The Divine essence is more distant from our intellect than any angel or intelligence. Now according to Avicenna (*Met. iii.*), *the existence of an intelligence in our intellect does not imply that its essence is in our intellect*, because in that case our knowledge of the intelligence would be a substance and not an accident, *but that its likeness is impressed on our intellect*. Therefore neither is God in our intellect, to be understood by us, except in so far as an impression of Him is in our intellect. But this impression cannot lead to the knowledge of the Divine essence, for since it is infinitely distant from the Divine essence, it degenerates to another image much more than if the image of a white thing were to degenerate to the image of a black thing. Therefore, just as a person in whose sight the image of a white thing degenerates to the image of a black thing, on account of an indisposition in the organ, is not said to see a white thing, so neither will our intellect be able to see God in His essence, since it understands God only by means of this impression.

Obj. 10. Further, *In things devoid of matter that which understands is the same as that which is understood* (*De*

Anima, iii.). Now God is supremely devoid of matter. Since then our intellect, which is created, cannot attain to be an uncreated essence, it is impossible for our intellect to see God in His essence.

Obj. 11. Further, Whatever is seen in its essence is known as to what it is. But our intellect cannot know of God what He is, but only what He is not, as Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* vii.) and Damascene (*De Fide Orthod.* i.) declare. Therefore our intellect will be unable to see God in His essence.

Obj. 12. Further, Every infinite thing, as such, is unknown. But God is in every way infinite. Therefore He is altogether unknown. Therefore it will be impossible for Him to be seen in His essence by a created intellect.

Obj. 13. Further, Augustine says (*De Videndo Deo: Ep.* cxlvii.): *God is by nature invisible.* Now that which is in God by nature cannot be otherwise. Therefore it is impossible for Him to be seen in His essence.

Obj. 14. Further, Whatever is in one way and is seen in another way is not seen as it is. Now God is in one way and will be seen in another way by the saints in heaven: for He is according to His own mode, but will be seen by the saints according to their mode. Therefore He will not be seen by the saints as He is, and thus will not be seen in His essence.

Obj. 15. Further, That which is seen through a medium is not seen in its essence. Now God will be seen in heaven through a medium which is the light of glory, according to Ps. xxxv. 10, *In Thy light we shall see light.* Therefore He will not be seen in His essence.

Obj. 16. Further, In heaven God will be seen face to face, according to 1 Cor. xiii. 12. Now when we see a man face to face, we see him through his likeness. Therefore in heaven God will be seen through His likeness, and consequently not in His essence.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. xiii. 12): *We see now through a glass in a dark manner, but then face to face.* Now that which is seen face to face is seen in its essence. Therefore God will be seen in His essence by the saints in heaven.

Further, It is written (1 Jo. iii. 2): *When He shall appear we shall be like to Him, because we shall see Him as He is.* Therefore we shall see Him in His essence.

Further, A gloss on 1 Cor. xv. 24, *When He shall have delivered up the kingdom to God and the Father*, says: *Where, i.e. in heaven, the essence of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost shall be seen: this is given to the clean of heart alone and is the highest bliss.* Therefore the blessed will see God in His essence.

Further, It is written (Jo. xiv. 21): *He that loveth Me shall be loved of My Father; and I will love him, and will manifest Myself to him.* Now that which is manifested is seen in its essence. Therefore God will be seen in His essence by the saints in heaven.

Further, Gregory commenting (*Moral.* lviii.) on the words of Exod. xxxiii. 20, *Man shall not see Me and live*, disapproves of the opinion of those who said that *in this abode of bliss God can be seen in His glory but not in His nature; for His glory differs not from His nature.* But His nature is His essence. Therefore He will be seen in His essence.

Further, The desire of the saints cannot be altogether frustrated. Now the common desire of the saints is to see God in His essence, according to Exod. xxxiii. 13, *Show me Thy glory*; Ps. lxxix. 20, *Show Thy face and we shall be saved*; and Jo. xiv. 8, *Show us the Father and it is enough for us.* Therefore the saints will see God in His essence.

I answer that, Even as we hold by faith that the last end of man's life is to see God, so the philosophers maintained that man's ultimate happiness is to understand immaterial substances according to their being. Hence in reference to this question we find that philosophers and theologians encounter the same difficulty and the same difference of opinion. For some philosophers held that our passive intellect can never come to understand separate substances; thus Alfarabius expresses himself at the end of his *Ethics*, although he says the contrary in his book *On the Intelligence*, as the Commentator attests (*De Anima*, iii.). In like manner certain theologians held that the human intellect can never

attain to the vision of God in His essence. On either side they were moved by the distance which separates our intellect from the Divine essence and from separate substances. For since the intellect in act is somewhat one with the intelligible object in act, it would seem difficult to understand how the created intellect is made to be an uncreated essence. Wherefore Chrysostom says (*Hom. xiv. in Joan.*); *How can the creature see the uncreated?* Those who hold the passive intellect to be the subject of generation and corruption, as being a power dependent on the body, encounter a still greater difficulty not only as regards the vision of God but also as regards the vision of any separate substances. But this opinion is altogether untenable. First, because it is in contradiction to the authority of canonical scripture, as Augustine declares (*De Videndo Deo : Ep. cxlvii.*). Secondly, because, since understanding is an operation most proper to man, it follows that his happiness must be held to consist in that operation when perfected in him. Now since the perfection of an intelligent being as such is the intelligible object, if in the most perfect operation of his intellect man does not attain to the vision of the Divine essence, but to something else, we shall be forced to conclude that something other than God is the object of man's happiness: and since the ultimate perfection of a thing consists in its being united to its principle, it follows that something other than God is the effective principle of man, which is absurd, according to us, and also according to the philosophers who maintain that our souls emanate from the separate substances, so that finally we may be able to understand these substances. Consequently, according to us, it must be asserted that our intellect will at length attain to the vision of the Divine essence, and according to the philosophers, that it will attain to the vision of separate substances.

It remains, then, to examine how this may come about. For some, like Alfarabius and Avempace, held that from the very fact that our intellect understands any intelligible objects whatever, it attains to the vision of a separate substance. To prove this they employ two arguments. The

first is that just as the specific nature is not diversified in various individuals, except as united to various individuating principles, so the idea understood is not diversified in me and you, except in so far as it is united to various imaginary forms: and consequently when the intellect separates the idea understood from the imaginary forms, there remains a quiddity understood, which is one and the same in the various persons understanding it, and such is the quiddity of a separate substance. Hence, when our intellect attains to the supreme abstraction of any intelligible quiddity, it thereby understands the quiddity of the separate substance that is similar to it. The second argument is that our intellect has a natural aptitude to abstract the quiddity from all intelligible objects having a quiddity. If, then, the quiddity which it abstracts from some particular individual be a quiddity without a quiddity, the intellect by understanding it understands the quiddity of the separate substance which has a like disposition, since separate substances are subsisting quiddities without quiddities; for the quiddity of a simple thing is the simple thing itself, as Avicenna says (*Met.* iii.). On the other hand if the quiddity abstracted from this particular sensible be a quiddity that has a quiddity, it follows that the intellect has a natural aptitude to abstract this quiddity, and consequently since we cannot go on indefinitely, we shall come to some quiddity without a quiddity, and this is what we understand by a separate quiddity.*

But this reasoning is seemingly inconclusive. First, because the quiddity of the material substance, which the intellect abstracts, is not of the same nature as the quiddity of the separate substances, and consequently from the fact that our intellect abstracts the quiddities of material substances and knows them, it does not follow that it knows the quiddity of a separate substance, especially of the Divine essence, which more than any other is of a different nature from any created quiddity. Secondly, because granted that it be of the same nature, nevertheless the knowledge of a

* Cf. P. I., Q. LXXXVIII., A. 2.

composite thing would not lead to the knowledge of a separate substance, except in the point of the most remote genus, namely substance: and such a knowledge is imperfect unless it reach to the properties of a thing. For to know a man only as an animal is to know him only in a restricted sense and potentially: and much less is it to know only the nature of substance in him. Hence to know God thus, or other separate substances, is not to see the essence of God or the quiddity of a separate substance, but to know Him in His effect and in a mirror as it were. For this reason Avicenna in his *Metaphysics* propounds another way of understanding separate substances, to wit that separate substances are understood by us by means of intentions of their quiddities, such intentions being images of their substances, not indeed abstracted therefrom, since they are immaterial, but impressed thereby on our souls. But this way also seems inadequate to the Divine vision which we seek. For it is agreed that *whatever is received into anything is therein after the mode of the recipient*: and consequently the likeness of the Divine essence impressed on our intellect will be according to the mode of our intellect: and the mode of our intellect falls short of a perfect reception of the Divine likeness. Now the lack of perfect likeness may occur in as many ways, as unlikeness may occur. For in one way there is a deficient likeness, when the form is participated according to the same specific nature, but not in the same measure of perfection: such is the defective likeness in a subject that has little whiteness in comparison with one that has much. In another way the likeness is yet more defective, when it does not attain to the same specific nature but only to the same generic nature: such is the likeness of an orange-coloured or yellowish object in comparison with a white one. In another way, still more defective is the likeness when it does not attain to the same generic nature, but only to a certain analogy or proportion: such is the likeness of whiteness to man, in that each is a being: and in this way every likeness received into a creature is defective in comparison with the Divine essence. Now in order that the sight know whiteness, it

is necessary for it to receive the likeness of whiteness according to its specific nature, although not according to the same manner of being, because the form has a manner of being in the sense other from that which it has in the thing outside the soul: for if the form of yellowness were received into the eye, the eye would not be said to see whiteness. In like manner in order that the intellect understand a quiddity, it is necessary for it to receive its likeness according to the same specific nature, although there may possibly not be the same manner of being on either side: for the form which is in the intellect or sense is not the principle of knowledge according to its manner of being on both sides, but according to its common ratio with the external object. Hence it is clear that by no likeness received in the created intellect can God be understood, so that His essence be seen immediately. And for this reason those who held the Divine essence to be seen in this way alone, said that the essence itself will not be seen, but a certain brightness, as it were a radiance thereof. Consequently neither does this way suffice for the Divine vision that we seek.

Therefore we must take the other way, which also certain philosophers held, namely Alexander and Averroes (*De Anima*, iii.). For since in every knowledge some form is required whereby the object is known or seen, this form by which the intellect is perfected so as to see separate substances is neither a quiddity abstracted by the intellect from composite things, as the first opinion maintained, nor an impression left on our intellect by the separate substance, as the second opinion affirmed; but the separate substance itself united to our intellect as its form, so as to be both that which is understood, and that whereby it is understood. And whatever may be the case with other separate substances, we must nevertheless allow this to be our way of seeing God in His essence, because by whatever other form our intellect were informed, it could not be led thereby to the Divine essence. This, however, must not be understood as though the Divine essence were in reality the form of our intellect, or as though from its conjunction with our intellect there resulted one

being simply, as in natural things from the natural form and matter: but the meaning is that the proportion of the Divine essence to our intellect is as the proportion of form to matter. For whenever two things, one of which is the perfection of the other, are received into the same recipient, the proportion of one to the other, namely of the more perfect to the less perfect, is as the proportion of form to matter: thus light and colour are received into a transparent object, light being to colour as form to matter. When therefore intellectual light is received into the soul, together with the indwelling Divine essence, though they are not received in the same way, the Divine essence will be to the intellect as form to matter: and that this suffices for the intellect to be able to see the Divine essence by the Divine essence itself may be shown as follows.

As from the natural form (whereby a thing has being) and matter, there results one thing simply, so from the form whereby the intellect understands, and the intellect itself, there results one thing intelligibly. Now in natural things a self-subsistent thing cannot be the form of any matter, if that thing has matter as one of its parts, since it is impossible for matter to be the form of a thing. But if this self-subsistent thing be a mere form, nothing hinders it from being the form of some matter and becoming that whereby the composite itself is,* as instanced in the soul. Now in the intellect we must take the intellect itself in potentiality as matter, and the intelligible species as form; so that the intellect actually understanding will be the composite as it were resulting from both. Hence if there be a self-subsistent thing, that has nothing in itself besides that which is intelligible, such a thing can by itself be the form whereby the intellect understands. Now a thing is intelligible in respect of its actuality and not of its potentiality (*Met.* ix.): in proof of which an intelligible form needs to be abstracted from matter and from all the properties of matter. Therefore, since the Divine essence is pure

* Literally,—and becoming the *whereby-it-is* of the composite itself.

act, it will be possible for it to be the form whereby the intellect understands: and this will be the beatific vision. Hence the Master says (ii. *Sent.* D. 1) that the union of the body with the soul is an illustration of the blissful union of the spirit with God.

Reply Obj. 1. The words quoted can be explained in three ways, according to Augustine (*De Videndo Deo : Ep.* cxlvii.). In one way as excluding corporeal vision, whereby no one ever saw or will see God in His essence; secondly, as excluding intellectual vision of God in His essence from those who dwell in this mortal flesh; thirdly, as excluding the vision of comprehension from a created intellect. It is thus that Chrysostom understands the saying, wherefore he adds: *By seeing, the evangelist means a most clear perception, and such a comprehension as the Father has of the Son.* This also is the meaning of the evangelist, since he adds: *The only-begotten Son Who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him :* his intention being to prove the Son to be God from His comprehending God.

Reply Obj. 2. Just as God, by His infinite essence, surpasses all existing things which have a determinate being, so His knowledge, whereby He knows, is above all knowledge. Wherefore as our knowledge is to our created essence, so is the Divine knowledge to His infinite essence. Now two things contribute to knowledge, to wit, the knower and the thing known. Again, the vision whereby we shall see God in His essence is the same whereby God sees Himself, as regards that whereby He is seen, because as He sees Himself in His essence, so shall we also see Him. But as regards the knower there is the difference that is between the Divine intellect and ours. Now in the order of knowledge the object known follows the form by which we know, since by the form of a stone we see a stone: whereas the efficacy of knowledge follows the power of the knower: thus he who has stronger sight sees more clearly. Consequently in that vision we shall see the same thing that God sees, namely His essence, but not so effectively.

Reply Obj. 3. Dionysius is speaking there of the know-

ledge whereby wayfarers know God by a created form, whereby our intellect is informed so as to see God. But as Augustine says (*loc. cit.*), *God evades every form of our intellect*, because whatever form our intellect conceive, that form is out of proportion to the Divine essence. Hence He cannot be fathomed by our intellect: but our most perfect knowledge of Him as wayfarers is to know that He is above all that our intellect can conceive, and thus we are united to Him as to something unknown. In heaven, however, we shall see Him by a form which is His essence, and we shall be united to Him as to something known.

Reply Obj. 4. God is light (Jo. i. 9). Now illumination is the impression of light on an illuminated object. And since the Divine essence is of a different mode from any likeness thereof impressed on the intellect, he (Dionysius) says that the *Divine darkness is impervious to all illumination*, because, to wit, the Divine essence, which he calls *darkness* on account of its surpassing brightness, remains undemonstrated by the impression on our intellect, and consequently *is hidden from all knowledge*. Therefore if anyone in seeing God conceives something in his mind, this is not God but one of God's effects.

Reply Obj. 5. Although the glory of God surpasses any form by which our intellect is informed now, it does not surpass the Divine essence, which will be the form of our intellect in heaven: and therefore although it is invisible now, it will be visible then.

Reply Obj. 6. Although there can be no proportion between finite and infinite, since the excess of the infinite over the finite is indeterminate, there can be proportionateness or a likeness to proportion between them: for as a finite thing is equal to some finite thing, so is an infinite thing equal to an infinite thing. Now in order that a thing be known totally, it is sometimes necessary that there be proportion between knower and known, because the power of the knower needs to be adequate to the knowableness of the thing known, and equality is a kind of proportion. Sometimes, however, the knowableness of the thing surpasses the power

of the knower, as when we know God, or conversely when He knows creatures: and then there is no need for proportion between knower and known, but only for proportionateness; so that, to wit, as the knower is to the knowable object, so is the knowable object to the fact of its being known: and this proportionateness suffices for the infinite to be known by the finite, or conversely.

We may also reply that proportion according to the strict sense in which it is employed signifies a ratio of quantity to quantity based on a certain fixed excess or equality; but is further transferred to denote any ratio of any one thing to another; and in this sense we say that matter should be proportionate to its form. In this sense nothing hinders our intellect, although finite, being described as proportionate to the vision of the Divine essence; but not to the comprehension thereof, on account of its immensity.

Reply Obj. 7. Likeness and distance are twofold. One is according to agreement in nature; and thus God is more distant from the created intellect than the created intelligible is from the sense. The other is according to proportionateness; and thus it is the other way about, for sense is not proportionate to the knowledge of the immaterial, as the intellect is proportionate to the knowledge of any immaterial object whatsoever. It is this likeness and not the former that is requisite for knowledge, for it is clear that the intellect understanding a stone is not like it in its natural being; thus also the sight apprehends red honey and red gall, though it does not apprehend sweet honey, for the redness of gall is more becoming to honey as visible, than the sweetness of honey to honey.

Reply Obj. 8. In the vision wherein God will be seen in His essence, the Divine essence itself will be the form, as it were, of the intellect, by which it will understand: nor is it necessary for them to become one in being, but only to become one as regards the act of understanding.

Reply Obj. 9. We do not uphold the saying of Avicenna as regards the point at issue, for in this other philosophers also disagree with him. Unless perhaps we might say that

Avicenna refers to the knowledge of separate substances, in so far as they are known by the habits of speculative sciences and the likeness of other things. Hence he makes this statement in order to prove that in us knowledge is not a substance but an accident. Nevertheless, although the Divine essence is more distant, as to the property of its nature, from our intellect, than is the substance of an angel, it surpasses it in the point of intelligibility, since it is pure act without any admixture of potentiality, which is not the case with other separate substances. Nor will that knowledge whereby we shall see God in His essence be in the genus of accident as regards that whereby He will be seen, but only as regards the act of the one who understands Him, for this act will not be the very substance either of the person understanding or of the thing understood.

Reply Obj. 10. A substance that is separate from matter understands both itself and other things; and in both cases the authority quoted can be verified. For since the very essence of a separate substance is of itself intelligible and actual, through being separate from matter, it is clear that when a separate substance understands itself, that which understands and that which is understood are absolutely identical, for it does not understand itself by an intention abstracted from itself, as we understand material objects. And this is apparently the meaning of the Philosopher (*De Anima*, iii.) as indicated by the Commentator (*loc. cit.*). But when it understands other things, the object actually understood becomes one with the intellect in act, in so far as the form of the object understood becomes the form of the intellect, for as much as the intellect is in act; not that it becomes identified with the essence of the intellect, as Avicenna proves (*De Natural.* vi.), because the essence of the intellect remains one under two forms whereby it understands two things in succession, in the same way as primary matter remains one under various forms. Hence also the Commentator (*De Anima*. iii.) compares the passive intellect, in this respect, to primary matter. Thus it by no means follows that our intellect in seeing God becomes the

very essence of God, but that the latter is compared to it as its perfection or form.

Reply Obj. 11. These and all like authorities must be understood to refer to the knowledge whereby we know God on the way, for the reason given above.

Reply Obj. 12. The infinite is unknown if we take it in the privative sense, as such, because it indicates removal of completion whence knowledge of a thing is derived. Wherefore the infinite amounts to the same as matter subject to privation, as stated in *Phys.* iii. But if we take the infinite in the negative sense, it indicates the absence of limiting matter, since even a form is somewhat limited by its matter. Hence the infinite in this sense is of itself most knowable; and it is in this way that God is infinite.

Reply Obj. 13. Augustine is speaking of bodily vision, by which God will never be seen. This is evident from what precedes: *For no man hath seen God at any time, nor can any man see Him as these things which we call visible are seen: in this way He is by nature invisible even as He is incorruptible.* As, however, He is by nature supremely being, so He is in Himself supremely intelligible. But that He be for a time not understood by us is owing to our defect: wherefore that He be seen by us after being unseen is owing to a change not in Him but in us.

Reply Obj. 14. In heaven God will be seen by the saints as He is, if this be referred to the mode of the object seen, for the saints will see that God has the mode which He has. But if we refer the mode to the knower, He will not be seen as He is, because the created intellect will not have so great an efficacy in seeing, as the Divine essence has to the effect of being seen.

Reply Obj. 15. There is a threefold medium both in bodily and in intellectual vision. The first is the medium *under which* the object is seen, and this is something perfecting the sight so as to see in general, without determining the sight to any particular object. Such is bodily light in relation to bodily vision; and the light of the active intellect in relation to the passive intellect, in so far as this light is a

medium. The second is the light *by which* the object is seen, and this is the visible form, whereby either sight is determined to a special object, for instance by the form of a stone to know a stone. The third is the medium *in which* it is seen: and this is something by gazing on which the sight is led to something else: thus by looking in a mirror it is led to see the things reflected in the mirror, and by looking at an image it is led to the thing represented by the image. In this way, too, the intellect from knowing an effect is led to the cause, or conversely. Accordingly in the heavenly vision there will be no third medium, so that, to wit, God be known by the images of other things, as He is known now, for which reason we are said to see now in a glass: nor will there be the second medium, because the essence itself of God will be that whereby our intellect will see God. But there will only be the first medium, which will upraise our intellect so that it will be possible for it to be united to the uncreated substance in the aforesaid manner. Yet this medium will not cause that knowledge to be mediate, because it does not come in between the knower and the thing known, but is that which gives the knower the power to know.*

Reply Obj. 16. Corporeal creatures are not said to be seen immediately, except when that which in them is capable of being brought into conjunction with the sight is in conjunction therewith. Now they are not capable of being in conjunction with the sight of their essence on account of their materiality: hence they are seen immediately when their image is in conjunction with the sight. But God is able to be united to the intellect by His essence: wherefore He would not be seen immediately, unless His essence were united to the intellect: and this vision, which is effected immediately, is called *vision of face*. Moreover the likeness of the corporeal object is received into the sight according to the same ratio as it is in the object, although not according to the same mode of being. Wherefore this likeness leads to the

* Cf. P. I., Q. XII., A. 5.

object directly: whereas no likeness can lead our intellect in this way to God, as shown above: and for this reason the comparison fails.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER AFTER THE RESURRECTION THE SAINTS WILL
SEE GOD WITH THE EYES OF THE BODY ?*

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that after the resurrection the saints will see God with the eyes of the body. Because the glorified eye has greater power than one that is not glorified. Now the blessed Job saw God with his eyes (Job xlii. 5): *With the hearing of the ear, I have heard Thee, but now my eye seeth Thee.* Much more therefore will the glorified eye be able to see God in His essence.

Obj. 2. Further, It is written (Job xix. 26): *In my flesh I shall see God my Saviour* (Vulg.,—*my God*). Therefore in heaven God will be seen with the eyes of the body.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine, speaking of the sight of the glorified eyes, expresses himself as follows (*De Civ. Dei*, xxii.): *A greater power will be in those eyes, not to see more keenly, as certain serpents or eagles are reported to see (for whatever acuteness of vision is possessed by these animals they can see only corporeal things), but to see even incorporeal things.* Now any power that is capable of knowing incorporeal things can be upraised to see God. Therefore the glorified eyes will be able to see God.

Obj. 4. Further, The disparity of corporeal to incorporeal things is the same as of incorporeal to corporeal. Now the incorporeal eye can see corporeal things. Therefore the corporeal eye can see the incorporeal: and consequently the same conclusion follows.

Obj. 5. Further, Gregory, commenting on Job iv. 16, *There stood one whose countenance I knew not*, says (*Moral.* v.): *Man who, had he been willing to obey the command, would have been spiritual in the flesh, became, by sinning, carnal even in mind.* Now through becoming carnal in mind, he

* Cf. P. I., Q. XII., A. 3.

thinks only of those things which he draws to his soul by the images of bodies (ibid.). Therefore when he will be spiritual in the flesh (which is promised to the saints after the resurrection), he will be able even in the flesh to see spiritual things. Therefore the same conclusion follows.

Obj. 6. Further, Man can be beatified by God alone. Now he will be beatified not only in soul but also in body. Therefore God will be visible not only to his intellect but also to his flesh.

Obj. 7. Further, Even as God is present to the intellect by His essence, so will He be to the senses, because He will be *all in all* (1 Cor. xv. 28). Now He will be seen by the intellect through the union of His essence therewith. Therefore He will also be visible to the sense.

On the contrary, Ambrose, commenting on Luke i. 11, *There appeared to him an angel, says: God is not sought with the eyes of the body, nor surveyed by the sight, nor clasped by the touch.* Therefore God will by no means be visible to the bodily sense.

Further, Jerome, commenting on Isa. vi. 1, *I saw the Lord sitting, says: The Godhead not only of the Father, but also of the Son and of the Holy Ghost is visible, not to carnal eyes, but only to the eyes of the mind, of which it is said: Blessed are the pure in heart.*

Further, Jerome says again (as quoted by Augustine, *Ep. cxlvii.*): *An incorporeal thing is invisible to a corporeal eye.* But God is supremely incorporeal. Therefore, etc.

Further, Augustine says (*De Videndo Deo, Ep. cxlvii.*): *No man hath seen God as He is at any time, neither in this life, nor in the angelic life, in the same way as these visible things which are seen with the corporeal sight.* Now the angelic life is the life of the blessed, wherein they will live after the resurrection. Therefore, etc.

Further, According to Augustine (*De Trin. xiv.*), *man is said to be made to God's image inasmuch as he is able to see God.* But man is in God's image as regards his mind, and not as regards his flesh. Therefore he will see God with his mind and not with his flesh.

I answer that, A thing is perceptible to the senses of the body in two ways, directly and indirectly. A thing is perceptible directly if it can act directly on the bodily senses. And a thing can act directly either on sense as such or on a particular sense as such. That which acts directly in this second way on a sense is called a proper sensible, for instance colour in relation to the sight, and sound in relation to the hearing. But as sense as such makes use of a bodily organ, nothing can be received therein except corporeally, since whatever is received into a thing is therein after the mode of the recipient. Hence all sensibles act on the sense as such, according to their magnitude: and consequently magnitude and all its consequences, such as movement, rest, number, and the like, are called common sensibles, and yet they are direct objects of sense.

An indirect object of sense is that which does not act on the sense, neither as sense nor as a particular sense, but is annexed to those things that act on sense directly: for instance Socrates, the son of Diæres, a friend and the like which are the direct object of the intellect's knowledge in the universal, and in the particular are the object of the cogitative power in man, and of the estimative power in other animals. The external sense is said to perceive things of this kind, although indirectly, when the apprehensive power (whose province it is to know directly this thing known), from that which is sensed directly, apprehends them at once and without any doubt or discourse (thus we see that a person is alive from the fact that he speaks): otherwise the sense is not said to perceive it even indirectly.

I say then that God can nowise be seen with the eyes of the body, or perceived by any of the senses, as that which is seen directly, neither here, nor in heaven: for if that which belongs to sense as such be removed from sense, there will be no sense, and in like manner if that which belongs to sight as sight be removed therefrom, there will be no sight. Accordingly seeing that sense as sense perceives magnitude, and sight as such a sense perceives colour, it is impossible for the sight to perceive that which is neither colour nor magni-

tude, unless we call it a sense equivocally. Since then sight and sense will be specifically the same in the glorified body, as in a non-glorified body, it will be impossible for it to see the Divine essence as an object of direct vision; yet it will see it as an object of indirect vision, because on the one hand the bodily sight will see so great a glory of God in bodies, especially in the glorified bodies and most of all in the body of Christ, and, on the other hand, the intellect will see God so clearly, that God will be perceived in things seen with the eye of the body, even as life is perceived in speech. For although our intellect will not then see God from seeing His creatures, yet it will see God in His creatures seen corporeally. This manner of seeing God corporeally is indicated by Augustine (*De Civ. Dei*, xxii.), as is clear if we take note of his words, for he says: *It is very credible that we shall so see the mundane bodies of the new heaven and the new earth, as to see most clearly God everywhere present, governing all corporeal things, not as we now see the invisible things of God as understood by those that are made, but as when we see men . . . we do not believe but see that they live.*

Reply Obj. 1. This saying of Job refers to the spiritual eye, of which the Apostle says (Eph. i. 18): *The eyes of our (Vulg,—your) heart enlightened.*

Reply Obj. 2. The passage quoted does not mean that we are to see God with the eyes of the flesh, but that, in the flesh, we shall see God.

Reply Obj. 3. In these words Augustine speaks as one inquiring and conditionally. This appears from what he had said before: *Therefore they will have an altogether different power, if they shall see that incorporeal nature*: and then he goes on to say: *Accordingly a greater power*, etc., and afterwards he explains himself.

Reply Obj. 4. All knowledge results from some kind of abstraction from matter. Wherefore the more a corporeal form is abstracted from matter, the more is it a principle of knowledge. Hence it is that a form existing in matter is in no way a principle of knowledge, while a form existing in the senses is somewhat a principle of knowledge, in so far

as it is abstracted from matter, and a form existing in the intellect is still better a principle of knowledge. Therefore the spiritual eye, whence the obstacle to knowledge is removed, can see a corporeal object: but it does not follow that the corporeal eye, in which the cognitive power is deficient as participating in matter, be able to know perfectly incorporeal objects of knowledge.

Reply Obj. 5. Although the mind that has become carnal cannot think but of things received from the senses, it thinks of them immaterially. In like manner whatever the sight apprehends it must always apprehend it corporeally: wherefore it cannot know things which cannot be apprehended corporeally.

Reply Obj. 6. Beatitude is the perfection of man as man. And since man is man not through his body but through his soul, and the body is essential to man, in so far as it is perfected by the soul: it follows that man's beatitude does not consist chiefly otherwise than in an act of the soul, and passes from the soul on to the body by a kind of overflow, as explained above (Q. LXXXV., A. 1). Yet our body will have a certain beatitude from seeing God in sensible creatures: and especially in Christ's body.

Reply Obj. 7. The intellect can perceive spiritual things, whereas the eyes of the body cannot: wherefore the intellect will be able to know the Divine essence united to it, but the eyes of the body will not.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SAINTS, SEEING GOD, SEE ALL THAT GOD SEES?*

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the saints, seeing God in His essence, see all that God sees in Himself. For as Isidore says (*De Sum. Bon.* i.): *The angels know all things in the Word of God, before they happen.* Now the saints will be equal to the angels of God (Matth. xxii. 30). Therefore the saints also in seeing God see all things.

* Cf. P. I., Q. XII., AA. 7, 8.

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says (*Dial. iv.*): *Since all see God there with equal clearness, what do they not know, who know Him Who knows all things?* and he refers to the blessed who see God in His essence. Therefore those who see God in His essence know all things.

Obj. 3. Further, It is stated in *De Anima*, iii., text. 7, that *when an intellect understands the greatest things, it is all the more able to understand the least things.* Now God is the greatest of intelligible things. Therefore the power of the intellect is greatly increased by understanding Him. Therefore the intellect seeing Him understands all things.

Obj. 4. Further, The intellect is not hindered from understanding a thing except by this surpassing it. Now no creature surpasses the intellect that understands God, since, as Gregory says (*Dial. ii.*), *to the soul which sees its Creator all creatures are small.* Therefore those who see God in His essence know all things.

Obj. 5. Further, Every passive power that is not reduced to act is imperfect. Now the passive intellect of the human soul is a power that is passive as it were to the knowledge of all things, since *the passive intellect is in which all are in potentiality* (*De Anima*, iii., text. 18). If then in that beatitude it were not to understand all things, it would remain imperfect, which is absurd.

Obj. 6. Further, Whoever sees a mirror sees the things reflected in the mirror. Now all things are reflected in the Word of God as in a mirror, because He is the type and image of all. Therefore the saints who see the Word in its essence see all created things.

Obj. 7. Further, According to Prov. x. 24, *to the just their desire shall be given.* Now the just desire to know all things, since *all men desire naturally to know*, and nature is not done away by glory. Therefore God will grant them to know all things.

Obj. 8. Further, Ignorance is one of the penalties of the present life.* Now all penalty will be removed from the

* Cf. I.-II., Q. LXXXV., A. 3.

saints by glory. Therefore all ignorance will be removed: and consequently they will know all.

Obj. 9. Further, The beatitude of the saints is in their soul before being in their body. Now the bodies of the saints will be reformed in glory to the likeness of Christ's body (Philip. iii. 21). Therefore their souls will be perfected in likeness to the soul of Christ. Now Christ's soul sees all things in the Word. Therefore all the souls of the saints will also see all things in the Word.

Obj. 10. Further, The intellect, like the senses, knows all the things with the image of which it is informed. Now the Divine essence shows a thing forth more clearly than any other image thereof. Therefore since in that blessed vision the Divine essence becomes the form as it were of our intellect, it would seem that the saints seeing God see all.

Obj. 11. Further, The Commentator says (*De Anima*, iii.), that *if the active intellect were the form of the passive intellect, we should understand all things*. Now the Divine essence represents all things more clearly than the active intellect. Therefore the intellect that sees God in His essence knows all things.

Obj. 12. Further, The lower angels are enlightened by the higher about the things they are ignorant of, for the reason that they know not all things. Now after the day of judgment, one angel will not enlighten another; for then all superiority will cease, as a gloss observes on 1 Cor. xv. 24, *When He shall have brought to nought*, etc. Therefore the lower angels will then know all things, and for the same reason all the other saints who will see God in His essence.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (*Hier. Eccles.* vi.): *The higher angels cleanse the lower angels from ignorance*. Now the lower angels see the Divine essence. Therefore an angel while seeing the Divine essence may be ignorant of certain things. But the soul will not see God more perfectly than an angel. Therefore the souls seeing God will not necessarily see all things.

Further, Christ alone has the spirit not *by measure* (Jo. iii. 34). Now it becomes Christ, as having the spirit

without measure, to know all things in the Word: wherefore it is stated in the same place (*verse 35*) that *the Father . . . hath given all things into His hand*. Therefore none but Christ is competent to know all things in the Word.

Further, The more perfectly a principle is known, the more of its effects are known thereby. Now some of those who see God in His essence will know God more perfectly than others. Therefore some will know more things than others, and consequently every one will not know all.

I answer that, God by seeing His essence knows all things whatsoever that are, shall be, or have been: and He is said to know these things by His *knowledge of vision*, because He knows them as though they were present in likeness to corporeal vision. Moreover by seeing this essence He knows all that He can do, although He never did them, nor ever will: else He would not know His power perfectly; since a power cannot be known unless its objects be known: and this is called His *science* or *knowledge of simple intelligence*. Now it is impossible for a created intellect, by seeing the Divine essence, to know all that God can do, because the more perfectly a principle is known, the more things are known in it; thus in one principle of demonstration one who is quick of intelligence sees more conclusions than one who is slow of intelligence. Since then the extent of the Divine power is measured according to what it can do, if an intellect were to see in the Divine essence all that God can do, its perfection in understanding would equal in extent the Divine power in producing its effects, and thus it would comprehend the Divine power, which is impossible for any created intellect to do. Yet there is a created intellect, namely the soul of Christ,* which knows in the Word all that God knows by the knowledge of vision. But regarding others who see the Divine essence there are two opinions. For some say that all who see God in His essence see all that God sees by His knowledge of vision. This, however, is contrary to the sayings of holy men, who hold that angels are ignorant of some things; and yet it is clear that according

* Cf. P. III., Q. XVI., A. 2.

to faith all the angels see God in His essence. Wherefore others say that others than Christ, although they see God in His essence, do not see all that God sees because they do not comprehend the Divine essence. For it is not necessary that he who knows a cause should know all its effects, unless he comprehend the cause: and this is not in the competency of a created intellect. Consequently of those who see God in His essence, each one sees in His essence so much the more things according as he sees the Divine essence the more clearly: and hence it is that one is able to instruct another concerning these things. Thus the knowledge of the angels and of the souls of the saints can go on increasing until the day of judgment, even as other things pertaining to the accidental reward. But afterwards it will increase no more, because then will be the final state of things, and in that state it is possible that all will know everything that God knows by the knowledge of vision.

Reply Obj. 1. The saying of Isidore, that *the angels know in the Word all things before they happen*, cannot refer to those things which God knows only by the knowledge of simple intelligence, because those things will never happen; but it must refer to those things which God knows only by the knowledge of vision. Even of these he does not say that all the angels know them all, but that perhaps some do; and that even those who know do not know all perfectly. For in one and the same thing there are many intelligible aspects to be considered, such as its various properties and relations to other things: and it is possible that while one thing is known in common by two persons, one of them perceives more aspects, and that the one learns these aspects from the other. Hence Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.) that *the lower angels learn from the higher angels the intelligible aspects of things*. Wherefore it does not follow that even the angels who know all creatures are able to see all that can be understood in them.

Reply Obj. 2. It follows from this saying of Gregory that this blessed vision suffices for the seeing of all things on the part of the Divine essence, which is the medium by

which one sees, and whereby God sees all things. That all things, however, are not seen is owing to the deficiency of the created intellect which does not comprehend the Divine essence.

Reply Obj. 3. The created intellect sees the Divine essence not according to the mode of that same essence, but according to its own mode which is finite. Hence its efficacy in knowing would need to be infinitely increased by reason of that vision in order for it to know all things.

Reply Obj. 4. Defective knowledge results not only from excess and deficiency of the knowable object in relation to the intellect, but also from the fact that the aspect of knowableness is not united to the intellect: thus sometimes the sight sees not a stone, through the image of the stone not being united to it. And although the Divine essence which is the type of all things is united to the intellect of one who sees God, it is united thereto not as the type of all things, but as the type of some and of so much the more according as one sees the Divine essence more fully.

Reply Obj. 5. When a passive power is perceptible by several perfections in order, if it be perfected with its ultimate perfection, it is not said to be imperfect, even though it lack some of the preceding dispositions. Now all knowledge by which the created intellect is perfected is directed to the knowledge of God as its end. Wherefore he who sees God in His essence, even though he know nothing else, would have a perfect intellect: nor is his intellect more perfect through knowing something else besides Him, except in so far as it sees Him more fully. Hence Augustine says (*Conf. v.*): *Unhappy is he who knoweth all these* (namely, creatures), *and knoweth not Thee: but happy whoso knoweth Thee, though he know not these. And whoso knoweth both Thee and them is not the happier for them, but for Thee only.*

Reply Obj. 6. This mirror has a will: and even as He will show Himself to whom He will, so will He show in Himself whatsoever He will. Nor does the comparison with a material mirror hold, for it is not in its power to be seen or not to be seen.

We may also reply that in a material mirror both object and mirror are seen under their proper image; although the mirror be seen through an image received from the thing itself, whereas the stone is seen through its proper image reflected in some other thing, where the reason for seeing the one is the reason for seeing the other. But in the uncreated mirror a thing is seen through the form of the mirror, just as an effect is seen through the image of its cause and conversely. Consequently it does not follow that whoever sees the eternal mirror sees all that is reflected in that mirror: since he who sees the cause does not of necessity see all its effects, unless he comprehend the cause.

Reply Obj. 7. The desire of the saints to know all things will be fulfilled by the mere fact of their seeing God: just as their desire to possess all good things will be fulfilled by their possessing God. For as God suffices the affections in that He has perfect goodness, and by possessing Him we possess all goods as it were, so does the vision of Him suffice the intellect: *Lord, show us the Father and it is enough for us* (Jo. xiv. 8).

Reply Obj. 8. Ignorance properly so called denotes a privation and thus is it a punishment: for in this way ignorance is nescience of things, the knowledge of which is a duty or a necessity. Now the saints in heaven will not be ignorant of any of these things. Sometimes, however, ignorance is taken in a broad sense of any kind of nescience: and thus the angels and saints in heaven will be ignorant of certain things. Hence Dionysius says (*loc. cit.*) that *the angels will be cleansed from their ignorance*. In this sense ignorance is not a penalty but a defect. Nor is it necessary for all such defects to be done away by glory: for thus we might say that it was a defect in Pope Linus that he did not attain to the glory of Peter.

Reply Obj. 9. Our body will be conformed to the body of Christ in glory, in likeness but not in equality, for it will be endowed with clarity even as Christ's body, but not equally. In like manner our soul will have glory in likeness to the soul of Christ, but not in equality thereto: thus it will have knowledge even as Christ's soul, but not so great, so as to know all as Christ's soul does.

Reply Obj. 10. Although the Divine essence is the type of all things knowable, it will not be united to each created intellect according as it is the type of all. Hence the objection proves nothing.

Reply Obj. 11. The active intellect is a form proportionate to the passive intellect; even as the passive power of matter is proportionate to the power of the natural agent, so that whatsoever is in the passive power of matter or of the passive intellect is in the active power of the active intellect or of the natural agent. Consequently if the active intellect become the form of the passive intellect, the latter must of necessity know all those things to which the power of the active intellect extends. But the Divine essence is not a form proportionate to our intellect in this sense. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 12. Nothing hinders us from saying that after the judgment day, when the glory of men and angels will be consummated once for all, all the blessed will know all that God knows by the knowledge of vision, yet so that not all will see all in the Divine essence. Christ's soul, however, will see clearly all things therein, even as it sees them now; while others will see therein a greater or lesser number of things according to the degree of clearness wherewith they will know God: and thus Christ's soul will enlighten all other souls concerning those things which it sees in the Word better than others. Hence it is written (Apoc. xxi. 23): *The glory of God shall enlighten the city of Jerusalem,* and the Lamb is the lamp thereof.* In like manner the higher souls will enlighten the lower (not indeed with a new enlightening, so as to increase the knowledge of the lower), but with a kind of continued enlightenment; thus we might understand the sun to enlighten the atmosphere while at a standstill. Wherefore it is written (Dan. xii. 3): *They that instruct many to justice shall shine as stars for all eternity.* The statement that the superiority of the orders will cease refers to their present ordinate ministry in our regard, as is clear from the same gloss.

* Vulg.,—*hath enlightened it.*

QUESTION XCIII.

OF THE HAPPINESS OF THE SAINTS AND OF THEIR MANSIONS.

(*In Three Articles.*)

WE must next consider the happiness of the saints and their mansions. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether the happiness of the saints will increase after the judgment? (2) Whether the degrees of happiness should be called mansions? (3) Whether the various mansions differ according to various degrees of charity?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE HAPPINESS OF THE SAINTS WILL BE GREATER AFTER THE JUDGMENT THAN BEFORE?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the happiness of the saints will not be greater after the judgment than before. For the nearer a thing approaches to the Divine likeness, the more perfectly does it participate happiness. Now the soul is more like God when separated from the body than when united to it. Therefore its happiness is greater before being reunited to the body than after.

Obj. 2. Further, Power is more effective when it is united than when divided. Now the soul is more united when separated from the body than when it is joined to the body. Therefore it has then greater power for operation, and consequently has a more perfect share of happiness, since this consists in action.*

* Cf. I.-II., Q. III., A. 2.

Obj. 3. Further, Beatitude consists in an act of the speculative intellect. Now the intellect, in its act, makes no use of a bodily organ; and consequently by being reunited to the body the soul does not become capable of more perfect understanding. Therefore the soul's happiness is not greater after than before the judgment.

Obj. 4. Further, Nothing can be greater than the infinite, and so the addition of the finite to the infinite does not result in something greater than the infinite by itself. Now the beatified soul before its reunion with the body is rendered happy by rejoicing in the infinite good, namely God; and after the resurrection of the body it will rejoice in nothing else except perhaps the glory of the body, and this is a finite good. Therefore their joy after the resumption of the body will not be greater than before.

On the contrary, A gloss on Apoc. vi. 9, *I saw under the altar the souls of them that were slain*, says: *At present the souls of the saints are under the altar, i.e. less exalted than they will be*. Therefore their happiness will be greater after the resurrection than after their death.

Further, Just as happiness is bestowed on the good as a reward, so is unhappiness awarded to the wicked. But the unhappiness of the wicked after reunion with their bodies will be greater than before, since they will be punished not only in the soul but also in the body. Therefore the happiness of the saints will be greater after the resurrection of the body than before.

I answer that, It is manifest that the happiness of the saints will increase in extent after the resurrection, because their happiness will then be not only in the soul but also in the body. Moreover, the soul's happiness also will increase in extent, seeing that the soul will rejoice not only in its own good, but also in that of the body. We may also say that the soul's happiness will increase in intensity.* For man's body may be considered in two ways: first, as being dependent on the soul for its completion; secondly, as containing

* Cf. I.-II., Q. IV., A. 5, *ad* 5, where S. Thomas retracts this statement.

something that hampers the soul in its operations, through the soul not perfectly completing the body. As regards the first way of considering the body, its union with the soul adds a certain perfection to the soul, since every part is imperfect, and is completed in its whole; wherefore the whole is to the part as form to matter. Consequently the soul is more perfect in its natural being, when it is in the whole—namely, man who results from the union of soul and body—than when it is a separate part. But as regards the second consideration the union of the body hampers the perfection of the soul, wherefore it is written (Wis. ix. 15) that *the corruptible body is a load upon the soul*. If, then, there be removed from the body all those things wherein it hampers the soul's action, the soul will be simply more perfect while existing in such a body than when separated therefrom. Now the more perfect a thing is in being, the more perfectly is it able to operate: wherefore the operation of the soul united to such a body will be more perfect than the operation of the separated soul. But the glorified body will be a body of this description, being altogether subject to the spirit. Therefore, since beatitude consists in an operation,* the soul's happiness after its reunion with the body will be more perfect than before. For just as the soul separated from a corruptible body is able to operate more perfectly than when united thereto, so after it has been united to a glorified body, its operation will be more perfect than while it was separated. Now every imperfect thing desires its perfection. Hence the separated soul naturally desires reunion with the body, and on account of this desire which proceeds from the soul's imperfection, its operation whereby it is borne towards God is less intense. This agrees with the saying of Augustine (*Gen. ad Lit.* xii. 35) that *on account of the body's desire it is held back from tending with all its might to that sovereign good*.

Reply Obj. 1. The soul united to a glorified body is more like to God than when separated therefrom, in so far as when united it has more perfect being. For the more per-

* Cf. I.-II., Q. III., A. 2 *seqq.*

fect a thing is the more it is like to God: even so the heart, the perfection of whose life consists in movement, is more like to God while in movement than while at rest, although God is never moved.

Reply Obj. 2. A power which by its own nature is capable of being in matter is more effective when subjected in matter than when separated from matter, although absolutely speaking a power separate from matter is more effective.

Reply Obj. 3. Although in the act of understanding the soul does not make use of the body, the perfection of the body will somewhat conduce to the perfection of the intellectual operation in so far as through being united to a glorified body, the soul will be more perfect in its nature, and consequently more effective in its operation, and accordingly the good itself of the body will conduce instrumentally, as it were, to the operation wherein happiness consists: thus the Philosopher asserts (*Ethic.* i. 8, 10) that external goods conduce instrumentally to the happiness of life.

Reply Obj. 4. Although finite added to infinite does not make a greater thing, it makes more things, since finite and infinite are two things, while infinite taken by itself is one. Now the greater extent of joy regards not a greater thing but more things. Wherefore joy is increased in extent, through referring to God and to the body's glory, in comparison with the joy which referred to God. Moreover, the body's glory will conduce to the intensity of the joy that refers to God, in so far as it will conduce to the more perfect operation whereby the soul tends to God: since the more perfect is a becoming operation, the greater the delight,* as stated in *Ethic.* x. 8.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE DEGREES OF BEATITUDE SHOULD BE
CALLED MANSIONS?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the degrees of beatitude should not be called mansions. For beatitude implies the

* Cf. I.-II., Q. XXXII., A. 1.

notion of a reward: whereas mansion denotes nothing pertaining to a reward. Therefore the various degrees of beatitude should not be called mansions.

Obj. 2. Further, mansion seemingly denotes a place. Now the place where the saints will be beatified is not corporeal but spiritual, namely God Who is one. Therefore there is but one mansion: and consequently the various degrees of beatitude should not be called mansions.

Obj. 3. Further, As in heaven there will be men of various merits, so are there now in purgatory, and were in the limbo of the fathers. But various mansions are not distinguished in purgatory and limbo. Therefore in like manner neither should they be distinguished in heaven.

On the contrary, It is written (Jo. xiv. 2): *In My Father's house there are many mansions:* and Augustine expounds this in reference to the different degrees of rewards (*Tract. lxvii. in Joan.*).

Further, In every well-ordered city there is a distinction of mansions. Now the heavenly kingdom is compared to a city (Apoc. xxi. 2). Therefore we should distinguish various mansions there according to the various degrees of beatitude.

I answer that, Since local movement precedes all other movements, terms of movement, distance and the like are derived from local movement to all other movements according to the Philosopher (*Phys. viii., text. 55, 56*). Now the end of local movement is a place, and when a thing has arrived at that place it remains there at rest and is maintained therein. Hence in every movement this very rest at the end of the movement is called an establishment (*collocatio*) or mansion. Wherefore since the term movement is transferred to the actions of the appetite and will, the attainment of the end of an appetitive movement is called a mansion or establishment: so that the unity of a house corresponds to the unity of beatitude, which unity is on the part of the object, and the plurality of mansions corresponds to the differences of beatitude on the part of the blessed: even so we observe in natural things that there is one same place above to which

all light objects tend, whereas each one reaches it more closely, according as it is lighter, so that they have various mansions corresponding to their various lightness.

Reply Obj. 1. Mansion implies the notion of end and consequently of reward which is the end of merit.

Reply Obj. 2. Though there is one spiritual place, there are different degrees of approaching thereto: and the various mansions correspond to these.

Reply Obj. 3. Those who were in limbo or are now in purgatory have not yet attained to their end. Wherefore various mansions are not distinguished in purgatory or limbo, but only in heaven and hell, wherein is the end of the good and of the wicked.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE VARIOUS MANSIONS ARE DISTINGUISHED
ACCORDING TO THE VARIOUS DEGREES OF CHARITY?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the various mansions are not distinguished according to the various degrees of charity. For it is written (Matth. xxv. 15): *He gave to every one according to his proper virtue* (Douay,—*ability*). Now the proper ability of a thing is its natural power. Therefore the gifts also of grace and glory are distributed according to the different degrees of natural power.

Obj. 2. Further, It is written (Ps. lxi. 12): *Thou wilt render to every man according to his works*. Now that which is rendered is the measure of beatitude. Therefore the degrees of beatitude are distinguished according to the diversity of works and not according to the diversity of charity.

Obj. 3. Further, Reward is due to act and not to habit: hence *it is not the strongest who are crowned but those who engage in the conflict* (Ethic. i. 8) and *he . . . shall not be* (Vulg.,—*is not*) *crowned except he strive lawfully*. Now beatitude is a reward. Therefore the various degrees of

beatitude will be according to the various degrees of works and not according to the various degrees of charity.

On the contrary, The more one will be united to God the happier will one be. Now the measure of charity is the measure of one's union with God. Therefore the diversity of beatitude will be according to the difference of charity.

Further, *If one thing simply follows from another thing simply, the increase of the former follows from the increase of the latter*. Now to have beatitude follows from having charity. Therefore to have greater beatitude follows from having greater charity.

I answer that, The distinctive principle of the mansions or degrees of beatitude is twofold, namely proximate and remote. The proximate principle is the difference of disposition which will be in the blessed, whence will result the difference of perfection in them in respect to the beatific operation: while the remote principle is the merit by which they have obtained that beatitude. In the first way the mansions are distinguished according to the charity of heaven, which the more perfect it will be in any one, the more will it render him capable of the Divine clarity, on the increase of which will depend the increase in perfection of the Divine vision. In the second way the mansions are distinguished according to the charity of the way. For our actions are meritorious, not by the very substance of the action, but only by the habit of virtue with which they are informed. Now every virtue obtains its meritorious efficacy from charity,* which has the end itself for its object.† Hence the diversity of merit is all traced to the diversity of charity, and thus the charity of the way will distinguish the mansions by way of merit.

Reply Obj. 1. In this passage *virtue* denotes not the natural ability alone, but the natural ability together with the endeavour to obtain grace.‡ Consequently virtue in this sense will be a kind of material disposition to the measure of grace and glory that one will receive. But charity is the

* Cf. I.-II., Q. CXIV., A. 4.

† Cf. II.-II., Q. XXIV., A. 3, *ad 1.*

‡ Cf. II.-II., Q. XXIII., A. 8.

formal complement of merit in relation to glory, and therefore the distinction of degrees in glory depends on the degrees of charity rather than on the degrees of the aforesaid virtue.

Reply Obj. 2. Works in themselves do not demand the payment of a reward, except as informed by charity: and therefore the various degrees of glory will be according to the various degrees of charity.

Reply Obj. 3. Although the habit of charity or of any virtue whatever is not a merit to which a reward is due, it is none the less the principle and reason of merit in the act: and consequently according to its diversity is the diversity of rewards. This does not prevent our observing a certain degree of merit in the act considered generically, not indeed in relation to the essential reward which is joy in God, but in relation to some accidental reward, which is joy in some created good.

QUESTION XCIV.

OF THE RELATIONS OF THE SAINTS TOWARDS THE DAMNED.

(*In Three Articles.*)

WE must next consider the relations of the saints towards the damned. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether the saints see the sufferings of the damned? (2) Whether they pity them? (3) Whether they rejoice in their sufferings?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE BLESSED IN HEAVEN WILL SEE THE SUFFERINGS OF THE DAMNED?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the blessed in heaven will not see the sufferings of the damned. For the damned are more cut off from the blessed than wayfarers. But the blessed do not see the deeds of wayfarers: wherefore a gloss on Isa. lxiii. 16, *Abraham hath not known us*, says: *The dead, even the saints, know not what the living, even their own children, are doing.** Much less therefore do they see the sufferings of the damned.

Obj. 2. Further, Perfection of vision depends on the perfection of the visible object: wherefore the Philosopher says (*Ethic. x. 4*) that *the most perfect operation of the sense of sight is when the sense is most disposed with reference to the most beautiful of the objects which fall under the sight*. Therefore, on the other hand, any deformity in the visible object

* S. Augustine, *De cura pro mortuis* xiii., xv.

redounds to the imperfection of the sight. But there will be no imperfection in the blessed. Therefore they will not see the sufferings of the damned wherein there is extreme deformity.

On the contrary, It is written (Isa. lxvi. 24): *They shall go out and see the carcasses of the men that have transgressed against Me*; and a gloss says: *The elect will go out by understanding or seeing manifestly, so that they may be urged the more to praise God.*

I answer that, Nothing should be denied the blessed that belongs to the perfection of their beatitude. Now everything is known the more for being compared with its contrary, because when contraries are placed beside one another they become more conspicuous. Wherefore in order that the happiness of the saints may be more delightful to them and that they may render more copious thanks to God for it, they are allowed to see perfectly the sufferings of the damned.

Reply Obj. 1. This gloss speaks of what the departed saints are able to do by nature: for it is not necessary that they should know by natural knowledge all that happens to the living. But the saints in heaven know distinctly all that happens both to wayfarers and to the damned. Hence Gregory says (*Moral.* xii.) that Job's words (xiv. 21), '*Whether his children come to honour or dishonour, he shall not understand,*' do not apply to the souls of the saints, because since they possess the glory of God within them, we cannot believe that external things are unknown to them.*

Reply Obj. 2. Although the beauty of the thing seen conduces to the perfection of vision, there may be deformity of the thing seen without imperfection of vision: because the images of things whereby the soul knows contraries are not themselves contrary. Wherefore also God Who has most perfect knowledge sees all things, beautiful and deformed.

* Concerning this *Reply* cf. P. I., Q. LXXXIX., A. 8.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE BLESSED PITY THE UNHAPPINESS OF
THE DAMNED ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the blessed pity the unhappiness of the damned. For pity proceeds from charity;* and charity will be most perfect in the blessed. Therefore they will most especially pity the sufferings of the damned.

Obj. 2. Further, The blessed will never be so far from taking pity as God is. Yet in a sense God compassionates our afflictions, wherefore He is said to be merciful.

On the contrary, Whoever pities another shares somewhat in his unhappiness. But the blessed cannot share in any unhappiness. Therefore they do not pity the afflictions of the damned.

I answer that, Mercy or compassion may be in a person in two ways: first by way of passion, secondly by way of choice. In the blessed there will be no passion in the lower powers except as a result of the reason's choice. Hence compassion or mercy will not be in them, except by the choice of reason. Now mercy or compassion comes of the reason's choice when a person wishes another's evil to be dispelled: wherefore in those things which, in accordance with reason, we do not wish to be dispelled, we have no such compassion. But so long as sinners are in this world they are in such a state that without prejudice to the Divine justice they can be taken away from a state of unhappiness and sin to a state of happiness. Consequently it is possible to have compassion on them both by the choice of the will,—in which sense God, the angels and the blessed are said to pity them by desiring their salvation,—and by passion, in which way they are pitied by the good men who are in the state of wayfarers. But in the future state it will be impossible for them to be taken away from their unhappiness: and consequently it will not be possible to pity their

* Cf. II.-II., Q. XXX.

sufferings according to right reason. Therefore the blessed in glory will have no pity on the damned.

Reply Obj. 1. Charity is the principle of pity when it is possible for us out of charity to wish the cessation of a person's unhappiness. But the saints cannot desire this for the damned, since it would be contrary to Divine justice. Consequently the argument does not prove.

Reply Obj. 2. God is said to be merciful, in so far as He succours those whom it is befitting to be released from their afflictions in accordance with the order of wisdom and justice: not as though He pitied the damned, except perhaps in punishing them less than they deserve.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE BLESSED REJOICE IN THE PUNISHMENT
OF THE WICKED ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the blessed do not rejoice in the punishment of the wicked. For rejoicing in another's evil pertains to hatred. But there will be no hatred in the blessed. Therefore they will not rejoice in the unhappiness of the damned.

Obj. 2. Further, The blessed in heaven will be in the highest degree conformed to God. Now God does not rejoice in our afflictions. Therefore neither will the blessed rejoice in the afflictions of the damned.

Obj. 3. Further, That which is blameworthy in a wayfarer has no place whatever in a comprehensor. Now it is most reprehensible in a wayfarer to take pleasure in the pains of others, and most praiseworthy to grieve for them. Therefore the blessed nowise rejoice in the punishment of the damned.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. lvii. 11): *The just shall rejoice when he shall see the revenge.*

Further, It is written (Isa. lvi. 24): *They shall satiate* the sight of all flesh.* Now satiety denotes refreshment of

* Douay,—*They shall be a loathsome sight to all flesh.*

the mind. Therefore the blessed will rejoice in the punishment of the wicked.

I answer that, A thing may be a matter of rejoicing in two ways. First directly, when one rejoices in a thing as such: and thus the saints will not rejoice in the punishment of the wicked. Secondly, indirectly, by reason namely of something annexed to it: and in this way the saints will rejoice in the punishment of the wicked, by considering therein the order of Divine justice and their own deliverance, which will fill them with joy. And thus the Divine justice and their own deliverance will be the direct cause of the joy of the blessed: while the punishment of the damned will cause it indirectly.

Reply Obj. 1. To rejoice in another's evil as such belongs to hatred, but not to rejoice in another's evil by reason of something annexed to it. Thus a person sometimes rejoices in his own evil as when we rejoice in our own afflictions, as helping us to merit life: *My brethren, count it all joy when you shall fall into divers temptations* (Jas. i. 2).

Reply Obj. 2. Although God rejoices not in punishments as such, He rejoices in them as being ordered by His justice.

Reply Obj. 3. It is not praiseworthy in a wayfarer to rejoice in another's afflictions as such: yet it is praiseworthy if he rejoice in them as having something annexed. However it is not the same with a wayfarer as with a comprehensor, because in a wayfarer the passions often forestall the judgment of reason, and yet sometimes such passions are praiseworthy, as indicating the good disposition of the mind, as in the case of shame, pity and repentance for evil: whereas in a comprehensor there can be no passion but such as follows the judgment of reason.

QUESTION XCV.

OF THE GIFTS* OF THE BLESSED.

(In Five Articles.)

WE must now consider the gifts of the blessed; under which head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether any gifts should be assigned to the blessed? (2) Whether a gift differs from beatitude? (3) Whether it is fitting for Christ to have gifts? (4) Whether this is competent to the angels? (5) Whether three gifts of the soul are rightly assigned?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANY GIFTS SHOULD BE ASSIGNED AS DOWRY
TO THE BLESSED?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that no gifts should be assigned as dowry to the blessed. For a dowry (Cod. v. 12, *De jure dot.*, 20; Dig. xxiii. 3, *De jure dot.*) is given to the bridegroom for the upkeep of the burdens of marriage. But the saints resemble not the bridegroom but the bride, as being members of the Church. Therefore they receive no dowry.

Obj. 2. Further, The dowry is given not by the bridegroom's father, but by the father of the bride (Cod. v. 11, *De dot. promiss.*, 7; Dig. xxiii. 2, *De rit. nup.*). Now all the beatific gifts are bestowed on the blessed by the father of the bridegroom, *i.e.* Christ: *Every best gift and every perfect gift is from above coming down from the Father of*

* The Latin *dos* signifies a dowry.

lights. Therefore these gifts which are bestowed on the blessed should not be called a dowry.

Obj. 3. Further, In carnal marriage a dowry is given that the burdens of marriage may be the more easily borne. But in spiritual marriage there are no burdens, especially in the state of the Church triumphant. Therefore no dowry should be assigned to that state.

Obj. 4. Further, A dowry is not given save on the occasion of marriage. But a spiritual marriage is contracted with Christ by faith in the state of the Church militant. Therefore if a dowry is befitting the blessed, for the same reason it will be befitting the saints who are wayfarers. But it is not befitting the latter: and therefore neither is it befitting the blessed.

Obj. 5. Further, A dowry pertains to external goods, which are styled goods of fortune: whereas the reward of the blessed will consist of internal goods. Therefore they should not be called a dowry.

On the contrary, It is written (Eph. v. 32): *This is a great sacrament: but I speak in Christ and in the Church.* Hence it follows that the spiritual marriage is signified by the carnal marriage. But in a carnal marriage the dowered bride is brought to the dwelling of the bridegroom. Therefore since the saints are brought to Christ's dwelling when they are beatified, it would seem that they are dowered with certain gifts.

Further, A dowry is appointed to carnal marriage for the ease of marriage. But the spiritual marriage is more blissful than the carnal marriage. Therefore a dowry should be especially assigned thereto.

Further, The adornment of the bride is part of the dowry. Now the saints are adorned when they are taken into glory, according to Isa. lxi. 10, *He hath clothed me with the garments of salvation . . . as a bride adorned with her jewels.* Therefore the saints in heaven have a dowry.

I answer that, Without doubt the blessed when they are brought into glory are dowered by God with certain gifts for their adornment, and this adornment is called their

dowry by the masters. Hence the dower of which we speak now is defined thus: *The dowry is the everlasting adornment of soul and body, adequate to life, lasting for ever in eternal bliss.* This description is taken from a likeness to the material dowry whereby the bride is adorned and the husband provided with an adequate support for his wife and children, and yet the dowry remains inalienable from the bride, so that if the marriage union be severed it reverts to her. As to the reason of the name there are various opinions. For some say that the name *dowry* is taken not from a likeness to the corporeal marriage, but according to the manner of speaking whereby any perfection or adornment of any person whatever is called an endowment; thus a man who is proficient in knowledge is said to be endowed with knowledge, and in this sense Ovid employed the word *endowment* (*De Arte Amandi*, i. 538): *By whatever endowment thou canst please, strive to please.* But this does not seem quite fitting, for whenever a term is employed to signify a certain thing principally, it is not usually transferred to another save by reason of some likeness. Wherefore since by its primary signification a dowry refers to carnal marriage, it follows that in every other application of the term we must observe some kind of likeness to its principal signification. Consequently others say that the likeness consists in the fact that in carnal marriage a dowry is properly a gift bestowed by the bridegroom on the bride for her adornment when she is taken to the bridegroom's dwelling: and that this is shown by the words of Sichem to Jacob and his sons (Gen. xxxiv. 12): *Raise the dowry, and ask gifts*, and from Exod. xxii. 16: *If a man seduce a virgin . . . and lie with her, he shall endow her, and have her to wife.* Hence the adornment bestowed by Christ on the saints, when they are brought into the abode of glory, is called a dowry. But this is clearly contrary to what jurists say, to whom it belongs to treat of these matters. For they say that a dowry, properly speaking, is a donation on the part of the wife made to those who are on the part of the husband, in view of the marriage burden

which the husband has to bear; while that which the bridegroom gives the bride is called *a donation in view of marriage*. In this sense dowry is taken (3 Kings ix. 16) where it is stated that *Pharao the king of Egypt, took Gezer . . . and gave it for a dowry to his daughter, Solomon's wife*. Nor do the authorities quoted prove anything to the contrary. For although it is customary for a dowry to be given by the maiden's parents, it happens sometimes that the bridegroom or his father gives the dowry instead of the bride's father; and this happens in two ways: either by reason of his very great love for the bride as in the case of Sicheim's father Hemor, who on account of his son's great love for the maiden, wished to give the dowry which he had a right to receive; or as a punishment on the bridegroom, that he should out of his own possessions give a dowry to the virgin seduced by him, whereas he should have received it from the girl's father. In this sense Moses speaks in the passage quoted above. Wherefore in the opinion of others we should hold that in carnal marriage a dowry, properly speaking, is that which is given by those on the wife's side to those on the husband's side, for the bearing of the marriage burden, as stated above. Yet the difficulty remains how this signification can be adapted to the case in point, since the heavenly adornments are given to the spiritual spouse by the Father of the Bridegroom. This shall be made clear by replying to the objections.

Reply Obj. 1. Although in carnal marriage the dowry is given to the bridegroom for his use, yet the ownership and control belong to the bride: which is evident by the fact that if the marriage be dissolved, the dowry reverts to the bride according to law (Cap. 1, 2, 3, *De donat. inter virum et uxorem*). Thus also in spiritual marriage, the very adornments bestowed on the spiritual bride, namely the Church in her members, belong indeed to the Bridegroom, in so far as they conduce to His glory and honour, yet to the bride as adorned thereby.

Reply Obj. 2. The Father of the Bridegroom, that is of Christ, is the Person of the Father alone: while the Father

of the bride is the whole Trinity, since that which is effected in creatures belongs to the whole Trinity. Hence in spiritual marriage these endowments, properly speaking, are given by the Father of the bride rather than by the Father of the Bridegroom. Nevertheless, although this endowment is made by all the Persons, it may be in a manner appropriated to each Person. To the Person of the Father, as endowing, since He possesses authority; and fatherhood in relation to creatures is also appropriated to Him, so that He is Father of both Bridegroom and bride. To the Son it is appropriated, inasmuch as it is made for His sake and through Him: and to the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as it is made in Him and according to Him, since love is the reason of all giving.*

Reply Obj. 3. That which is effected by the dowry belongs to the dowry by its nature, and that is the ease of marriage: while that which the dowry removes, namely the marriage burden which is lightened thereby, belongs to it accidentally: thus it belongs to grace by its nature to make a man righteous, but accidentally to make an ungodly man righteous. Accordingly, though there are no burdens in the spiritual marriage, there is the greatest gladness; and that this gladness may be perfected the bride is dowered with gifts, so that by their means she may be happily united with the bridegroom.

Reply Obj. 4. The dowry is usually settled on the bride not when she is espoused, but when she is taken to the bridegroom's dwelling, so as to be in the presence of the bridegroom, since *while we are in the body we are absent from the Lord* (2 Cor. v. 6). Hence the gifts bestowed on the saints in this life are not called a dowry, but those which are bestowed on them when they are received into glory, where the Bridegroom delights them with His presence.

Reply Obj. 5. In spiritual marriage inward comeliness is required, wherefore it is written (Ps. xlv. 14): *All the glory of the king's daughter is within*, etc. But in carnal marriage

* Cf. P. I., Q. XXXVIII., A. 2.

outward comeliness is necessary. Hence there is no need for a dowry of this kind to be appointed in spiritual marriage as in carnal marriage.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE DOWRY IS THE SAME AS BEATITUDE?*

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the dowry is the same as beatitude. For as appears from the definition of dowry (A. 1), the dowry is *the everlasting adornment of body and soul in eternal happiness*. Now the happiness of the soul is an adornment thereof. Therefore beatitude is a dowry.

Obj. 2. Further, A dowry signifies something whereby the union of bride and bridegroom is rendered delightful. Now such is beatitude in the spiritual marriage. Therefore beatitude is a dowry.

Obj. 3. Further, According to Augustine (*De Trin.* i.) vision is *the whole essence of beatitude*. Now vision is accounted one of the dowries. Therefore beatitude is a dowry.

Obj. 4. Further, Fruition gives happiness. Now fruition is a dowry. Therefore a dowry gives happiness and thus beatitude is a dowry.

Obj. 5. Further, According to Boëthius (*De Consol.* iii.), *beatitude is a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things*. Now the state of the blessed is perfected by the dowries. Therefore the dowries are a part of beatitude.

On the contrary, The dowries are given without merits: whereas beatitude is not given, but is awarded in return for merits. Therefore beatitude is not a dowry.

Further, Beatitude is one only, whereas the dowries are several. Therefore beatitude is not a dowry.

Further, Beatitude is in man according to that which is principal in him (*Ethic.* x. 7): whereas a dowry is also appointed to the body. Therefore dowry and beatitude are not the same.

* Cf. P. I., Q. XII., A. 7, *ad* 1; I.-II., Q. IV., A. 3.

I answer that, There are two opinions on this question. For some say that beatitude and dowry are the same in reality but differ in aspect: because dowry regards the spiritual marriage between Christ and the soul, whereas beatitude does not. But seemingly this will not stand, since beatitude consists in an operation, whereas a dowry is not an operation, but a quality or disposition. Wherefore according to others it must be stated that beatitude and dowry differ even in reality, beatitude being the perfect operation itself by which the soul is united to God, while the dowries are habits or dispositions or any other qualities directed to this same perfect operation, so that they are directed to beatitude instead of being in it as parts thereof.

Reply Obj. 1. Beatitude, properly speaking, is not an adornment of the soul, but something resulting from the soul's adornment, since it is an operation, while its adornment is a certain comeliness of the blessed themselves.

Reply Obj. 2. Beatitude is not directed to the union but is the union itself of the soul with Christ. This union is by an operation, whereas the dowries are gifts disposing to this same union.

Reply Obj. 3. Vision may be taken in two ways. First, actually, *i.e.* for the act itself of vision; and thus vision is not a dowry, but beatitude itself. Secondly, it may be taken habitually, *i.e.* for the habit whereby this act is elicited, namely the clarity of glory, by which the soul is enlightened from above to see God: and thus it is a dowry and the principle of beatitude, but not beatitude itself. The same answer applies to *Obj.* 4.

Reply Obj. 5. Beatitude is the sum of all goods not as though they were essential parts of beatitude, but as being in a way directed to beatitude, as stated above.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS FITTING THAT CHRIST SHOULD RECEIVE
A DOWRY?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem fitting that Christ should receive a dowry. For the saints will be conformed to Christ through glory, according to Philip. iii. 21, *Who will reform the body of our lowliness made like to the body of His glory.* Therefore Christ also will have a dowry.

Obj. 2. Further, In the spiritual marriage a dowry is given in likeness to a carnal marriage. Now there is a spiritual marriage in Christ, which is peculiar to Him, namely of the two natures in one Person, in regard to which the human nature in Him is said to have been espoused by the Word, as a gloss* has it on Ps. xviii. 6, *He hath set His tabernacle in the sun*, etc., and Apoc. xxi. 3, *Behold the tabernacle of God with men.* Therefore it is fitting that Christ should have a dowry.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (*De Doctr. Christ.* iii.) that Christ, according to the *Rule*† of Tyconius, on account of the unity of the mystic body that exists between the head and its members, calls Himself also the Bride and not only the Bridegroom, as may be gathered from Isa. lxi. 10, *As a bridegroom decked with a crown, and as a bride adorned with her jewels.* Since then a dowry is due to the bride, it would seem that Christ ought to receive a dowry.

Obj. 4. Further, A dowry is due to all the members of the Church, since the Church is the spouse. But Christ is a member of the Church according to 1 Cor. xii. 27, *You are the body of Christ, and members of member, i.e. of Christ*, according to a gloss. Therefore the dowry is due to Christ.

Obj. 5. Further, Christ has perfect vision, fruition, and joy. Now these are the dowries. Therefore, etc.

On the contrary, A distinction of persons is requisite

* S. Augustine, *De Consensu Evang.* i. 40.

† *Liber regularum.*

between the bridegroom and the bride. But in Christ there is nothing personally distinct from the Son of God Who is the Bridegroom, as stated in John iii. 29, *He that hath the bride is the bridegroom*. Therefore since the dowry is allotted to the bride or for the bride, it would seem unfitting for Christ to have a dowry.

Further, The same person does not both give and receive a dowry. But it is Christ Who gives spiritual dowries. Therefore it is not fitting that Christ should have a dowry.

I answer that, There are two opinions on this point. For some say that there is a threefold union in Christ. One is the union of concord, whereby He is united to God in the bond of love; another is the union of condescension, whereby the human nature is united to the Divine; the third is the union whereby Christ is united to the Church. They say, then, that as regards the first two unions it is fitting for Christ to have the dowries as such, but as regards the third, it is fitting for Him to have the dowries in the most excellent degree, considered as to that in which they consist, but not considered as dowries; because in this union Christ is the bridegroom and the Church the bride, and a dowry is given to the bride as regards property and control, although it is given to the bridegroom as to use. But this does not seem congruous. For in the union of Christ with the Father by the concord of love, even if we consider Him as God, there is not said to be a marriage, since it implies no subjection such as is required in the bride towards the bridegroom. Nor again in the union of the human nature with the Divine, whether we consider the Personal union or that which regards the conformity of will, can there be a dowry, properly speaking, for three reasons. First, because in a marriage where a dowry is given there should be likeness of nature between bridegroom and bride, and this is lacking in the union of the human nature with the Divine; secondly, because there is required a distinction of persons, and the human nature is not personally distinct from the Word; thirdly, because a dowry is given when the bride is first taken to the dwelling of the bridegroom and thus

would seem to belong to the bride, who from being not united becomes united; whereas the human nature, which was assumed into the unity of Person by the Word, never was otherwise than perfectly united. Wherefore in the opinion of others we should say that the notion of dowry is either altogether unbecoming to Christ, or not so properly as to the saints; but that the things which we call dowries befit Him in the highest degree.

Reply Obj. 1. This conformity must be understood to refer to the thing which is a dowry and not to the notion of a dowry being in Christ: for it is not requisite that the thing in which we are conformed to Christ should be in the same way in Christ and in us.

Reply Obj. 2. Human nature is not properly said to be a bride in its union with the Word, since the distinction of persons, which is requisite between bridegroom and bride, is not observed therein. That human nature is sometimes described as being espoused in reference to its union with the Word is because it has a certain act of the bride, in that it is united to the Bridegroom inseparably, and in this union is subject to the Word and ruled by the Word, as the bride by the bridegroom.

Reply Obj. 3. If Christ is sometimes spoken of as the Bride, this is not because He is the Bride in very truth, but in so far as He personifies His spouse, namely the Church, who is united to Him spiritually. Hence nothing hinders Him, in this way of speaking, from being said to have the dowries, not that He Himself is dowered, but the Church.

Reply Obj. 4. The term Church is taken in two senses. For sometimes it denotes the body only, which is united to Christ as its Head. In this way alone has the Church the character of spouse: and in this way Christ is not a member of the Church, but is the Head from which all the members receive. In another sense the Church denotes the head and members united together; and thus Christ is said to be a member of the Church, inasmuch as He fulfils an office distinct from all others, by pouring forth life into

the other members: although He is not very properly called a member, since a member implies a certain restriction, whereas in Christ spiritual good is not restricted but is absolutely entire,* so that He is the entire good of the Church, nor is He together with others anything greater than He is by Himself. Speaking of the Church in this sense, the Church denotes not only the bride, but the bridegroom and bride, in so far as one thing results from their spiritual union. Consequently although Christ be called a member of the Church in a certain sense, He can by no means be called a member of the bride; and therefore the idea of a dowry is not becoming to Him.

Reply Obj. 5. There is here a fallacy of *accident*; for these things are not befitting to Christ if we consider them under the aspect of dowry.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ANGELS RECEIVE THE DOWRIES?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the angels receive dowries. For a gloss on Cant. vi. 8, *One is my dove*, says: *One is the Church among men and angels.* But the Church is the bride, wherefore it is fitting for the members of the Church to have the dowries. Therefore the angels have the dowries.

Obj. 2. Further, A gloss on Luke xii. 36, *And you yourselves like to men who wait for their lord, when he shall return from the wedding*, says: *Our Lord went to the wedding when after His resurrection the new Man espoused to Himself the angelic host.* Therefore the angelic hosts are the spouse of Christ and consequently it is fitting that they should have the dowries.

Obj. 3. Further, The spiritual marriage consists in a spiritual union. Now the spiritual union between the angels and God is no less than between beatified men and God. Since, then, the dowries of which we treat now are

* Cf. P. III., Q. VIII., A. 1.

assigned by reason of a spiritual marriage, it would seem that they are becoming to the angels.

Obj. 4. Further, A spiritual marriage demands a spiritual bridegroom and a spiritual bride. Now the angels are by nature more conformed than men to Christ as the supreme spirit. Therefore a spiritual marriage is more possible between the angels and Christ than between men and Christ.

Obj. 5. Further, A greater conformity is required between the head and members than between bridegroom and bride. Now the conformity between Christ and the angels suffices for Christ to be called the Head of the angels. Therefore for the same reason it suffices for Him to be called their bridegroom.

On the contrary, Origen at the beginning of the prologue to his commentary on the Canticles, distinguishes four persons, namely *the bridegroom with the bride, the young maidens, and the companions of the bridegroom*: and he says that *the angels are the companions of the bridegroom*. Since then the dowry is due only to the bride, it would seem that the dowries are not becoming to the angels.

Further, Christ espoused the Church by His Incarnation and Passion: wherefore this is foreshadowed in the words (Exod. iv. 25), *A bloody spouse thou art to me*. Now by His Incarnation and Passion Christ was not otherwise united to the angels than before. Therefore the angels do not belong to the Church, if we consider the Church as spouse. Therefore the dowries are not becoming to the angels.

I answer that, Without any doubt, whatever pertains to the endowments of the soul is befitting to the angels as it is to men. But considered under the aspect of dowry they are not as becoming to the angels as to men, because the character of bride is not so properly becoming to the angels as to men. For there is required a conformity of nature between bridegroom and bride, to wit that they should be of the same species. Now men are in conformity with Christ in this way, since He took human nature, and by so doing became conformed to all men in the specific

nature of man. On the other hand, He is not conformed to the angels in unity of species, neither as to His Divine nor as to His human nature. Consequently the notion of dowry is not so properly becoming to angels as to men. Since, however, in metaphorical expressions, it is not necessary to have a likeness in every respect, we must not argue that one thing is not to be said of another metaphorically on account of some lack of likeness; and consequently the argument we have adduced does not prove that the dowries are simply unbecoming to the angels, but only that they are not so properly befitting to angels as to men, on account of the aforesaid lack of likeness.

Reply Obj. 1. Although the angels are included in the unity of the Church, they are not members of the Church according to conformity of nature, if we consider the Church as bride: and thus it is not properly fitting for them to have the dowries.

Reply Obj. 2. Espousal is taken there in a broad sense, for union without conformity of specific nature: and in this sense nothing prevents our saying that the angels have the dowries taking these in a broad sense.

Reply Obj. 3. In the spiritual marriage although there is no other than a spiritual union, those whose union answers to the idea of a perfect marriage should agree in specific nature. Hence espousal does not properly befit the angels.

Reply Obj. 4. The conformity between the angels and Christ as God is not such as suffices for the notion of a perfect marriage, since so far are they from agreeing in species that there is still an infinite distance between them.

Reply Obj. 5. Not even is Christ properly called the Head of the angels, if we consider the head as requiring conformity of nature with the members. We must observe, however, that although the head and the other members are parts of an individual of one species, if we consider each one by itself, it is not of the same species as another member, for a hand is another specific part from the head. Hence, speaking of the members in themselves, the only conformity required among them is one of proportion, so that one

receive from another, and one serve another. Consequently the conformity between God and the angels suffices for the notion of head rather than for that of bridegroom.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THREE DOWRIES OF THE SOUL ARE SUITABLY ASSIGNED ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem unfitting to assign to the soul three dowries, namely, *vision, love and fruition*. For the soul is united to God according to the mind wherein is the image of the Trinity in respect of the memory, understanding, and will. Now love regards the will, and vision the understanding. Therefore there should be something corresponding to the memory, since fruition regards not the memory but the will.

Obj. 2. Further, The beatific dowries are said to correspond to the virtues of the way, which united us to God: and these are faith, hope, and charity, whereby God Himself is the object. Now love corresponds to charity, and vision to faith. Therefore there should be something corresponding to hope, since fruition corresponds rather to charity.

Obj. 3. Further, We enjoy God by love and vision only, since *we are said to enjoy those things which we love for their own sake*, as Augustine says (*De Doctr. Christ.* i. 4). Therefore fruition should not be reckoned a distinct dowry from love.

Obj. 4. Further, Comprehension is required for the perfection of beatitude: *So run that you may comprehend* (1 Cor. ix. 24). Therefore we should reckon a fourth dowry.

Obj. 5. Further, Anselm says (*De Simil.* xlviii.) that the following pertain to the soul's beatitude: *wisdom, friendship, concord, power, honour, security, joy*: and consequently the aforesaid dowries are reckoned unsuitably.

Obj. 6. Further, Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei*, xxii.) that *in that beatitude God will be seen unendingly, loved without wearying, praised untiringly*. Therefore praise should be added to the aforesaid dowries.

Obj. 7. Further, Boëthius reckons five things pertaining to beatitude (*De Consol.* iii.) and these are: Sufficiency which wealth offers, joy which pleasure offers, celebrity which fame offers, security which power offers, reverence which dignity offers. Consequently it seems that these should be reckoned as dowries rather than the aforesaid.

I answer that, All agree in reckoning three dowries of the soul, in different ways however. For some say that the three dowries of the soul are vision, love, and fruition; others reckon them to be vision, comprehension, and fruition; others, vision, delight, and comprehension. However, all these reckonings come to the same, and their number is assigned in the same way. For it has been said (A. 2) that a dowry is something inherent to the soul, and directing it to the operation in which beatitude consists. Now two things are requisite in this operation: its essence which is vision, and its perfection which is delight: since beatitude must needs be a perfect operation. Again, a vision is delightful in two ways: first, on the part of the object, by reason of the thing seen being delightful; secondly, on the part of the vision, by reason of the seeing itself being delightful, even as we delight in knowing evil things, although the evil things themselves delight us not. And since this operation wherein ultimate beatitude consists must needs be most perfect, this vision must needs be delightful in both ways. Now in order that this vision be delightful on the part of the vision, it needs to be made connatural to the seer by means of a habit; while for it to be delightful on the part of the visible object, two things are necessary, namely that the visible object be suitable, and that it be united to the seer. Accordingly for the vision to be delightful on its own part a habit is required to elicit the vision, and thus we have one dowry, which all call vision. But on the part of the visible object two things are necessary. First, suitability, which regards the affections,—and in this respect some reckon love as a dowry, others fruition (in so far as fruition regards the affective part) since what we love most we deem most suitable. Secondly, union is

required on the part of the visible object, and thus some reckon comprehension, which is nothing else than to have God present and to hold Him within oneself;* while others reckon fruition, not of hope, which is ours while on the way, but of possession† which is in heaven.

Thus the three dowries correspond to the three theological virtues, namely vision to faith, comprehension (or fruition in one sense) to hope, and fruition (or delight according to another reckoning) to charity. For perfect fruition such as will be had in heaven includes delight and comprehension, for which reason some take it for the one, and some for the other.

Others, however, ascribe these three dowries to the three powers of the soul, namely vision to the rational, delight to the concupiscible, and fruition to the irascible, seeing that this fruition is acquired by a victory. But this is not said properly, because the irascible and concupiscible powers are not in the intellective but in the sensitive part, whereas the dowries of the soul are assigned to the mind.

Reply Obj. 1. Memory and understanding have but one act: either because understanding is itself an act of memory, or—if understanding denote a power—because memory does not proceed to act save through the medium of the understanding, since it belongs to the memory to retain knowledge. Consequently there is only one habit, namely knowledge, corresponding to memory and understanding: wherefore only one dowry, namely vision, corresponds to both.

Reply Obj. 2. Fruition corresponds to hope, in so far as it includes comprehension which will take the place of hope: since we hope for that which we have not yet; wherefore hope chafes somewhat on account of the distance of the beloved: for which reason it will not remain in heaven‡ but will be succeeded by comprehension.

Reply Obj. 3. Fruition as including comprehension is distinct from vision and love, but otherwise than love

* Cf. I.-II., Q. IV., A. 3.

† Literally *of the reality*,—*non spei . . . sed rei*.

‡ Cf. II.-II., Q. XVIII., A. 2.

from vision. For love and vision denote different habits, the one belonging to the intellect, the other to the affective faculty. But comprehension, or fruition as denoting comprehension, does not signify a habit distinct from those two, but the removal of the obstacles which made it impossible for the mind to be united to God by actual vision. This is brought about by the habit of glory freeing the soul from all defects; for instance by making it capable of knowledge without phantasms, of complete control over the body, and so forth, thus removing the obstacles which result in our being pilgrims from the Lord.

Reply Obj. 4 is clear from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 5. Properly speaking, the dowries are the immediate principles of the operation in which perfect beatitude consists and whereby the soul is united to Christ. The things mentioned by Anselm do not answer to this description; but they are such as in any way accompany or follow beatitude, not only in relation to the Bridegroom, to Whom *wisdom* alone of the things mentioned by him refers, but also in relation to others. They may be either one's equals, to whom *friendship* refers as regards the union of affections, and *concord* as regards consent in actions, or one's inferiors, to whom *power* refers, so far as inferior things are ordered by superior, and *honour* as regards that which inferiors offer to their superiors. Or again (they may accompany or follow beatitude) in relation to oneself: to this *security* refers as regards the removal of evil, and *joy* as regards the attainment of good.

Reply Obj. 6. Praise, which Augustine mentions as the third of those things which will obtain in heaven, is not a disposition to beatitude but rather a sequel to beatitude: because from the very fact of the soul's union with God, wherein beatitude consists, it follows that the soul breaks forth into praise. Hence praise has not the necessary conditions of a dowry.

Reply Obj. 7. The five things aforesaid mentioned by Boëthius are certain conditions of beatitude, but not dispositions to beatitude or to its act, because beatitude

by reason of its perfection has of itself alone and undividedly all that men seek in various things, as the Philosopher declares (*Ethic.* i. 7, x. 7, 8). Accordingly Boëthius shows that these five things obtain in perfect beatitude, because they are what men seek in temporal happiness. For they pertain either, as *security*, to immunity from evil, or to the attainment either of the suitable good, as *joy*, or of the perfect good, as *sufficiency*, or to the manifestation of good, as *celebrity*, inasmuch as the good of one is made known to others, or as *reverence*, as indicating that good or the knowledge thereof, for reverence is the showing of honour which bears witness to virtue. Hence it is evident that these five should not be called dowries, but conditions of beatitude.

QUESTION XCVI.

OF THE AUREOLES.

(*In Thirteen Articles.*)

IN the next place we must consider the aureoles. Under this head there are thirteen points of inquiry: (1) Whether the aureoles differ from the essential reward? (2) Whether they differ from the fruit? (3) Whether a fruit is due to the virtue of continence only? (4) Whether three fruits are fittingly assigned to the three parts of continence? (5) Whether an aureole is due to virgins? (6) Whether it is due to martyrs? (7) Whether it is due to doctors? (8) Whether it is due to Christ? (9) Whether to the angels? (10) Whether it is due to the human body? (11) Whether three aureoles are fittingly assigned? (12) Whether the virgin's aureole is the greatest? (13) Whether one has the same aureole in a higher degree than another?

FIRST ARTICLE

WHETHER THE AUREOLE IS THE SAME AS THE ESSENTIAL REWARD WHICH IS CALLED THE AUREA?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the aureole is not distinct from the essential reward which is called the *aurea*. For the essential reward is beatitude itself. Now according to Boëthius (*De Consol.* iii.), beatitude is *a state rendered perfect by the aggregate of all goods*. Therefore the essential reward includes every good possessed in heaven; so that the aureole is included in the *aurea*.

Obj. 2. Further, *More* and *less* do not change a species. But those who keep the counsels and commandments receive a greater reward than those who keep the commandments only, nor seemingly does their reward differ, except in one reward being greater than another. Since then the aureole denotes the reward due to works of perfection it would seem that it does not signify something distinct from the *aurea*.

Obj. 3. Further, Reward corresponds to merit. Now charity is the root of all merit. Since then the *aurea* corresponds to charity, it would seem that there will be no reward in heaven other than the *aurea*.

Obj. 4. Further, *All the blessed are taken into the angelic orders* as Gregory declares (*Hom. xxxiv. in Ev.*). Now as regards the angels, *though some of them receive certain gifts in a higher degree, nothing is possessed by any of them exclusively, for all gifts are in all of them, though not equally, because some are endowed more highly than others with gifts which, however, they all possess*, as Gregory says (*ibid.*). Therefore as regards the blessed, there will be no reward other than that which is common to all. Therefore the aureole is not a distinct reward from the *aurea*.

Obj. 5. Further, A higher reward is due to higher merit. If, then, the *aurea* is due to works which are of obligation, and the aureole to works of counsel, the aureole will be more perfect than the *aurea*, and consequently should not be expressed by a diminutive.* Therefore it would seem that the aureole is not a distinct reward from the *aurea*.

On the contrary, A gloss† on Exod. xxv. 24, 25, *Thou shalt make . . . another little golden crown (coronam aureolam)*, says: *This crown denotes the new hymn which the virgins alone sing in the presence of the Lamb*. Wherefore apparently the aureole is a crown awarded, not to all, but especially to some: whereas the *aurea* is awarded to all the blessed. Therefore the aureole is distinct from the *aurea*.

Further, A crown is due to the fight which is followed by

* *Aureola*, i.e., a little *aurea*.

† Ven. Bede, *De Tabernaculis* i. 6.

victory: *He . . . is not crowned except he strive lawfully* (2 Tim. ii. 5). Hence where there is a special kind of conflict, there should be a special crown. Now in certain works there is a special kind of conflict. Therefore they deserve a special kind of crown, which we call an aureole.

Further, The Church militant comes down from the Church triumphant: *I saw the Holy City*, etc. (Apoc. xxi. 2). Now in the Church militant special rewards are given to those who perform special deeds, for instance a crown to the conqueror, a prize to the runner. Therefore the same should obtain in the Church triumphant.

I answer that, Man's essential reward, which is his beatitude, consists in the perfect union of the soul with God, inasmuch as it enjoys God perfectly as seen and loved perfectly. Now this reward is called a *crown* or *aurea* metaphorically, both with reference to merit which is gained by a kind of conflict,—since *the life of man upon earth is a warfare* (Job vii. 1),—and with reference to the reward whereby in a way man is made a participator of the Godhead, and consequently endowed with regal power: *Thou hast made us to our God a kingdom*, etc. (Apoc. v. 10); for a crown is the proper sign of regal power.

In like manner the accidental reward which is added to the essential has the character of a crown. For a crown signifies some kind of perfection, on account of its circular shape, so that for this very reason it is becoming to the perfection of the blessed. Since, however, nothing can be added to the essential, but what is less than it, the additional reward is called an *aureole*. Now something may be added in two ways to this essential reward which we call the *aurea*. First, in consequence of a condition attaching to the nature of the one rewarded: thus the glory of the body is added to the beatitude of the soul, wherefore this same glory of the body is sometimes called an *aureole*. Thus a gloss of Bede on Exod. xxv. 25, *Thou . . . shalt make another little golden crown*, says that *finally the aureole is added, when it is stated in the Scriptures that a higher degree of glory is in store for us when our bodies are resumed*. But

it is not in this sense that we speak of an aureole now. Secondly, in consequence of the nature of the meritorious act. Now this has the character of merit on two counts, whence also it has the character of good. First, to wit, from its root which is charity, since it is referred to the last end, and thus there is due to it the essential reward, namely the attainment of the end, and this is the *aurea*. Secondly, from the very genus of the act which derives a certain praiseworthiness from its due circumstances, from the habit eliciting it and from its proximate end, and thus is due to it a kind of accidental reward which we call an *aureole*: and it is in this sense that we regard the aureole now. Accordingly it must be said that an *aureole* denotes something added to the *aurea*, a kind of joy, to wit, in the works one has done, in that they have the character of a signal victory: for this joy is distinct from the joy in being united to God, which is called the *aurea*. Some, however, affirm that the common reward, which is the *aurea*, receives the name of *aureole*, according as it is given to virgins, martyrs, or doctors: even as money receives the name of debt through being due to some one, though the money and the debt are altogether the same. And that nevertheless this does not imply that the essential reward is any greater when it is called an *aureole*; but that it corresponds to a more excellent act, more excellent not in intensity of merit but in the manner of meriting; so that although two persons may have the Divine vision with equal clearness, it is called an *aureole* in one and not in the other, in so far as it corresponds to higher merit as regards the way of meriting. But this would seem contrary to the meaning of the gloss quoted above. For if *aurea* and *aureole* were the same, the *aureole* would not be described as added to the *aurea*. Moreover, since reward corresponds to merit, a more excellent reward must needs correspond to this more excellent way of meriting: and it is this excellence that we call an *aureole*. Hence it follows that an *aureole* differs from the *aurea*.

Reply Obj. 1. Beatitude includes all the goods necessary

for man's perfect life consisting in his perfect operation. Yet some things can be added, not as being necessary for that perfect operation as though it were impossible without them, but as adding to the glory of beatitude. Hence they regard the well-being of beatitude and a certain fitness thereto. Even so civic happiness is embellished by nobility and bodily beauty and so forth, and yet it is possible without them as stated in *Ethic.* i. 8: and thus is the aureole in comparison with the happiness of heaven.

Reply Obj. 2. He who keeps the counsels and the commandments always merits more than he who keeps the commandments only, if we gather the notion of merit in works from the very genus of those works; but not always if we gauge the merit from its root, charity: since sometimes a man keeps the commandments alone out of greater charity than one who keeps both commandments and counsels. For the most part, however, the contrary happens, because the *proof of love is in the performance of deeds*, as Gregory says (*Hom. xxx. in Ev.*). Wherefore it is not the more excellent essential reward that is called an aureole, but that which is added to the essential reward without reference to the essential reward of the possessor of an aureole being greater, or less than, or equal to the essential reward of one who has no aureole.

Reply Obj. 3. Charity is the first principle of merit: but our actions are the instruments, so to speak, whereby we merit. Now in order to obtain an effect there is requisite not only a due disposition in the first mover, but also a right disposition in the instrument. Hence something principal results in the effect with reference to the first mover, and something secondary with reference to the instrument. Wherefore in the reward also there is something on the part of charity, namely the *aurea*, and something on the part of the kind of work, namely the *aureole*.

Reply Obj. 4. All the angels merited their beatitude by the same kind of act namely by turning to God: and consequently no particular reward is found in anyone which

another has not in some way. But men merit beatitude by different kinds of acts: and so the comparison fails.

Nevertheless among men what one seems to have specially, all have in common in some way, in so far as each one, by charity, deems another's good his own. Yet this joy whereby one shares another's joy cannot be called an aureole, because it is not given him as a reward for his victory, but regards more the victory of another: whereas a crown is awarded the victors themselves and not to those who rejoice with them in the victory.

Reply Obj. 5. The merit arising from charity is more excellent than that which arises from the kind of action: just as the end to which charity directs us is more excellent than the things directed to that end, and with which our actions are concerned. Wherefore the reward corresponding to merit by reason of charity, however little it may be, is greater than any reward corresponding to an action by reason of its genus. Hence *aureole* is used as a diminutive in comparison with *aurea*.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE AUREOLE DIFFERS FROM THE FRUIT ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the aureole does not differ from the fruit. For different rewards are not due to the same merit. Now the aureole and the hundredfold fruit correspond to the same merit, according to a gloss on Matth. xiii. 8, *Some a hundredfold*. Therefore the aureole is the same as the fruit.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*De Virgin.* xlv.) that the *hundredfold fruit is due to the martyrs, and also to virgins*. Therefore the fruit is a reward common to virgins and martyrs. But the aureole also is due to them. Therefore the aureole is the same as the fruit.

Obj. 3. Further, There are only two rewards in beatitude, namely the essential, and the accidental which is added to the essential. Now that which is added to the essential

reward is called an aureole, as evidenced by the statement (Exod. xxv. 25) that the little crown (*aureola*) is added to the crown. But the fruit is not the essential reward, for in that case it would be due to all the blessed. Therefore it is the same as the aureole.

On the contrary, Things which are not divided in the same way are not of the same nature. Now fruit and aureole are not divided in the same way, since aureole is divided into the aureole of virgins, of martyrs, and of doctors: whereas fruit is divided into the fruit of the married, of widows, and of virgins. Therefore fruit and aureole are not the same.

Further, If fruit and aureole were the same, the aureole would be due to whomsoever the fruit is due. But this is manifestly untrue, since a fruit is due to widowhood, while an aureole is not. Therefore, etc.

I answer that, Metaphorical expressions can be taken in various ways, according as we find resemblances to the various properties of the thing from which the comparison is taken. Now since fruit, properly speaking, is applied to material things born of the earth, we employ it variously in a spiritual sense, with reference to the various conditions that obtain in material fruits. For the material fruit has sweetness whereby it refreshes so far as it is used by man: again it is the last thing to which the operation of nature attains: moreover it is that to which husbandry looks forward as the result of sowing or any other process. Accordingly fruit is taken in a spiritual sense sometimes for that which refreshes, as being the last end: and according to this signification we are said to enjoy (*frui*) God perfectly in heaven, and imperfectly on the way. From this signification we have fruition which is a dowry: but we are not speaking of fruit in this sense now. Sometimes fruit signifies spiritually that which refreshes only, though it is not the last end; and thus the virtues are called fruits, inasmuch as *they refresh the mind with genuine sweetness*, as Ambrose says.* In this sense fruit is taken (Gal. vi. 22):

* *De Parad.* xiii.

The fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, etc. Nor again is this the sense in which we speak of fruit now; for we have treated of this already.*

We may, however, take spiritual fruit in another sense, in likeness to material fruit, inasmuch as material fruit is a profit expected from the labour of husbandry: so that we call fruit that reward which man acquires from his labour in this life: and thus every reward which by our labours we shall acquire for the future life is called a *fruit*. In this sense fruit is taken (Rom. vi. 22): *You have your fruit unto sanctification, and the end life everlasting.* Yet neither in this sense do we speak of fruit now, but we are treating of fruit as being the product of seed: for it is in this sense that our Lord speaks of fruit (Matth. xiii. 23), where He divides fruit into thirtyfold, sixtyfold, and hundredfold. Now fruit is the product of seed in so far as the seed power is capable of transforming the humours of the soil into its own nature; and the more efficient this power, and the better prepared the soil, the more plentiful fruit will result. Now the spiritual seed which is sown in us is the Word of God: wherefore the more a person is transformed into a spiritual nature by withdrawing from carnal things, the greater is the fruit of the Word in him. Accordingly the fruit of the Word of God differs from the *aurea* and the *aureole*, in that the *aurea* consists in the joy one has in God, and the *aureole* in the joy one has in the perfection of one's works, whereas the *fruit* consists in the joy that the worker has in his own disposition as to his degree of spirituality to which he has attained through the seed of God's Word.

Some, however, distinguish between *aureole* and *fruit*, by saying that the *aureole* is due to the fighter, according to 2 Tim. ii. 5, *He . . . shall not be crowned, except he strive lawfully*; whereas the *fruit* is due to the labourer, according to the saying of Wisdom iii. 15, *The fruit of good labours is glorious*. Others again say that the *aurea* regards conversion to God, while the *aureole* and the *fruit* regard things directed to the end; yet so that the *fruit* regards the will rather, and the

* Cf. I.-II., Q. LXX., A. 1, *ad* 2.

aureole the body. Since, however, labour and strife are in the same subject and about the same matter, and since the body's reward depends on the soul's, these explanations of the difference between fruit, aurea and aureole would only imply a logical difference: and this cannot be, since fruit is assigned to some to whom no aureole is assigned.

Reply Obj. 1. There is nothing incongruous if various rewards correspond to the same merit according to the various things contained therein. Wherefore to virginity corresponds the aurea in so far as virginity is kept for God's sake at the command of charity; the aureole, in so far as virginity is a work of perfection having the character of a signal victory; and the fruit, in so far as by virginity a person acquires a certain spirituality by withdrawing from carnal things.

Reply Obj. 2. Fruit, according to the proper acceptation as we are speaking of it now, does not denote the reward common to martyrdom and virginity, but that which corresponds to the three degrees of continency. This gloss which states that the hundredfold fruit corresponds to martyrs takes fruit in a broad sense, according as any reward is called a fruit, the hundredfold fruit thus denoting the reward due to any perfect works whatever.

Reply Obj. 3. Although the aureole is an accidental reward added to the essential reward, nevertheless not every accidental reward is an aureole, but only that which is assigned to works of perfection, whereby man is most conformed to Christ in the achievement of a perfect victory. Hence it is not unfitting that another accidental reward, which is called the fruit, be due sometimes to the withdrawal from a carnal life.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER A FRUIT IS DUE TO THE VIRTUE OF CONTINENCE
ALONE?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that a fruit is not due to the virtue of continence alone. For a gloss on 1 Cor. xv. 41,

One is the glory of the sun, says that the worth of those who have the hundredfold fruit is compared to the glory of the sun; to the glory of the moon those who have the sixtyfold fruit; and to the stars those who have the thirtyfold fruit. Now this difference of glory, in the meaning of the Apostle, regards any difference whatever of beatitude. Therefore the various fruits should correspond to none but the virtue of continence.

Obj. 2. Further, Fruits are so called from fruition. But fruition belongs to the essential reward which corresponds to all the virtues. Therefore, etc.

Obj. 3. Further, Fruit is due to labour: *The fruit of good labours is glorious* (Wis. iii. 15). Now there is greater labour in fortitude than in temperance or continence. Therefore fruit does not correspond to continence alone.

Obj. 4. Further, It is more difficult not to exceed the measure in food which is necessary for life, than in sexual matters without which life can be sustained: and thus the labour of frugality is greater than that of continence. Therefore fruit corresponds to frugality rather than to continence.

Obj. 5. Further, Fruit implies delight, and delight regards especially the end. Since then the theological virtues have the end for their object, namely God Himself, it would seem that to them especially the fruit should correspond.

On the contrary is the statement of the gloss on Matth. xiii. 23, *The one a hundredfold*, which assigns the fruits to virginity, widowhood, and conjugal continence, which are parts of continence.

I answer that, A fruit is a reward due to a person in that he passes from the carnal to the spiritual life. Consequently a fruit corresponds especially to that virtue which more than any other frees man from subjection to the flesh. Now this is the effect of continence, since it is by sexual pleasures that the soul is especially subject to the flesh; so much so that in the carnal act, according to Jerome (*Ep. ad Ageruch.*), *not even the spirit of prophecy touches the heart of the prophet, nor is it possible to understand anything in the midst of that pleasure*, as the Philosopher says (*Ethic. vii. 11*).

Therefore fruit corresponds to continence rather than to another virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. This gloss takes fruit in a broad sense, according as any reward is called a fruit.

Reply Obj. 2. Fruition does not take its name from fruit by reason of any comparison with fruit in the sense in which we speak of it now, as evidenced by what has been said.

Reply Obj. 3. Fruit, as we speak of it now, corresponds to labour not as resulting in fatigue, but as resulting in the production of fruit. Hence a man calls his crops his labour, inasmuch as he laboured for them, or produced them by his labour. Now the comparison to fruit, as produced from seed, is more adapted to continence than to fortitude, because man is not subjected to the flesh by the passions of fortitude, as he is by the passions with which continence is concerned.

Reply Obj. 4. Although the pleasures of the table are more necessary than the pleasures of sex, they are not so strong: wherefore the soul is not so much subjected to the flesh thereby.

Reply Obj. 5. Fruit is not taken here in the sense in which fruition applies to delight in the end; but in another sense as stated above (A. 2). Hence the argument proves nothing.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THREE FRUITS ARE FITTINGLY ASSIGNED TO THE
THREE PARTS OF CONTINENCE ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that three fruits are unfittingly assigned to the three parts of continence: because twelve fruits of the Spirit are assigned, *charity, joy, peace*, etc. (Gal. v. 22). Therefore seemingly we should reckon only three.

Obj. 2. Further, Fruit denotes a special reward. Now the reward assigned to virgins, widows, and married persons is not a special reward, because all who are to be saved are comprised under one of these three, since no one is saved who lacks continence, and continence is adequately divided

by these three. Therefore three fruits are unfittingly assigned to the three aforesaid.

Obj. 3. Further, Just as widowhood surpasses conjugal continence, so does virginity surpass widowhood. But the excess of sixtyfold over thirtyfold is not as the excess of a hundredfold over sixtyfold; neither in arithmetical proportion, since sixty exceeds thirty by thirty, and a hundred exceeds sixty by forty; nor in geometrical proportion, since sixty is twice thirty and a hundred surpasses sixty as containing the whole and two-thirds thereof. Therefore the fruits are unfittingly adapted to the degrees of continence.

Obj. 4. Further, The statements contained in Holy Writ stand for all time: *Heaven and earth shall pass away, but My words shall not pass away* (Luke xxi. 33): whereas human institutions are liable to change every day. Therefore human institutions are not to be taken as a criterion of the statements of Holy Writ: and it would seem in consequence that the explanation of these fruits given by Bede is unfitting. For he says (*Expos. in Luc. iii. 8*) that *the thirtyfold fruit is assigned to married persons, because in the signs drawn on the 'abacus' the number 30 is denoted by the thumb and index finger touching one another at the tips as though kissing one another: so that the number 30 denotes the embraces of married persons. The number 60 is denoted by the contact of the index finger above the middle joint of the thumb, so that the index finger by lying over the thumb and weighing on it, signifies the burden which widows have to bear in this world. When, however, in the course of enumeration we come to the number 100 we pass from the left to the right hand, so that the number 100 denotes virginity, which has a share in the angelic excellence; for the angels are on the right hand, i.e. in glory, while we are on the left on account of the imperfection of the present life.*

I answer that, By continence, to which the fruit corresponds, man is brought to a kind of spiritual nature, by withdrawing from carnal things. Consequently various fruits are distinguished according to the various manners of the spirituality resulting from continence. Now there

is a certain spirituality which is necessary, and one which is superabundant. The spirituality that is necessary consists in the rectitude of the spirit not being disturbed by the pleasures of the flesh: and this obtains when one makes use of carnal pleasures according to the order of right reason. This is the spirituality of married persons. Spirituality is superabundant when a man withdraws himself entirely from those carnal pleasures which stifle the spirit. This may be done in two ways: either in respect of all time past, present, and future, and this is the spirituality of virgins; or in respect of a particular time, and this is the spirituality of widows. Accordingly to those who keep conjugal continence, the thirtyfold fruit is awarded; to those who keep the continence of widows, the sixtyfold fruit; and to those who keep virginal continence, the hundredfold fruit: and this for the reason given by Bede quoted above, although another motive may be found in the very nature of the numbers. For 30 is the product of 3 multiplied by 10. Now 3 is the number of everything, as stated in *De Cælo et Mundo*, i., and contains a certain perfection common to all, namely of beginning, middle, and end. Wherefore the number 30 is fittingly assigned to married persons, in whom no other perfection is added to the observance of the Decalogue, signified by the number 10, than the common perfection without which there is no salvation. The number six the multiplication of which by 10 amounts to 60 has perfection from its parts, being the aggregate of all its parts taken together; wherefore it corresponds fittingly to widowhood, wherein we find perfect withdrawal from carnal pleasures as to all its circumstances (which are the parts so to speak of a virtuous act), since widowhood uses no carnal pleasures in connexion with any person, place, or any other circumstance; which was not the case with conjugal continence. The number 100 corresponds fittingly to virginity; because the number 10 of which 100 is a multiple is the limit of numbers: and in like manner virginity occupies the limit of spirituality, since no further spirituality can be added to it. The number 100 also being a square

number has perfection from its figure: for a square figure is perfect through being equal on all sides, since all its sides are equal: wherefore it is adapted to virginity wherein incorruption is found equally as to all times.

Reply Obj. 1. Fruit is not taken there in the sense in which we are taking it now.

Reply Obj. 2. Nothing obliges us to hold that fruit is a reward that is not common to all who will be saved. For not only the essential reward is common to all, but also a certain accidental reward, such as joy in those works without which one cannot be saved. Yet it may be said that the fruits are not becoming to all who will be saved, as is evidently the case with those who repent in the end after leading an incontinent life, for to such no fruit is due but only the essential reward.

Reply Obj. 3. The distinction of the fruits is to be taken according to the species and figures of the numbers rather than according to their quantity. Nevertheless even if we regard the excess in point of quantity, we may find an explanation. For the married man abstains only from one that is not his, the widow from both hers and not hers, so that in the latter case we find the notion of double, just as 60 is the double of 30. Again 100 is $60 + 40$, which latter number is the product of 4×10 , and the number 4 is the first solid and square number. Thus the addition of this number is fitting to virginity, which adds perpetual incorruption to the perfection of widowhood.

Reply Obj. 4. Although these numerical signs are a human institution, they are founded somewhat on the nature of things, in so far as the numbers are denoted in gradation, according to the order of the aforesaid joints and contacts.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN AUREOLE IS DUE ON ACCOUNT OF
VIRGINITY ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that an aureole is not due on account of virginity. For where there is greater difficulty in the work, a greater reward is due. Now widows have greater difficulty than virgins in abstaining from the works of the flesh. For Jerome says (*Ep. ad Ageruch.*) that the greater difficulty certain persons experience in abstaining from the allurements of pleasure, the greater their reward, and he is speaking in praise of widows. Moreover, the Philosopher says (*De Anim. Hist.* vii.) that *young women who have been deflowered desire sexual intercourse the more for the recollection of the pleasure.* Therefore the aureole which is the greatest reward is due to widows more than to virgins.

Obj. 2. Further, If an aureole were due to virginity, it would be especially found where there is the most perfect virginity. Now the most perfect virginity is in the Blessed Virgin, wherefore she is called the Virgin of virgins: and yet no aureole is due to her because she experienced no conflict in being continent, for she was not infected with the corruption of the fomes.* Therefore an aureole is not due to virginity.

Obj. 3. Further, A special reward is not due to that which has not been at all times praiseworthy. Now it would not have been praiseworthy to observe virginity in the state of innocence, since then was it commanded: *Increase and multiply and fill the earth* (Gen. i. 28): nor again during the time of the Law, since the barren were accursed. Therefore an aureole is not due to virginity.

Obj. 4. Further, The same reward is not due to virginity observed, and virginity lost. Yet an aureole is sometimes due to lost virginity; for instance if a maiden be violated

* Cf. P. III., Q. XXVII., A. 3.

unwillingly at the order of a tyrant for confessing Christ. Therefore an aureole is not due to virginity.

Obj. 5. Further, A special reward is not due to that which is in us by nature. But virginity is inborn in every man both good and wicked. Therefore an aureole is not due to virginity.

Obj. 6. Further, As widowhood is to the sixtyfold fruit, so is virginity to the hundredfold fruit, and to the aureole. Now the sixtyfold fruit is not due to every widow, but only, as some say, to one who vows to remain a widow. Therefore it would seem that neither is the aureole due to any kind of virginity, but only to that which is observed by vow.

Obj. 7. Further, Reward is not given to that which is done of necessity, since all merit depends on the will. But some are virgins of necessity, such as those who are naturally cold-blooded, and eunuchs. Therefore an aureole is not always due to virginity.

On the contrary, A gloss on Exod. xxv. 25: *Thou shalt also make a little golden crown (coronam aureolam) says: This crown denotes the new hymn which the virgins sing in the presence of the Lamb, those, to wit, who follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth.* Therefore the reward due to virginity is called an aureole.

Further, It is written (Isa. lvi. 4): *Thus saith the Lord to the eunuchs: and the text continues (verse 5): I will give to them . . . a name better than sons and daughters: and a gloss* says: This refers to their peculiar and transcendent glory.* Now the eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven (Matth. xix. 12) denote virgins. Therefore it would seem that some special reward is due to virginity, and this is called the aureole.

I answer that, Where there is a notable kind of victory, a special crown is due. Wherefore since by virginity a person wins a signal victory over the flesh, against which a continuous battle is waged: *The flesh lusteth against the spirit, etc.* (Gal. v. 17), a special crown called the aureole is due to virginity. This indeed is the common opinion of

* S. Augustine, *De Virginit.* xxv.

all; but all are not agreed as to the kind of virginity to which it is due. For some say that the aureole is due to the act. So that she who actually remains a virgin will have the aureole provided she be of the number of the saved. But this would seem unreasonable, because in this case those who have the will to marry and nevertheless die before marrying would have the aureole. Hence others hold that the aureole is due to the state and not to the act: so that those virgins alone merit the aureole who by vow have placed themselves in the state of observing perpetual virginity. But this also seems unreasonable, because it is possible to have the same intention of observing virginity without a vow as with a vow. Hence it may be said otherwise that merit is due to every virtuous act commanded by charity. Now virginity comes under the genus of virtue in so far as perpetual incorruption of mind and body is an object of choice, as appears from what has been said above (iv. *Sent.* D. 33. Q. III., AA. 1, 2).^{*} Consequently the aureole is due to those virgins alone, who had the purpose of observing perpetual virginity, whether or no they have confirmed this purpose by vow,—and this I say with reference to the aureole in its proper signification of a reward due to merit,—although this purpose may at some time have been interrupted, integrity of the flesh remaining withal, provided it be found at the end of life, because virginity of the mind may be restored, although virginity of the flesh cannot. If, however, we take the aureole in its broad sense for any joy added to the essential joy of heaven, the aureole will be applicable even to those who are incorrupt in flesh, although they had not the purpose of observing perpetual virginity. For without doubt they will rejoice in the incorruption of their body, even as the innocent will rejoice in having been free from sin, although they had no opportunity of sinning, as in the case of baptized children. But this is not the proper meaning of an aureole, although it is very commonly taken in this sense.

Reply Obj. 1. In some respects virgins experience a

* Cf. II.-II., Q. CLII., AA. 1, 3.

greater conflict in remaining continent; and in other respects, widows, other things being equal. For virgins are inflamed by concupiscence, and by the desire of experience, which arises from a certain curiosity as it were, which makes man more willing to see what he has never seen. Sometimes, moreover, this concupiscence is increased by their esteeming the pleasure to be greater than it is in reality, and by their failing to consider the grievances attaching to this pleasure. In these respects widows experience the lesser conflict, yet theirs is the greater conflict by reason of their recollection of the pleasure. Moreover, in different subjects one motive is stronger than another, according to the various conditions and dispositions of the subject, because some are more susceptible to one, and others to another. However, whatever we may say of the degree of conflict, this is certain,—that the virgin's victory is more perfect than the widow's, for the most perfect and most brilliant kind of victory is never to have yielded to the foe: and the crown is due, not to the battle but to the victory gained by the battle.

Reply Obj. 2. There are two opinions about this. For some say that the Blessed Virgin has not an aureole in reward of her virginity, if we take aureole in the proper sense as referring to a conflict, but that she has something more than an aureole, on account of her most perfect purpose of observing virginity. Others say that she has an aureole even in its proper signification, and that a most transcendent one: for though she experienced no conflict, she had a certain conflict of the flesh, but owing to the exceeding strength of her virtue, her flesh was so subdued that she did not feel this conflict. This, however, would seem to be said without reason, for since we believe the Blessed Virgin to have been altogether immune from the inclination of the fomes on account of the perfection of her sanctification, it is wicked to suppose that there was in her any conflict with the flesh, since suchlike conflict is only from the inclination of the fomes, nor can temptation from the flesh be without sin, as declared by a gloss* on 2 Cor. xii. 7,

* S. Augustine, *De Civ. Dei.* xix. 4.

There was given me a sting of my flesh. Hence we must say that she has an aureole properly speaking, so as to be conformed in this to those other members of the Church in whom virginity is found: and although she had no conflict by reason of the temptation which is of the flesh, she had the temptation which is of the enemy, who feared not even Christ (Matth. iv.).

Reply Obj. 3. The aureole is not due to virginity except as adding some excellence to the other degrees of continence. If Adam had not sinned, virginity would have had no perfection over conjugal continence, since in that case marriage would have been honourable, and the marriage-bed unsullied, for it would not have been dishonoured by lust: hence virginity would not then have been observed, nor would an aureole have been due to it. But the condition of human nature being changed, virginity has a special beauty of its own, and consequently a special reward is assigned to it.

During the time of the Mosaic law, when the worship of God was to be continued by means of the carnal act, it was not altogether praiseworthy to abstain from carnal intercourse: wherefore no special reward would be given for such a purpose unless it came from a Divine inspiration, as is believed to have been the case with Jeremias and Elias, of whose marriage we do not read.

Reply Obj. 4. If a virgin is violated, she does not forfeit the aureole, provided she retain unfailingly the purpose of observing perpetual virginity, and nowise consent to the act. Nor does she forfeit virginity thereby; and be this said, whether she be violated for the faith, or for any other cause whatever. But if she suffer this for the faith, this will count to her for merit, and will be a kind of martyrdom: wherefore Lucy said: *If thou causest me to be violated against my will, my chastity will receive a double crown*;* not that she has two aureoles of virginity, but that she will receive a double reward, one for observing virginity, the other for the outrage she has suffered. Even supposing

* Office of S. Lucy; *le ct.* vi. (Dominican Breviary, December 13th)

that one thus violated should conceive, she would not for that reason forfeit her virginity: nor would she be equal to Christ's mother, in whom there was integrity of the flesh together with integrity of the mind.*

Reply Obj. 5. Virginity is inborn in us as to that which is material in virginity: but the purpose of observing perpetual incorruption, whence virginity derives its merit, is not inborn, but comes from the gift of grace.

Reply Obj. 6. The sixtyfold fruit is due, not to every widow, but only to those who retain the purpose of remaining widows, even though they do not make it the matter of a vow, even as we have said in regard to virginity.

Reply Obj. 7. If cold-blooded persons and eunuchs have the will to observe perpetual incorruption even though they were capable of sexual intercourse, they must be called virgins and merit the aureole: for they make a virtue of necessity. If, on the other hand, they have the will to marry if they could, they do not merit the aureole. Hence Augustine says (*De Sancta Virgin.*, xxiv.): *For those like eunuchs whose bodies are so formed that they are unable to beget, it suffices when they become Christians and keep the commandments of God, that they have a mind to have a wife if they could, in order to rank with the faithful who are married.*

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN AUREOLE IS DUE TO MARTYRS?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that an aureole is not due to martyrs. For an aureole is a reward given for works of supererogation, wherefore Bede commenting on Exod. xxv. 25, *Thou shalt also make another . . . crown*, says: *This may be rightly referred to the reward of those who by freely choosing a more perfect life go beyond the general commandments.* But to die for confessing the faith is sometimes an obligation, and not a work of supererogation,

* Cf. II.-II., Q. LXIV., A. 3, *ad* 3; Q. CXXIV., A. 4, *ad* 2; Q. CLII., A. 1.

as appears from the words of Rom. x. 10, *With the heart, we believe unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation.* Therefore an aureole is not always due to martyrdom.

Obj. 2. Further, According to Gregory (*Moral. ix.*)* *the freer the service, the more acceptable it is.* Now martyrdom has a minimum of freedom, since it is a punishment inflicted by another person with force. Therefore an aureole is not due to martyrdom, since it is accorded to surpassing merit.

Obj. 3. Further, Martyrdom consists not only in suffering death externally, but also in the interior act of the will: wherefore Bernard in a sermon on the Holy Innocents distinguishes three kinds of martyr,—in will and not in death, as John; in both will and death, as Stephen; in death and not in will, as the Innocents. Accordingly if an aureole were due to martyrdom, it would be due to voluntary rather than external martyrdom, since merit proceeds from will. Yet such is not the case. Therefore an aureole is not due to martyrdom.

Obj. 4. Further, Bodily suffering is less than mental, which consists of internal sorrow and affliction of soul. But internal suffering is also a kind of martyrdom: wherefore Jerome says in a sermon on the Assumption:† *I should say rightly that the Mother of God was both virgin and martyr, although she ended her days in peace, wherefore: Thine own soul a sword hath pierced—namely for her Son's death.* Since then no aureole corresponds to interior sorrow, neither should one correspond to outward suffering.

Obj. 5. Further, Penance itself is a kind of martyrdom, wherefore Gregory says (*Hom. iii. in Ev.*): *Although persecution has ceased to offer the opportunity, yet the peace we enjoy is not without its martyrdom; since even if we no longer yield the life of the body to the sword, yet do we slay fleshly desires in the soul with the sword of the spirit.* But no aureole is due to penance which consists in external works. Neither therefore is an aureole due to every external martyrdom.

* Cf. S. Augustine, *De Adult. Conjug.*, i. 14.

† *Ep. ad Paul. et Eustoch.*

Obj. 6. Further, An aureole is not due to an unlawful work. Now it is unlawful to lay hands on oneself, as Augustine declares (*De Civ. Dei*, i.), and yet the Church celebrates the martyrdom of some who laid hands upon themselves in order to escape the fury of tyrants, as in the case of certain women at Antioch (Eusebius,—*Eccles. Hist.* viii. 24). Therefore an aureole is not always due to martyrdom.

Obj. 7. Further, It happens at times that a person is wounded for the faith, and survives for some time. Now it is clear that such a one is a martyr, and yet seemingly an aureole is not due to him, since his conflict did not last until death. Therefore an aureole is not always due to martyrdom.

Obj. 8. Further, Some suffer more from the loss of temporal goods than from the affliction even of their own body, and this is shown by their bearing many afflictions for the sake of gain. Therefore if they be despoiled of their temporal goods for Christ's sake they would seem to be martyrs, and yet an aureole is not apparently due to them. Therefore the same conclusion follows as before.

Obj. 9. Further, A martyr would seem to be no other than one who dies for the faith, wherefore Isidore says (*Etym.* vii.): *They are called martyrs in Greek, witnesses in Latin: because they suffered in order to bear witness to Christ, and strove unto death for the truth.* Now there are virtues more excellent than faith, such as justice, charity, and so forth, since these cannot be without grace, and yet no aureole is due to them. Therefore seemingly neither is an aureole due to martyrdom.

Obj. 10. Further, Even as the truth of faith is from God, so is all other truth, as Ambrose* declares, since *every truth by whomsoever uttered is from the Holy Ghost.* Therefore if an aureole is due to one who suffers death for the truth of faith, in like manner it is also due to those who suffer death for any other virtue: and yet apparently this is not the case.

Obj. 11. Further, The common good is greater than the good of the individual. Now if a man die in a just war in

* Another author on 1 Cor. xii. 3, *No man can say*, etc.

order to save his country, an aureole is not due to him. Therefore even though he be put to death in order to keep the faith that is in himself, no aureole is due to him: and consequently the same conclusion follows as above.

Obj. 12. Further, All merit proceeds from the free will. Yet the Church celebrates the martyrdom of some who had not the use of the free will. Therefore they did not merit an aureole: and consequently an aureole is not due to all martyrs.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Sancta Virgin.* xlv.): *No one, methinks, would dare prefer virginity to martyrdom.* Now an aureole is due to virginity, and consequently also to martyrdom.

Further, The crown is due to one who has striven. But in martyrdom the strife presents a special difficulty. Therefore a special aureole is due thereto.

I answer that, Just as in the spirit there is a conflict with the internal concupiscences, so is there in man a conflict with the passion that is inflicted from without. Wherefore, just as a special crown, which we call an aureole, is due to the most perfect victory whereby we triumph over the concupiscences of the flesh, in a word to virginity, so too an aureole is due to the most perfect victory that is won against external assaults. Now the most perfect victory over passion caused from without is considered from two points of view. First from the greatness of the passion. Now among all passions inflicted from without, death holds the first place, just as sexual concupiscences are chief among internal passions. Consequently, when a man conquers death and things directed to death, his is a most perfect victory. Secondly, the perfection of victory is considered from the point of view of the motive of conflict, when, to wit, a man strives for the most honourable cause; which is Christ Himself. Both these things are to be found in martyrdom, which is death suffered for Christ's sake: for *it is not the pain but the cause that makes the martyr*, as Augustine says (*Contra Crescon.* iii.). Consequently an aureole is due to martyrdom as well as to virginity.

Reply Obj. 1. To suffer death for Christ's sake is, absolutely

speaking, a work of supererogation; since every one is not bound to confess his faith in the face of a persecutor: yet in certain cases it is necessary for salvation, when, to wit, a person is seized by a persecutor and interrogated as to his faith which he is then bound to confess. Nor does it follow that he does not merit an aureole. For an aureole is due to a work of supererogation, not as such, but as having a certain perfection. Wherefore so long as this perfection remains, even though the supererogation cease, one merits the aureole.

Reply Obj. 2. A reward is due to martyrdom, not in respect of the exterior infliction, but because it is suffered voluntarily: since we merit only through that which is in us. And the more that which one suffers voluntarily is difficult and naturally repugnant to the will, the more is the will that suffers it for Christ's sake shown to be firmly established in Christ, and consequently a higher reward is due to him.

Reply Obj. 3. There are certain acts which, in their very selves, contain intense pleasure or difficulty: and in such the act always adds to the character of merit or demerit, for as much as in the performance of the act the will, on account of the aforesaid intensity, must needs undergo an alteration from the state in which it was before. Consequently, other things being equal, one who performs an act of lust sins more than one who merely consents in the act, because in the very act the will is increased. In like manner since in the act of suffering martyrdom there is a very great difficulty, the will to suffer martyrdom does not reach the degree of merit due to actual martyrdom by reason of its difficulty: although indeed it may possibly attain to a higher reward, if we consider the root of merit, since the will of one man to suffer martyrdom may possibly proceed from a greater charity than another man's act of martyrdom. Hence one who is willing to be a martyr may by his will merit an essential reward equal to or greater than that which is due to an actual martyr. But the aureole is due to the difficulty inherent to the conflict itself of martyrdom: wherefore it is not due to those who are martyrs only in will.

Reply Obj. 4. Just as pleasures of touch, which are the matter of temperance, hold the chief place among all pleasures both internal and external, so pains of touch surpass all other pains. Consequently an aureole is due to the difficulty of suffering pains of touch, for instance, from blows and so forth, rather than to the difficulty of bearing internal sufferings, by reason of which, however, one is not properly called a martyr, except by a kind of comparison. It is in this sense that Jerome speaks.

Reply Obj. 5. The sufferings of penance are not a martyrdom properly speaking, because they do not consist in things directed to the causing of death, since they are directed merely to the taming of the flesh: and if any one go beyond this measure, such afflictions will be deserving of blame. However such afflictions are spoken of as a martyrdom by a kind of comparison; and they surpass the sufferings of martyrdom in duration but not in intensity.

Reply Obj. 6. According to Augustine (*De Civ. Dei*, i.) it is lawful to no one to lay hands on himself for any reason whatever; unless perchance it be done by Divine instinct as an example of fortitude that others may despise death. Those to whom the objection refers are believed to have brought death on themselves by Divine instinct, and for this reason the Church celebrates their martyrdom.*

Reply Obj. 7. If any one receive a mortal wound for the faith and survive, without doubt he merits the aureole: as instanced in blessed Cecilia who survived for three days, and many martyrs who died in prison. But, even if the wound he receives be not mortal, yet be the occasion of his dying, he is believed to merit the aureole: although some say that he does not merit the aureole if he happen to die through his own carelessness or neglect. For this neglect would not have occasioned his death, except on the supposition of the wound which he received for the faith: and consequently this wound previously received for the faith is the original occasion of his death, so that he would not seem to lose the aureole for that reason, unless his neglect were such as to

* Cf. II.-II., Q. LXIV., A. 5.

involve a mortal sin, which would deprive him of both aurea and aureole. If, however, by some chance or other he were not to die of the mortal wound received, or again if the wounds received were not mortal, and he were to die while in prison, he would still merit the aureole. Hence the martyrdom of some saints is celebrated in the Church for that they died in prison, having been wounded long before, as in the case of Pope Marcellus. Accordingly in whatever way suffering for Christ's sake be continued unto death, whether death ensue or not, a man becomes a martyr and merits the aureole. If, however, it be not continued unto death, this is not a reason for calling a person a martyr, as in the case of the blessed Sylvester, whose feast the Church does not solemnize as a martyr's, since he ended his days in peace, although previously he had undergone certain sufferings.

Reply Obj. 8. Even as temperance is not about pleasures of money, honours, and the like, but only about pleasures of touch as being the principal of all, so fortitude is about dangers of death as being the greatest of all (*Ethic.* iii. 6). Consequently the aureole is due to such injuries only as are inflicted on a person's own body and are of a nature to cause death. Accordingly whether a person lose his temporalities, or his good name, or anything else of the kind, for Christ's sake, he does not for that reason become a martyr, nor merit the aureole. Nor is it possible to love ordinate-ly external things more than one's body; and inordinate love does not help one to merit an aureole: nor again can sorrow for the loss of corporeal things be equal to the sorrow for the slaying of the body and other like things.*

Reply Obj. 9. The sufficient motive for martyrdom is not only confession of the faith, but any other virtue, not civic but infused, that has Christ for its end. For one becomes a witness of Christ by any virtuous act, inasmuch as the works which Christ perfects in us bear witness to His goodness. Hence some virgins were slain for virginity which they desired to keep, for instance blessed Agnes and others whose martyrdom is celebrated by the Church.

* Cf. II.-II., Q. CXXIV., A. 5.

Reply Obj. 10. The truth of faith has Christ for end and object; and therefore the confession thereof, if suffering be added thereto, merits an aureole, not only on the part of the end but also on the part of the matter. But the confession of any other truth is not a sufficient motive for martyrdom by reason of its matter, but only on the part of the end; for instance if a person were willing to be slain for Christ's sake rather than sin against Him by telling any lie whatever.

Reply Obj. 11. The uncreated good surpasses all created good. Hence any created end, whether it be the common or a private good, cannot confer so great a goodness on an act as can the uncreated end, when, to wit, an act is done for God's sake. Hence when a person dies for the common good without referring it to Christ, he will not merit the aureole; but if he refer it to Christ he will merit the aureole and he will be a martyr; for instance, if he defend his country from the attack of an enemy who designs to corrupt the faith of Christ, and suffer death in that defence.

Reply Obj. 12. Some say that the use of reason was by the Divine power accelerated in the Innocents slain for Christ's sake, even as in John the Baptist while yet in his mother's womb: and in that case they were truly martyrs in both act and will, and have the aureole. Others say, however, that they were martyrs in act only and not in will: and this seems to be the opinion of Bernard, who distinguishes three kinds of martyrs, as stated above (*Obj.* 3). In this case the Innocents, even as they do not fulfil all the conditions of martyrdom, and yet are martyrs in a sense, in that they died for Christ, so too they have the aureole, not in all its perfection, but by a kind of participation, in so far as they rejoice in having been slain in Christ's service; thus it was stated above (A. 5) in reference to baptized children, that they will have a certain joy in their innocence and carnal integrity.*

* Cf. II.-II., Q. CXXIV., A. 1, *ad* 1, where S. Thomas declares that the Holy Innocents were truly martyrs.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN AUREOLE IS DUE TO DOCTORS ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that an aureole is not due to doctors. For every reward to be had in the life to come will correspond to some act of virtue. But preaching or teaching is not the act of a virtue. Therefore an aureole is not due to teaching or preaching.

Obj. 2. Further, Teaching and preaching are the result of studying and being taught. Now the things that are rewarded in the future life are not acquired by a man's study, since we merit not by our natural and acquired gifts. Therefore no aureole will be merited in the future life for teaching and preaching.

Obj. 3. Further, Exaltation in the life to come corresponds to humiliation in the present life, because *he that humbleth himself shall be exalted* (Matth. xxiii. 12). But there is no humiliation in teaching and preaching, in fact they are occasions of pride; for a gloss on Matth. iv. 5, *Then the devil took Him up*, says that *the devil deceives many who are puffed up with the honour of the master's chair*. Therefore it would seem that an aureole is not due to preaching and teaching.

On the contrary, A gloss on Eph. i. 18, 19, *That you may know . . . what is the exceeding greatness*, etc., says: *The holy doctors will have an increase of glory above that which all have in common*. Therefore, etc.

Further, A gloss on Cant. viii. 12, *My vineyard is before me*, says: *He describes the peculiar reward which He has prepared for His doctors*. Therefore doctors will have a peculiar reward: and we call this an aureole.

I answer that, Just as by virginity and martyrdom a person wins a most perfect victory over the flesh and the world, so is a most perfect victory gained over the devil, when a person not only refuses to yield to the devil's assaults, but also drives him out, not from himself alone, but from others also. Now this is done by preaching and teaching:

wherefore an aureole is due to preaching and teaching, even as to virginity and martyrdom. Nor can we admit, as some affirm, that it is due to prelates only, who are competent to preach and teach by virtue of their office; but it is due to all whosoever exercise this act lawfully. Nor is it due to prelates, although they have the office of preaching, unless they actually preach, since a crown is due not to the habit, but to the actual strife, according to 2 Tim. ii. 5, *He . . . shall not be* (Vulg.,—*is not*) *crowned, except he strive lawfully.*

Reply Obj. 1. Preaching and teaching are acts of a virtue, namely mercy, wherefore they are reckoned among the spiritual alms-deeds.*

Reply Obj. 2. Although ability to preach and teach is sometimes the outcome of study, the practice of teaching comes from the will, which is informed with charity infused by God: and thus its act can be meritorious.

Reply Obj. 3. Exaltation in this life does not lessen the reward of the other life, except for him who seeks his own glory from that exaltation: whereas he who turns that exaltation to the profit of others acquires thereby a reward for himself. Still, when it is stated that an aureole is due to teaching, this is to be understood of the teaching of things pertaining to salvation, by which teaching the devil is expelled from men's hearts, as by a kind of spiritual weapon, of which it is said (2 Cor. x. 4): *The weapons of our warfare are not carnal but spiritual* (Vulg.,—*but mighty to God*).

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN AUREOLE IS DUE TO CHRIST ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that an aureole is due to Christ. For an aureole is due to virginity, martyrdom, and teaching. Now these three were pre-eminently in Christ. Therefore an aureole is especially due to Him.

Obj. 2. Further, Whatever is most perfect in human

* Cf. II.-II., Q. XXXII., A. 2.

things must be especially ascribed to Christ. Now an aureole is due as the reward of most excellent merits. Therefore it is also due to Christ.

Obj. 3. Further, Cyprian says (*De Habit. Virg.*) that *virginity bears a likeness to God*. Therefore the exemplar of virginity is in God. Therefore it would seem that an aureole is due to Christ even as God.

On the contrary, An aureole is described as *joy in being conformed to Christ*. Now no one is conformed or likened to himself, as the Philosopher says (*Met. x., text. 10, 11*). Therefore an aureole is not due to Christ.

Further, Christ's reward was never increased. Now Christ had no aureole from the moment of His conception, since then He had never fought. Therefore He never had an aureole afterwards.

I answer that, There are two opinions on this point. For some say that Christ has an aureole in its strict sense, seeing that in Him there is both conflict and victory, and consequently a crown in its proper acceptation. But if we consider the question carefully, although the notion of aurea or crown is becoming to Christ, the notion of aureole is not. For from the very fact that aureole is a diminutive term it follows that it denotes something possessed by participation and not in its fulness. Wherefore an aureole is becoming to those who participate in the perfect victory by imitating Him in Whom the fulness of perfect victory is realised. And therefore, since in Christ the notion of victory is found chiefly and fully, for by His victory others are made victors,—as shown by the words of John xvi. 33, *Have confidence, I have overcome the world*, and Apoc. v. 5, *Behold the lion of the tribe of Juda . . . hath prevailed*,—it is not becoming for Christ to have an aureole, but to have something from which all aureoles are derived. Hence it is written (Apoc. iii. 21): *To him that shall overcome, I will give to sit with Me in My throne, as I also have overcome, and am set down in My Father's throne* (Vulg.,—*with My Father in His throne*). Therefore we must say with others that although there is nothing of the nature of an aureole

in Christ, there is nevertheless something more excellent than any aureole.

Reply Obj. 1. Christ was most truly virgin, martyr, and doctor; yet the corresponding accidental reward in Christ is a negligible quantity in comparison with the greatness of His essential reward. Hence He has not an aureole in its proper sense.

Reply Obj. 2. Although the aureole is due to a most perfect work, yet with regard to us, so far as it is a diminutive term, it denotes the participation of a perfection derived from one in whom that perfection is found in its fulness. Accordingly it implies a certain inferiority, and thus it is not found in Christ in Whom is the fulness of every perfection.

Reply Obj. 3. Although in some way virginity has its exemplar in God, that exemplar is not homogeneous. For the incorruption of God, which virginity imitates, is not in God in the same way as in a virgin.

NINTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN AUREOLE IS DUE TO THE ANGELS?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that an aureole is due to the angels. For Jerome (*Serm. de Assump.*)* speaking of virginity says: *To live without the flesh while living in the flesh is to live as an angel rather than as a man*: and a gloss on 1 Cor. vii. 26, *For the present necessity*, says that *virginity is the portion of the angels*. Since then an aureole corresponds to virginity, it would seem due to the angels.

Obj. 2. Further, Incorruption of the spirit is more excellent than incorruption of the flesh. Now there is incorruption of spirit in the angels, since they never sinned. Therefore an aureole is due to them rather than to men incorrupt in the flesh and who have sinned at some time.

Obj. 3. Further, An aureole is due to teaching. Now angels teach us by cleansing, enlightening, and perfecting†

* *Ep. ad Paul. et Eustoch. x.*

† Cf. P. I., Q. CXI., A. 1.

us, as Dionysius says (*Hier. Eccles. vi.*). Therefore at least the aureole of doctors is due to them.

On the contrary, It is written (2 Tim. ii. 5): *He . . . shall not be* (Vulg.,—*is not*) *crowned, except he strive lawfully*. But there is no conflict in the angels. Therefore an aureole is not due to them.

Further, An aureole is not due to an act that is not performed through the body: wherefore it is not due to lovers of virginity, martyrdom, or teaching, if they do not practise them outwardly. But angels are incorporeal spirits. Therefore they have no aureole.

I answer that, An aureole is not due to the angels. The reason of this is that an aureole, properly speaking, corresponds to some perfection of surpassing merit. Now those things which make for perfect merit in man are con-natural to angels, or belong to their state in general, or to their essential reward. Wherefore the angels have not an aureole in the same sense as an aureole is due to men.

Reply Obj. 1. Virginity is said to be an angelic life, in so far as virgins imitate by grace what angels have by nature. For it is not owing to a virtue that angels abstain altogether from pleasures of the flesh, since they are incapable of such pleasures.

Reply Obj. 2. Perpetual incorruption of the spirit in the angels merits their essential reward: because it is necessary for their salvation, since in them recovery is impossible after they have fallen.*

Reply Obj. 3. The acts whereby the angels teach us belong to their glory and their common state: wherefore they do not merit an aureole thereby.

TENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN AUREOLE IS ALSO DUE TO THE BODY?

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that an aureole is also due to the body. For the essential reward is greater than the

* Cf. P. I., Q. LXIV., A. 2.

accidental. But the dowries which belong to the essential reward are not only in the soul but also in the body. Therefore there is also an aureole which pertains to the accidental reward.

Obj. 2. Further, Punishment in soul and body corresponds to sin committed through the body. Therefore a reward both in soul and in body is due to merit gained through the body. But the aureole is merited through works of the body. Therefore an aureole is also due to the body.

Obj. 3. Further, A certain fulness of virtue will shine forth in the bodies of martyrs, and will be seen in their bodily scars: wherefore Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei*, xxii.): *We feel an undescribable love for the blessed martyrs so as to desire to see in that kingdom the scars of the wounds in their bodies, which they bore for Christ's name. Perchance indeed we shall see them, for this will not make them less comely, but more glorious. A certain beauty will shine in them, a beauty, though in the body, yet not of the body but of virtue.* Therefore it would seem that the martyr's aureole is also in his body; and in like manner the aureoles of others.

On the contrary, The souls now in heaven have aureoles; and yet they have no body. Therefore the proper subject of an aureole is the soul and not the body.

Further, All merit is from the soul. Therefore the whole reward should be in the soul.

I answer that, Properly speaking the aureole is in the mind: since it is joy in the works to which an aureole is due. But even as from the joy in the essential reward, which is the aurea, there results a certain comeliness in the body, which is the glory of the body, so from the joy in the aureole there results a certain bodily comeliness: so that the aureole is chiefly in the mind, but by a kind of overflow it shines forth in the body.

This suffices for the *Replies* to the *Objections*. It must be observed, however, that the beauty of the scars which will appear in the bodies of the martyrs cannot be called an aureole, since some of the martyrs will have an aureole in

which such scars will not appear, for instance those who were put to death by drowning, starvation, or the squalor of prison.

ELEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THREE AUREOLES ARE FITTINGLY ASSIGNED, THOSE OF VIRGINS, OF MARTYRS, AND OF DOCTORS?

We proceed thus to the Eleventh Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the three aureoles of virgins, martyrs, and doctors are unfittingly assigned. For the aureole of martyrs corresponds to their virtue of fortitude, the aureole of virgins to the virtue of temperance, and the aureole of doctors to the virtue of prudence. Therefore it seems that there should be a fourth aureole corresponding to the virtue of justice.

Obj. 2. Further, A gloss on Exod. xxv. 25: *A polished crown, etc., says that a golden (aurea) crown is added, when the Gospel promises eternal life to those who keep the commandments: 'If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments' (Matth. xix. 17). To this is added the little golden crown (aureola) when it is said: 'If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell all that thou hast, and give to the poor' (ibid. 21). Therefore an aureole is due to poverty.*

Obj. 3. Further, A man subjects himself wholly to God by the vow of obedience: wherefore the greatest perfection consists in the vow of obedience. Therefore it would seem that an aureole is due thereto.

Obj. 4. Further, There are also many other works of supererogation in which one will rejoice in the life to come. Therefore there are many aureoles besides the aforesaid three.

Obj. 5. Further, Just as a man spreads the faith by preaching and teaching, so does he by publishing written works. Therefore a fourth aureole is due to those who do this.

I answer that, An aureole is an exceptional reward corresponding to an exceptional victory: wherefore the three aureoles are assigned in accordance with the exceptional

victories in the three conflicts which beset every man. For in the conflict with the flesh, he above all wins the victory who abstains altogether from sexual pleasures which are the chief of this kind; and such is a virgin. Wherefore an aureole is due to virginity. In the conflict with the world, the chief victory is to suffer the world's persecution even until death: wherefore the second aureole is due to martyrs who win the victory in this battle. In the conflict with the devil, the chief victory is to expel the enemy not only from oneself but also from the hearts of others: this is done by teaching and preaching, and consequently the third aureole is due to doctors and preachers.

Some, however, distinguish the three aureoles in accordance with the three powers of the soul, by saying that the three aureoles correspond to the three chief acts of the soul's three highest powers. For the act of the rational power is to publish the truth of faith even to others, and to this act the aureole of doctors is due: the highest act of the irascible power is to overcome even death for Christ's sake, and to this act the aureole of martyrs is due: and the highest act of the concupiscible power is to abstain altogether from the greatest carnal pleasures, and to this act the aureole of virgins is due.

Others again, distinguish the three aureoles in accordance with those things whereby we are most signally conformed to Christ. For He was the mediator between the Father and the world. Hence He was a doctor, by manifesting to the world the truth which He had received from the Father; He was a martyr, by suffering the persecution of the world; and He was a virgin, by His personal purity. Wherefore doctors, martyrs and virgins are most perfectly conformed to Him: and for this reason an aureole is due to them.

Reply Obj. 1. There is no conflict to be observed in the act of justice as in the acts of the other virtues. Nor is it true that to teach is an act of prudence: in fact rather is it an act of charity or mercy,—inasmuch as it is by suchlike habits that we are inclined to the practice of such an act,—or again of wisdom, as directing it.

We may also reply, with others, that justice embraces all the virtues, wherefore a special aureole is not due to it.

Reply Obj. 2. Although poverty is a work of perfection, it does not take the highest place in a spiritual conflict, because the love of temporalities assails a man less than carnal concupiscence or persecution whereby his own body is broken. Hence an aureole is not due to poverty; but judicial power by reason of the humiliation consequent upon poverty. The gloss quoted takes aureole in the broad sense for any reward given for excellent merit.

We reply in the same way to the *Third* and *Fourth Objections*.

Reply Obj. 5. An aureole is due to those who commit the sacred doctrine to writing; but it is not distinct from the aureole of doctors, since the compiling of writing is a way of teaching.

TWELFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE VIRGIN'S AUREOLE IS THE GREATEST
OF ALL?

We proceed thus to the Twelfth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the virgin's aureole is the greatest of all. For it is said of virgins (Apoc. xiv. 4) that they *follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth*, and (*ibid.* 3) that *no other man could say the canticle* which the virgins sang. Therefore virgins have the most excellent aureole.

Obj. 2. Further, Cyprian (*De Habit. Virg.*) says of virgins that they are *the more illustrious portion of Christ's flock*. Therefore the greater aureole is due to them.

Obj. 3. Again, it would seem that the martyr's aureole is the greatest. For Aymo, commenting on Apoc. xiv. 3, *No man could say the hymn*, says that *virgins do not all take precedence of married folk; but only those who in addition to the observance of virginity are by the tortures of their passion on a par with married persons who have suffered martyrdom*. Therefore martyrdom gives virginity its precedence over other states: and consequently a greater aureole is due to virginity.

Obj. 4. Again, it would seem that the greatest aureole is due to doctors. Because the Church militant is modelled after the Church triumphant. Now in the Church militant the greatest honour is due to doctors (1 Tim. v. 17): *Let the priests that rule well be esteemed worthy of double honour, especially they who labour in the word and doctrine.* Therefore a greater aureole is due to them in the Church triumphant.

I answer that, Precedence of one aureole over another may be considered from two standpoints. First, from the point of view of the conflicts, that aureole being considered greater which is due to the more strenuous battle. Looking at it thus the martyr's aureole takes precedence of the others in one way, and the virgin's in another. For the martyr's battle is more strenuous in itself, and more intensely painful; while the conflict with the flesh is fraught with greater danger, inasmuch as it is more lasting and threatens us at closer quarters. Secondly, from the point of view of the things about which the battle is fought: and thus the doctor's aureole takes precedence of all others, since this conflict is about intelligible goods; while the other conflicts are about sensible passions. Nevertheless, the precedence that is considered in view of the conflict is more essential to the aureole; since the aureole, according to its proper character, regards the victory and the battle, and the difficulty of fighting which is viewed from the standpoint of the battle is of greater importance than that which is considered from our standpoint through the conflict being at closer quarters. Therefore the martyr's aureole is simply the greatest of all: for which reason a gloss on Matth. v. 10, says that *all the other beatitudes are perfected in the eighth, which refers to the martyrs, namely, Blessed are they that suffer persecution.* For this reason, too, the Church in enumerating the saints together places the martyrs before the doctors and virgins. Yet nothing hinders the other aureoles from being more excellent in some particular way. And this suffices for the *Replies to the Objections.*

THIRTEENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ONE PERSON HAS AN AUREOLE MORE
EXCELLENTLY THAN ANOTHER PERSON ?

We proceed thus to the Thirteenth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that one person has not the aureole either of virginity; or of martyrdom, or of doctrine more perfectly than another person. For things which have reached their term are not subject to intension or remission. Now the aureole is due to works which have reached their term of perfection. Therefore an aureole is not subject to intension or remission.

Obj. 2. Further, Virginity is not subject to being more or less, since it denotes a kind of privation; and privations are not subject to intension or remission. Therefore neither does the reward of virginity, the virgin's aureole to wit, receive intension or remission.

On the contrary, The aureole is added to the aurea. But the aurea is more intense in one than in another. Therefore the aureole is also.

I answer that, Since merit is somewhat the cause of reward, rewards must needs be diversified, according as merits are diversified: for the intension or remission of a thing follows from the intension or remission of its cause. Now the merit of the aureole may be greater or lesser: wherefore the aureole may also be greater or lesser.

We must observe, however, that the merit of an aureole may be intensified in two ways: first, on the part of its cause, secondly on the part of the work. For there may happen to be two persons, one of whom, out of lesser charity, suffers greater torments of martyrdom, or is more constant in preaching, or again withdraws himself more from carnal pleasures. Accordingly, intension not of the aureole but of the aurea corresponds to the intension of merit derived from its root; while intension of the aureole corresponds to intension of merit derived from the kind of act. Consequently it is possible for one who merits less in martyrdom

as to his essential reward, to receive a greater aureole for his martyrdom.

Reply Obj. 1. The merits to which an aureole is due do not reach the term of their perfection simply, but according to their species: even as fire is specifically the most subtle of bodies. Hence nothing hinders one aureole being more excellent than another, even as one fire is more subtle than another.

Reply Obj. 2. The virginity of one may be greater than the virginity of another, by reason of a greater withdrawal from that which is contrary to virginity: so that virginity is stated to be greater in one who avoids more the occasions of corruption. For in this way privations may increase, as when a man is said to be more blind, if he be removed further from the possession of sight.

QUESTION XCVII.

OF THE PUNISHMENT OF THE DAMNED.

(*In Seven Articles.*)

IN due sequence we must consider those things that concern the damned after the judgment: (1) The punishment of the damned, and the fire by which their bodies will be tormented; (2) matters relating to their will and intellect; (3) God's justice and mercy in regard to the damned.

Under the first head there are seven points of inquiry: (1) Whether in hell the damned are tormented with the sole punishment of fire? (2) Whether the worm by which they are tormented is corporeal? (3) Whether their weeping is corporeal? (4) Whether their darkness is material? (5) Whether the fire whereby they are tormented is corporeal? (6) Whether it is of the same species as our fire? (7) Whether this fire is beneath the earth?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN HELL THE DAMNED ARE TORMENTED
BY THE SOLE PUNISHMENT OF FIRE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that in hell the damned are tormented by the sole punishment of fire; because Matth. xxv. 41, where their condemnation is declared, mention is made of fire only, in the words: *Depart from Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire.*

Obj. 2. Further, Even as the punishment of purgatory is due to venial sin, so is the punishment of hell due to mortal sin. Now no other punishment but that of fire is stated

to be in purgatory, as appears from the words of 1 Cor. iii. 13: *The fire shall try every man's work, of what sort it is.* Therefore neither in hell will there be a punishment other than of fire.

Obj. 3. Further, Variety of punishment affords a respite, as when one passes from heat to cold. But we can admit no respite in the damned. Therefore there will not be various punishments, but that of fire alone.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. x. 7): *Fire and brimstone and storms of winds shall be the portion of their cup.*

Further, It is written (Job. xxiv. 19): *Let him pass from the snow waters to excessive heat.*

I answer that, According to Basil (*Conc. xiv. De Futuro Judic.*, and *Hom. i. in Ps. xxviii.*), at the final cleansing of the world, there will be a separation of the elements, whatever is pure and noble remaining above for the glory of the blessed, and whatever is ignoble and sordid being cast down for the punishment of the damned: so that just as every creature will be to the blessed a matter of joy, so will all the elements conduce to the torture of the damned, according to Wis. v. 21, *the whole world will fight with Him against the unwise.* This is also becoming to Divine justice, that whereas they departed from One by sin, and placed their end in material things which are many and various, so should they be tormented in many ways and from many sources.

Reply Obj. 1. It is because fire is most painful, through its abundance of active force, that the name of fire is given to any torment if it be intense.

Reply Obj. 2. The punishment of purgatory is not intended chiefly to torment, but to cleanse: wherefore it should be inflicted by fire alone which is above all possessed of cleansing power. But the punishment of the damned is not directed to their cleansing. Consequently the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 3. The damned will pass from the most intense heat to the most intense cold, without this giving them any respite: because they will suffer from external agencies, not by the transmutation of their body from its original

natural disposition, and the contrary passion affording a respite by restoring an equable or moderate temperature, as happens now, but by a spiritual action, in the same way as sensible objects act on the senses, being perceived by impressing the organ with their forms according to their spiritual and not their material being.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WORM OF THE DAMNED IS CORPOREAL ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the worm by which the damned are tormented is corporeal. Because flesh cannot be tormented by a spiritual worm. Now the flesh of the damned will be tormented by a worm: *He will give fire and worms into their flesh* (Judith xvi. 21), and: *The vengeance on the flesh of the ungodly is fire and worms* (Ecclus. vii. 19). Therefore that worm will be corporeal.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei*, xx. 22; xxi. 20): *Both, namely fire and worm, will be the punishment of the body.* Therefore, etc.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei*, xx. 22): *The unquenchable fire and the restless worm in the punishment of the damned are explained in various ways by different persons. Some refer both to the body, some, both to the soul: others refer the fire, in the literal sense, to the body, the worm to the soul metaphorically: and this seems the more probable.*

I answer that, After the day of judgment, no animal or mixed body will remain in the renewed world except only the body of man, because the former are not directed to incorruption,* nor after that time will there be generation or corruption. Consequently the worm ascribed to the damned must be understood to be not of a corporeal but of a spiritual nature: and this is the remorse of conscience, which is called a worm because it originates from the corruption of sin, and torments the soul, as a corporeal worm born of corruption torments by gnawing.

* Cf. Q. XCI., A. 5.

Reply Obj. 1. The very souls of the damned are called their flesh for as much as they were subject to the flesh. Or we may reply that the flesh will be tormented by the spiritual worm, according as the afflictions of the soul overflow into the body, both here and hereafter.

Reply Obj. 2. Augustine speaks by way of comparison. For he does not wish to assert absolutely that this worm is material, but that it is better to say that both are to be understood materially, than that both should be understood only in a spiritual sense: for then the damned would suffer no bodily pain. This is clear to anyone that examines the context of his words in this passage.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WEEPING OF THE DAMNED WILL BE CORPOREAL ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the weeping of the damned will be corporeal. For a gloss on Luke xiii. 28, *There will be weeping*, says that *the weeping with which our Lord threatens the wicked is a proof of the resurrection of the body*. But this would not be the case if that weeping were merely spiritual. Therefore, etc.

Obj. 2. Further, The pain of the punishment corresponds to the pleasure of the sin, according to Apoc. xviii. 7: *As much as she hath glorified herself and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her*. Now sinners had internal and external pleasure in their sin. Therefore they will also have external weeping.

On the contrary, Corporeal weeping results from dissolving into tears. Now there cannot be a continual dissolution from the bodies of the damned, since nothing is restored to them by food; for everything finite is consumed if something be continually taken from it. Therefore the weeping of the damned will not be corporeal.

I answer that, Two things are to be observed in corporeal weeping. One is the resolution of tears: and as to this

corporeal weeping cannot be in the damned, since after the day of judgment, the movement of the first movable being at an end, there will be neither generation, nor corruption, nor bodily alteration: and in the resolution of tears that humour needs to be generated which is shed forth in the shape of tears. Wherefore in this respect it will be impossible for corporeal weeping to be in the damned. The other thing to be observed in corporeal weeping is a certain commotion and disturbance of the head and eyes, and in this respect weeping will be possible in the damned after the resurrection: for the bodies of the damned will be tormented not only from without, but also from within, according as the body is affected at the instance of the soul's passion towards good or evil. In this sense weeping is a proof of the body's resurrection, and corresponds to the pleasure of sin, experienced by both soul and body.

This suffices for the *Replies* to the *Objections*.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE DAMNED ARE IN MATERIAL DARKNESS?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the damned are not in material darkness. For commenting on Job. x. 22, *But everlasting horror dwelleth*, Gregory says (*Moral. ix.*): *Although that fire will give no light for comfort, yet, that it may torment the more it does give light for a purpose, for by the light of its flame the wicked will see their followers whom they have drawn thither from the world.* Therefore the darkness there is not material.

Obj. 2. Further, The damned see their own punishment, for this increases their punishment. But nothing is seen without light. Therefore there is no material darkness there.

Obj. 3. Further, There the damned will have the power of sight after being reunited to their bodies. But this power would be useless to them unless they see something. Therefore, since nothing is seen unless it be in the light, it would seem that they are not in absolute darkness.

On the contrary, It is written (Matth. xxii. 13): *Bind his*

hands and his feet, and cast him into the exterior darkness. Commenting on these words Gregory says (*Moral. ix.*): *If this fire gave any light, he would by no means be described as cast into exterior darkness.*

Further, Basil says (*Hom. i. in Ps. xxviii. 7, The voice of the Lord divideth the flame of fire*) that by God's might the brightness of the fire will be separated from its power of burning, so that its brightness will conduce to the joy of the blessed, and the heat of the flame to the torment of the damned. Therefore the damned will be in material darkness.

Other points relating to the punishment of the damned have been decided above (Q. LXXXVI.).

I answer that, The disposition of hell will be such as to be adapted to the utmost unhappiness of the damned. Wherefore accordingly both light and darkness are there, in so far as they are most conducive to the unhappiness of the damned. Now seeing is in itself pleasant for, as stated in *Metaph. i., the sense of sight is most esteemed, because thereby many things are known.* Yet it happens accidentally that seeing is painful, when we see things that are hurtful to us, or displeasing to our will. Consequently in hell the place must be so disposed for seeing as regards light and darkness, that nothing be seen clearly, and that only such things be dimly seen as are able to bring anguish to the heart. Wherefore, simply speaking, the place is dark. Yet by Divine disposition, there is a certain amount of light, as much as suffices for seeing those things which are capable of tormenting the soul. The natural situation of the place is enough for this, since in the centre of the earth, where hell is said to be, fire cannot be otherwise than thick and cloudy, and reeky as it were.

Some hold that this darkness is caused by the massing together of the bodies of the damned, which will so fill the place of hell with their numbers, that no air will remain, so that there will be no translucent body that can be the subject of light and darkness, except the eyes of the damned, which will be darkened utterly.

This suffices for the *Replies* to the *Objections.*

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE FIRE OF HELL WILL BE CORPOREAL?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the fire of hell whereby the bodies of the damned will be tormented will not be corporeal. For Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iv.): The devil, and demons, and his man,* namely Antichrist, together with the ungodly and sinners, will be cast into everlasting fire, not material fire, such as that which we have, but such as God knoweth. Now everything corporeal is material. Therefore the fire of hell will not be corporeal.

Obj. 2. Further, The souls of the damned when severed from their bodies are cast into hell fire. But Augustine says (*Gen. ad Lit.* xii. 32): *In my opinion the place to which the soul is committed after death is spiritual and not corporeal.* Therefore, etc.

Obj. 3. Further, Corporeal fire in the mode of its action does not follow the mode of guilt in the person who is burnt at the stake, rather does it follow the mode of humid and dry: for in the same corporeal fire we see both good and wicked suffer. But the fire of hell, in its mode of torture or action, follows the mode of guilt in the person punished; wherefore Gregory says (*Dial.* iv. 63): *There is indeed but one hell fire, but it does not torture all sinners equally. For each one will suffer as much pain according as his guilt deserves.* Therefore this fire will not be corporeal.

On the contrary, He says (*Dial.* iv. 29): *I doubt not that the fire of hell is corporeal, since it is certain that bodies are tortured there.*

Further, It is written (*Wis.* v. 21): *The . . . world shall fight . . . against the unwise.* But the whole world would not fight against the unwise if they were punished with a spiritual and not a corporeal punishment. Therefore they will be punished with a corporeal fire.

* Cf. 2 Thess. ii. 3, *And the man of sin be revealed, the son of perdition.*

I answer that, There have been many opinions about the fire of hell. For some philosophers, as Avicenna, disbelieving in the resurrection, thought that the soul alone would be punished after death. And as they considered it impossible for the soul, being incorporeal, to be punished with a corporeal fire, they denied that the fire whereby the wicked are punished is corporeal, and pretended that all statements as to souls being punished in future after death by any corporeal means are to be taken metaphorically. For just as the joy and happiness of good souls will not be about any corporeal object, but about something spiritual, namely the attainment of their end, so will the torment of the wicked be merely spiritual, in that they will be grieved at being separated from their end, the desire whereof is in them by nature. Wherefore, just as all descriptions of the soul's delight after death that seem to denote bodily pleasure,—for instance, that they are refreshed, that they smile, and so forth,—must be taken metaphorically, so also are all such descriptions of the soul's suffering as seem to imply bodily punishment,—for instance, that they burn in fire, or suffer from the stench, and so forth. For as spiritual pleasure and pain are unknown to the majority, these things need to be declared under the figure of corporeal pleasures and pains, in order that men may be moved the more to the desire or fear thereof. Since, however, in the punishment of the damned there will be not only pain of loss corresponding to the aversion that was in their sin, but also pain of sense corresponding to the conversion, it follows that it is not enough to hold the above manner of punishment. For this reason Avicenna himself (*Met.* ix.) added another explanation, by saying that the souls of the wicked are punished after death, not by bodies but by images of bodies; just as in a dream it seems to a man that he is suffering various pains on account of suchlike images being in his imagination. Even Augustine seems to hold this kind of punishment (*Gen. ad Lit.* xii. 32), as is clear from the text. But this would seem an unreasonable statement. For the imagination is a power that makes use of a bodily

organ: so that it is impossible for such visions of the imagination to occur in the soul separated from the body, as in the soul of the dreamer. Wherefore Avicenna also, that he might avoid this difficulty, said that the soul separated from the body uses as an organ some part of the heavenly body, to which the human body needs to be conformed, in order to be perfected by the rational soul, which is like the movers of the heavenly body,—thus following somewhat the opinion of certain philosophers of old, who maintained that souls return to the stars that are their compeers. But this is absolutely absurd according to the Philosopher's teaching, since the soul uses a definite bodily organ, even as art uses definite instruments, so that it cannot pass from one body to another, as Pythagoras is stated (*De Anima* i, text. 53) to have maintained. As to the statement of Augustine we shall say below how it is to be answered (*ad 2*). However, whatever we may say of the fire that torments the separated souls, we must admit that the fire which will torment the bodies of the damned after the resurrection is corporeal, since one cannot fittingly apply a punishment to a body unless that punishment itself be bodily. Wherefore Gregory (*Dial.* iv.) proves the fire of hell to be corporeal from the very fact that the wicked will be cast thither after the resurrection. Again Augustine, as quoted in the text of iv. *Sent.* D. 44, clearly admits (*De Civ. Dei*, xxi. 10) that the fire by which the bodies are tormented is corporeal. And this is the point at issue for the present. We have said elsewhere (Q. LXX., A. 3) how the souls of the damned are punished by this corporeal fire.

Reply Obj. 1. Damascene does not absolutely deny that this fire is material, but that it is material as our fire, since it differs from ours in some of its properties. We may also reply that since that fire does not alter bodies as to their matter, but acts on them for their punishment by a kind of spiritual action, it is for this reason that it is stated not to be material, not as regards its substance, but as to its punitive effect on bodies and, still more, on souls.

Reply Obj. 2. The assertion of Augustine may be taken

in this way, that the place whither souls are conveyed after death be described as incorporeal, in so far as the soul is there, not corporeally, *i.e.* as bodies are in a place, but in some other spiritual way, as angels are in a place. Or we may reply that Augustine is expressing an opinion without deciding the point, as he often does in those books.

Reply Obj. 3. That fire will be the instrument of Divine justice inflicting punishment. Now an instrument acts not only by its own power and in its own way, but also by the power of the principal agent, and as directed thereby. Wherefore although fire is not able, of its own power, to torture certain persons more or less, according to the measure of sin, it is able to do so nevertheless in so far as its action is regulated by the ordering of Divine justice: even so the fire of the furnace is regulated by the forethought of the smith, according as the effect of his art requires.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE FIRE OF HELL IS OF THE SAME SPECIES
AS OURS ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that this fire is not of the same species as the corporeal fire which we see. For Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei*, xx. 16): *In my opinion no man knows of what kind is the everlasting fire, unless the Spirit of God has revealed it to anyone.* But all or nearly all know the nature of this fire of ours. Therefore that fire is not of the same species as this.

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory commenting on Job. xx. 26, *A fire that is not kindled shall devour him*, says (*Moral.* xv.): *Bodily fire needs bodily fuel in order to become fire; neither can it be except by being kindled, nor live unless it be renewed. On the other hand the fire of hell, since it is a bodily fire, and burns in a bodily way the wicked cast therein, is neither kindled by human endeavour, nor kept alive with fuel, but once created endures unquenchably; at one and the same time it needs no*

kindling, and lacks not heat. Therefore it is not of the same nature as the fire that we see.

Obj. 3. Further, The everlasting and the corruptible differ essentially, since they agree not even in genus, according to the Philosopher (*Metaph.* x.). But this fire of ours is corruptible, whereas the other is everlasting: *Depart from Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire* (Matth. xxv. 41). Therefore they are not of the same nature.

Obj. 4. Further, It belongs to the nature of this fire of ours to give light. But the fire of hell gives no light, hence the saying of Job xviii. 5: *Shall not the light of the wicked be extinguished?* Therefore . . . as above.

On the contrary, According to the Philosopher (*Top.* i. 6), *every water is of the same species as every other water.* Therefore in like manner every fire is of the same species as every other fire.

Further, It is written (Wis. xi. 17): *By what things a man sinneth by the same also he is tormented.* Now men sin by the sensible things of this world. Therefore it is just that they should be punished by those same things.

I answer that, As stated in *Meteor.* iv. 1, fire has other bodies for its matter, for the reason that of all the elements it has the greatest power of action. Hence fire is found under two conditions: in its own matter, as existing in its own sphere, and in a strange matter, whether of earth, as in burning coal, or of air, as in the flame. Under whatever conditions however fire be found, it is always of the same species, so far as the nature of fire is concerned, but there may be a difference of species as to the bodies which are the matter of fire. Wherefore flame and burning coal differ specifically, and likewise burning wood and red-hot iron; nor does it signify, as to this particular point, whether they be kindled by force, as in the case of iron, or by a natural intrinsic principle, as happens with sulphur. Accordingly it is clear that the fire of hell is of the same species as the fire we have, so far as the nature of fire is concerned. But whether that fire subsists in its proper matter, or if it subsists in a strange matter, what that matter may be, we know

not. And in this way it may differ specifically from the fire we have, considered materially. It has, however, certain properties differing from our fire, for instance that it needs no kindling, nor is kept alive by fuel. But the differences do not argue a difference of species as regards the nature of the fire.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine is speaking of that fire with regard to its matter, and not with regard to its nature.

Reply Obj. 2. This fire of ours is kept alive with fuel, and is kindled by man, because it is introduced into a foreign matter by art and force. But that other fire needs no fuel to keep it alive, because either it subsists in its own matter, or is in a foreign matter, not by force but by nature from an intrinsic principle. Wherefore it is kindled not by man but by God, Who fashioned its nature. This is the meaning of the words of Isaias (xxx. 33): *The breath of the Lord is as a torrent of brimstone kindling it.*

Reply Obj. 3. Even as the bodies of the damned will be of the same species as now, although now they are corruptible, whereas then they will be incorruptible, both by the ordering of Divine justice, and on account of the cessation of the heavenly movement, so is it with the fire of hell whereby those bodies will be punished.

Reply Obj. 4. To give light does not belong to fire according to any mode of existence, since in its own matter it gives no light; wherefore it does not shine in its own sphere according to the philosophers: and in like manner in certain foreign matters it does not shine, as when it is in an opaque earthly substance such as sulphur. The same happens also when its brightness is obscured by thick smoke. Wherefore that the fire of hell gives no light is not sufficient proof of its being of a different species.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE FIRE OF HELL IS BENEATH THE EARTH?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that this fire is not beneath the earth. For it is said of the damned (Job. xviii. 18), *And God shall remove him out of the globe* (Douay,—*world*). Therefore the fire whereby the damned will be punished is not beneath the earth but outside the globe.

Obj. 2. Further, Nothing violent or accidental can be everlasting. But this fire will be in hell for ever. Therefore it will be there, not by force but naturally. Now fire cannot be under the earth save by violence. Therefore the fire of hell is not beneath the earth.

Obj. 3. Further, After the day of judgment the bodies of all the damned will be tormented in hell. Now those bodies will fill a place. Consequently, since the multitude of the damned will be exceeding great, for *the number of fools is infinite* (Eccles. i. 15), the space containing that fire must also be exceeding great. But it would seem unreasonable to say that there is so great a hollow within the earth, since all the parts of the earth naturally tend to the centre. Therefore that fire will not be beneath the earth.

Obj. 4. Further, *By what things a man sinneth, by the same also he is tormented* (Wis. xi. 17). But the wicked have sinned on the earth. Therefore the fire that punishes them should not be under the earth.

On the contrary, It is written (Isa. xiv. 9): *Hell below was in an uproar to meet Thee at Thy coming.* Therefore the fire of hell is beneath us.

Further, Gregory says (*Dial.* iv.): *I see not what hinders us from believing that hell is beneath the earth.*

Further, A gloss on Jonas ii. 4, *Thou hast cast me forth . . . into the heart of the sea*, says, *i.e. into hell*, and in the Gospel (Matth. xii. 40) the words *in the heart of the earth* have the same sense, for as the heart is in the middle of an animal, so is hell supposed to be in the middle of the earth.

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei, xv. 16), I am of opinion that no one knows in what part of the world hell is situated, unless the Spirit of God has revealed this to some one. Wherefore Gregory (Dial. iv.) having been questioned on this point answers: About this matter I dare not give a rash decision. For some have deemed hell to be in some part of the earth's surface; others think it to be beneath the earth. He shows the latter opinion to be the more probable for two reasons. First from the very meaning of the word. These are his words: If we call it the nether regions (infernus), for the reason that it is beneath us (inferius), what earth is in relation to heaven, such should be hell in relation to earth. Secondly, from the words of Apoc. v. 3: No man was able, neither in heaven, nor on earth, nor under the earth, to open the book: where the words in heaven refer to the angels, on earth to men living in the body, and under the earth to souls in hell. Augustine too (Gen. ad Lit. xii. 34) seems to indicate two reasons for the congruity of hell being under the earth. One is that whereas the souls of the departed sinned through love of the flesh, they should be treated as the dead flesh is wont to be treated, by being buried beneath the earth. The other is that heaviness is to the body what sorrow is to the spirit, and joy (of spirit) is as lightness (of body). Wherefore just as in reference to the body, all the heavier things are beneath the others, if they be placed in order of gravity, so in reference to the spirit, the lower place is occupied by whatever is more sorrowful; and thus even as the empyrean is a fitting place for the joy of the elect, so the lowest part of the earth is a fitting place for the sorrow of the damned. Nor does it signify that Augustine (ibid.) says that hell is stated or believed to be under the earth, because he withdraws this (Retract. ii. 29) where he says: Methinks I should have said that hell is beneath the earth, rather than have given the reason why it is stated or believed to be under the earth. However, some philosophers have maintained that hell is situated beneath the terrestrial orb, but above the surface of the*

* The Latin for *hell*.

earth, on that part which is opposite to us. This seems to have been the meaning of Isidore when he asserted that *the sun and the moon will stop in the place wherein they were created, lest the wicked should enjoy this light in the midst of their torments*. But this is no argument, if we assert that hell is under the earth. We have already stated how these words may be explained (Q. XCI., A. 2).

Pythagoras held the place of punishment to be in a fiery sphere situated, according to him, in the middle of the whole world: and he called it the prison-house of Jupiter as Aristotle relates (*De Cælo et Mundo*. ii.). It is, however, more in keeping with Scripture to say that it is beneath the earth.

Reply Obj. 1. The words of Job, *God shall remove him out of the globe*, refer to the surface of the earth,* *i.e.* from this world. This is how Gregory expounds it (*Moral.* xiv.) where he says: *He is removed from the globe when, at the coming of the heavenly judge, he is taken away from this world wherein he now prides himself in his wickedness*. Nor does globe here signify the universe, as though the place of punishment were outside the whole universe.

Reply Obj. 2. Fire continues in that place for all eternity by the ordering of Divine justice: although according to its nature an element cannot last for ever outside its own place, especially if things were to remain in this state of generation and corruption. The fire there will be of the very greatest heat, because its heat will be all gathered together from all parts, through being surrounded on all sides by the cold of the earth.

Reply Obj. 3. Hell will never lack sufficient room to admit the bodies of the damned: since hell is accounted one of the three things that *never are satisfied* (Prov. xxx. 15, 16). Nor is it unreasonable that God's power should maintain within the bowels of the earth a hollow great enough to contain all the bodies of the damned.

Reply Obj. 4. It does not follow of necessity that *by what things a man sinneth, by the same also he is tormented*, except

* *De orbe terrarum*, which might be rendered *from the land of the living*.

as regards the principal instruments of sin: for as much as man having sinned in soul and body will be punished in both. But it does not follow that a man will be punished in the very place where he sinned, because the place due to the damned is other from that due to wayfarers. We may also reply that these words refer to the punishments inflicted on man on the way: according as each sin has its corresponding punishment, since *inordinate love is its own punishment*, as Augustine states (*Conf.* i. 12).

QUESTION XCVIII.

OF THE WILL AND INTELLECT OF THE DAMNED.

(In Nine Articles.)

WE must next consider matters pertaining to the will and intellect of the damned. Under this head there are nine points of inquiry: (1) Whether every act of will in the damned is evil? (2) Whether they ever repent of the evil they have done? (3) Whether they would rather not be than be? (4) Whether they would wish others to be damned? (5) Whether the wicked hate God? (6) Whether they can demerit? (7) Whether they can make use of the knowledge acquired in this life? (8) Whether they ever think of God? (9) Whether they see the glory of the blessed?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER EVERY ACT OF WILL IN THE DAMNED IS
EVIL?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that not every act of will in the damned is evil. For according to Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* iv.), *the demons desire the good and the best, namely to be, to live, to understand.* Since, then, men who are damned are not worse off than the demons, it would seem that they also can have a good will.

Obj. 2. Further, As Dionysius says (*ibid.*), *evil is altogether involuntary.* Therefore if the damned will anything, they will it as something good or apparently good. Now a will that is directly ordered to good is itself good. Therefore the damned can have a good will.

Obj. 3. Further, Some will be damned who, while in

this world, acquired certain habits of virtue, for instance heathens who had civic virtues. Now a will elicits praiseworthy acts by reason of virtuous habits. Therefore there may be praiseworthy acts of the will in some of the damned.

On the contrary, An obstinate will can never be inclined except to evil. Now men who are damned will be obstinate even as the demons.* Therefore their will can never be good.

Further, As the will of the damned is in relation to evil, so is the will of the blessed in regard to good. But the blessed never have an evil will. Neither therefore have the damned any good will.

I answer that, A twofold will may be considered in the damned, namely the deliberate will and the natural will. Their natural will is theirs not of themselves but of the Author of nature, Who gave nature this inclination which we call the natural will. Wherefore since nature remains in them, it follows that the natural will in them can be good. But their deliberate will is theirs of themselves, inasmuch as it is in their power to be inclined by their affections to this or that. This will is in them always evil: and this because they are completely turned away from the last end of a right will, nor can a will be good except it be directed to that same end. Hence even though they will some good, they do not will it well so that one be able to call their will good on that account.

Reply Obj. 1. The words of Dionysius must be understood of the natural will, which is nature's inclination to some particular good. And yet this natural inclination is corrupted by their wickedness, in so far as this good which they desire naturally is desired by them under certain evil circumstances.†

Reply Obj. 2. Evil, as evil, does not move the will, but in so far as it is thought to be good. Yet it comes of their wickedness that they esteem that which is evil as though it were good. Hence their will is evil.

* Cf. P. I., Q. LXIV., A. 2.

† Cf. P. I., Q. LXIV., A. 2, *ad* 5.

Reply Obj. 3. The habits of civic virtue do not remain in the separated soul, because those virtues perfect us only in the civic life which will not remain after this life. Even though they remained, they would never come into action, being enchained, as it were, by the obstinacy of the mind.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE DAMNED REPENT OF THE EVIL THEY
HAVE DONE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the damned never repent of the evil they have done. For Bernard says on the Canticle* that *the damned ever consent to the evil they have done*. Therefore they never repent of the sins they have committed.

Obj. 2. Further, To wish one had not sinned is a good will. But the damned will never have a good will. Therefore the damned will never wish they had not sinned: and thus the same conclusion follows as above.

Obj. 3. Further, According to Damascene (*De Fide Orthod.* ii.), *death is to man what their fall was to the angels*. But the angel's will is irrevocable after his fall, so that he cannot withdraw from the choice whereby he previously sinned.† Therefore the damned also cannot repent of the sins committed by them.

Obj. 4. Further, The wickedness of the damned in hell will be greater than that of sinners in the world. Now in this world some sinners repent not of the sins they have committed, either through blindness of mind, as heretics, or through obstinacy, as those *who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things* (Prov. ii. 14). Therefore, etc.

On the contrary, It is said of the damned (Wis. v. 3): *Repenting within themselves* (Vulg.,—*Saying within themselves, repenting*).

* Cf. *De Consideratione* v. 12, and *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* ix.

† Cf. P. I., Q. LXIV., A. 2.

Further, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ix. 4) that *the wicked are full of repentance; for afterwards they are sorry for that in which previously they took pleasure.* Therefore the damned, being most wicked, repent all the more.

I answer that, A person may repent of sin in two ways: in one way directly, in another way indirectly. He repents of a sin directly who hates sin as such: and he repents indirectly who hates it on account of something connected with it, for instance punishment or something of that kind. Accordingly the wicked will not repent of their sins directly, because consent in the malice of sin will remain in them; but they will repent indirectly, inasmuch as they will suffer from the punishment inflicted on them for sin.

Reply Obj. 1. The damned will wickedness, but shun punishment: and thus indirectly they repent of wickedness committed.

Reply Obj. 2. To wish one had not sinned on account of the shamefulness of vice is a good will: but this will not be in the wicked.

Reply Obj. 3. It will be possible for the damned to repent of their sins without turning their will away from sin, because in their sins they will shun, not what they heretofore desired, but something else, namely the punishment.

Reply Obj. 4. However obstinate men may be in this world, they repent of the sins indirectly, if they be punished for them. Thus Augustine says (QQ. LXXXIII., qu. 36): *We see the most savage beasts are deterred from the greatest pleasures by fear of pain.*

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE DAMNED, BY RIGHT AND DELIBERATE
REASON WOULD WISH NOT TO BE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem impossible for the damned, by right and deliberate reason, to wish not to be. For Augustine says (*De Lib. Arb.* iii. 7): *Consider how great a good it is to be; since both the happy and the unhappy will it; for*

to be and yet to be unhappy is a greater thing than not to be at all.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine argues thus (*ibid.* 8): Preference supposes election. But *not to be* is not eligible; since it has not the appearance of good, for it is nothing. Therefore *not to be* cannot be more desirable to the damned than *to be*.

Obj. 3. Further, The greater evil is the more to be shunned. Now *not to be* is the greatest evil, since it removes good altogether, so as to leave nothing. Therefore *not to be* is more to be shunned than to be unhappy: and thus the same conclusion follows as above.

On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. ix. 6): *In those days men . . . shall desire to die, and death shall fly from them.*

Further, The unhappiness of the damned surpasses all unhappiness of this world. Now in order to escape the unhappiness of this world, it is desirable to some to die, wherefore it is written (Ecclus. xli. 3, 4): *O death, thy sentence is welcome to the man that is in need, and to him whose strength faileth; who is in a decrepit age, and that is in care about all things, and to the distrustful that loseth wisdom* (Vulg.,—*patience*). Much more, therefore, is *not to be* desirable to the damned according to their deliberate reason.

I answer that, *Not to be* may be considered in two ways. First, in itself, and thus it can nowise be desirable, since it has no aspect of good, but is pure privation of good. Secondly, it may be considered as a relief from a painful life or from some unhappiness: and thus *not to be* takes on the aspect of good, since *to lack an evil is a kind of good* as the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* v. 1). In this way it is better for the damned not to be than to be unhappy. Hence it is said (Matth. xxvi. 24): *It were better for him, if that man had not been born,* and (Jerem. xx. 14): *Cursed be the day wherein I was born,* where a gloss of Jerome observes: *It is better not to be than to be evilly.* In this sense the damned can prefer *not to be* according to their deliberate reason.*

Reply Obj. 1. The saying of Augustine is to be understood

* Cf. P. I., Q. V., A. 2, *ad* 3.

in the sense that *not to be* is eligible, not in itself but accidentally, as putting an end to unhappiness. For when it is stated that *to be* and *to live* are desired by all naturally, we are not to take this as referable to an evil and corrupt life, and a life of unhappiness, as the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ix. 4), but absolutely.

Reply Obj. 2. Non-existence is eligible, not in itself, but only accidentally, as stated already.

Reply Obj. 3. Although *not to be* is very evil, in so far as it removes being, it is very good, in so far as it removes unhappiness, which is the greatest of evils, and thus it is preferred *not to be*.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN HELL THE DAMNED WOULD WISH OTHERS
WERE DAMNED WHO ARE NOT DAMNED ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that in hell the damned would not wish others were damned who are not damned. For it is said (Luke xvi. 27, 28) of the rich man that he prayed for his brethren, lest they should come *into the place of torments*. Therefore in like manner the other damned would not wish, at least, their friends in the flesh to be damned in hell.

Obj. 2. Further, The damned are not deprived of their inordinate affections. Now some of the damned loved inordinately some who are not damned. Therefore they would not desire their evil, *i.e.* that they should be damned.

Obj. 3. Further, The damned do not desire the increase of their punishment. Now if more were damned, their punishment would be greater, even as the joy of the blessed is increased by an increase in their number. Therefore the damned desire not the damnation of those who are saved.

On the contrary, A gloss on Isa. xiv. 9, *are risen up from their thrones*, says: *The wicked are comforted by having many companions in their punishment.*

Further, Envy reigns supreme in the damned. Therefore

they grieve for the happiness of the blessed, and desire their damnation.

I answer that, Even as in the blessed in heaven there will be most perfect charity, so in the damned there will be the most perfect hate. Wherefore as the saints will rejoice in all goods, so will the damned grieve for all goods. Consequently the sight of the happiness of the saints will give them very great pain; hence it is written (Isa. xxvi. 11): *Let the envious people see and be confounded, and let fire devour Thy enemies.* Therefore they will wish all the good were damned.

Reply Obj. 1. So great will be the envy of the damned that they will envy the glory even of their kindred, since they themselves are supremely unhappy, for this happens even in this life, when envy increases. Nevertheless they will envy their kindred less than others, and their punishment would be greater if all their kindred were damned, and others saved, than if some of their kindred were saved. For this reason the rich man prayed that his brethren might be warded from damnation: for he knew that some are guarded therefrom. Yet he would rather that his brethren were damned as well as all the rest.

Reply Obj. 2. Love that is not based on virtue is easily voided, especially in evil men, as the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ix. 4). Hence the damned will not preserve their friendship for those whom they loved inordinately. Yet the will of them will remain perverse, because they will continue to love the cause of their inordinate loving.

Reply Obj. 3. Although an increase in the number of the damned results in an increase of each one's punishment, so much the more will their hatred and envy increase that they will prefer to be more tormented with many rather than less tormented alone.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE DAMNED HATE GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the damned do not hate God. For, according to Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* i.), *the beautiful and good that is the cause of all goodness and beauty is beloved of all.* But this is God. Therefore God cannot be the object of anyone's hate.

Obj. 2. Further, No one can hate goodness itself, as neither can one will badness itself, since *evil is altogether involuntary*, as Dionysius asserts (*Div. Nom.* iv.). Now God is goodness itself. Therefore no one can hate Him.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. lxxiii. 23): *The pride of them that hate Thee ascendeth continually.*

I answer that, The appetite is moved by good or evil apprehended. Now God is apprehended in two ways, namely in Himself, as by the blessed, who see Him in His essence; and in His effects, as by us and by the damned. Since, then, He is goodness by His essence, He cannot in Himself be displeasing to any will; wherefore whoever sees Him in His essence cannot hate Him. On the other hand, some of His effects are displeasing to the will in so far as they are opposed to any one: and accordingly a person may hate God not in Himself, but by reason of His effects. Therefore the damned, perceiving God in His punishment, which is the effect of His justice, hate Him, even as they hate the punishment inflicted on them.*

Reply Obj. 1. The saying of Dionysius refers to the natural appetite; and even this is rendered perverse in the damned, by that which is added thereto by their deliberate will, as stated above (A. 1.)†

Reply Obj. 2. This argument would prove if the damned saw God in Himself, as being in His essence.

* Cf. Q. XC., A. 3, *ad 2*, and II.-II., Q. XXXIV., A. 1.

† Cf. II.-II., Q. XXXIV., A. 1, *ad 1*, where S. Thomas gives another answer.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE DAMNED DEMERIT?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the damned demerit. For the damned have an evil will, as stated in the last *Distinction* of iv. *Sent.* But they demerited by the evil will that they had here. Therefore if they demerit not there, their damnation is to their advantage.

Obj. 2. Further, The damned are on the same footing as the demons. Now the demons demerit after their fall, wherefore God inflicted a punishment on the serpent, who induced man to sin (Gen. iii. 14, 15). Therefore the damned also demerit.

Obj. 3. Further, An inordinate act that proceeds from a deliberate will is not excused from demerit, even though there be necessity of which one is oneself the cause: for the *drunken man deserves a double punishment*, if he commit a crime through being drunk (*Ethic.* iii.). Now the damned were themselves the cause of their own obstinacy, owing to which they are under a kind of necessity of sinning. Therefore since their act proceeds from their free will, they are not excused from demerit.

On the contrary, Punishment is contradistinguished from fault.* Now the perverse will of the damned proceeds from their obstinacy which is their punishment. Therefore the perverse will of the damned is not a fault whereby they may demerit.

Further, After reaching the last term there is no further movement, or advancement in good or evil. Now the damned, especially after the judgment day, will have reached the last term of their damnation, since then there *will cease to be two cities*, according to Augustine (*Enchir.* cxi.). Therefore after the judgment day the damned will not demerit by their perverse will, for if they did their damnation would be augmented.

I answer that, We must draw a distinction between the

* Cf. P. I., Q. XLVIII., A. 5.

damned before the judgment day and after. For all are agreed that after the judgment day there will be neither merit nor demerit. The reason for this is because merit or demerit is directed to the attainment of some further good or evil: and after the day of judgment good and evil will have reached their ultimate consummation, so that there will be no further addition to good or evil. Consequently, good will in the blessed will not be a merit but a reward, and evil will in the damned will be not a demerit but a punishment only. For works of virtue belong especially to the state of happiness, and their contraries to the state of unhappiness (*Ethic.* i. 9, 10).

On the other hand, some say that, before the judgment day, both the good merit and the damned demerit. But this cannot apply to the essential reward or to the principal punishment, since in this respect both have reached the term. Possibly, however, this may apply to the accidental reward, or secondary punishment, which are subject to increase until the day of judgment. Especially may this apply to the demons, or to the good angels, by whose activities some are drawn to salvation, whereby the joy of the blessed angels is increased, and some to damnation, whereby the punishment of the demons is augmented.*

Reply Obj. 1. It is in the highest degree unprofitable to have reached the highest degree of evil, the result being that the damned are incapable of demerit. Hence it is clear that they gain no advantage from their sin.

Reply Obj. 2. Men who are damned are not occupied in drawing others to damnation, as the demons are, for which reason the latter demerit as regards their secondary punishment.*

Reply Obj. 3. The reason why they are not excused from demerit is not because they are under the necessity of sinning, but because they have reached the highest of evils.

* Cf. P. I., Q. LXII., A. 9, *ad* 3: II.-II., Q. XIII., A. 4, *ad* 2; where S. Thomas tacitly retracts the opinion expressed here as to merit or demerit.

However, the necessity of sinning whereof we are ourselves the cause, in so far as it is a necessity, excuses from sin, because every sin needs to be voluntary: but it does not excuse, in so far as it proceeds from a previous act of the will: and consequently the whole demerit of the subsequent sin would seem to belong to the previous sin.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE DAMNED CAN MAKE USE OF THE
KNOWLEDGE THEY HAD IN THIS WORLD?*

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the damned are unable to make use of the knowledge they had in this world. For there is very great pleasure in the consideration of knowledge. But we must not admit that they have any pleasure. Therefore they cannot make use of the knowledge they had heretofore, by applying their consideration thereto.

Obj. 2. Further, The damned suffer greater pains than any pains of this world. Now in this world, when one is in very great pain, it is impossible to consider any intelligible conclusions, through being distracted by the pains that one suffers. Much less therefore can one do so in hell.

Obj. 3. Further, The damned are subject to time. But *length of time is the cause of forgetfulness* (*Phys.* iv., text. 128). Therefore the damned will forget what they knew here.

On the contrary, It is said to the rich man who was damned (Luke xvi. 25): *Remember that thou didst receive good things in thy lifetime*, etc. Therefore they will consider about the things they knew here.

Further, The intelligible species remain in the separated soul, as stated above (Q. LXX., A. 2, *ad* 3; P. I., Q. LXXXIX. AA. 5, 6). Therefore, if they could not use them, these would remain in them to no purpose.

I answer that, Even as in the saints, on account of the perfection of their glory, there will be nothing but what is a matter of joy, so there will be nothing in the damned but

* Cf. P. I., Q. LXXXIX.

what is a matter and cause of sorrow; nor will anything that can pertain to sorrow be lacking, so that their unhappiness is consummate. Now the consideration of certain things known brings us joy, in some respect, either on the part of the things known, because we love them, or on the part of the knowledge, because it is fitting and perfect. There may also be a reason for sorrow both on the part of the things known, because they are of a grievous nature, and on the part of the knowledge, if we consider its imperfection; for instance a person may consider his defective knowledge about a certain thing, which he would desire to know perfectly. Accordingly, in the damned there will be actual consideration of the things they knew heretofore as matters of sorrow, but not as a cause of pleasure. For they will consider both the evil they have done, and for which they were damned, and the delightful goods they have lost, and on both counts they will suffer torments. Likewise they will be tormented with the thought that the knowledge they had of speculative matters was imperfect, and that they missed its highest degree of perfection which they might have acquired.

Reply Obj. 1. Although the consideration of knowledge is delightful in itself, it may accidentally be the cause of sorrow, as explained above.

Reply Obj. 2. In this world the soul is united to a corruptible body, wherefore the soul's consideration is hindered by the suffering of the body. On the other hand, in the future life the soul will not be so drawn by the body, but however much the body may suffer, the soul will have a most clear view of those things that can be a cause of anguish to it.

Reply Obj. 3. Time causes forgetfulness accidentally, in so far as the movement whereof it is the measure is the cause of change. But after the judgment day there will be no movement of the heavens; wherefore neither will it be possible for forgetfulness to result from any lapse of time however long. Before the judgment day, however, the separated soul is not changed from its disposition by the heavenly movement.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE DAMNED WILL EVER THINK OF GOD?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the damned will sometimes think of God. For one cannot hate a thing actually, except one think about it. Now the damned will hate God, as stated in the text of iv. *Sent.* in the last *Distinction*. Therefore they will think of God sometimes.

Obj. 2. Further, The damned will have remorse of conscience. But the conscience suffers remorse for deeds done against God. Therefore they will sometimes think of God.

On the contrary, Man's most perfect thoughts are those which are about God: whereas the damned will be in a state of the greatest imperfection. Therefore they will not think of God.

I answer that, One may think of God in two ways. First, in Himself and according to that which is proper to Him, namely that He is the fount of all goodness: and thus it is altogether impossible to think of Him without delight, so that the damned will by no means think of Him in this way. Secondly, according to something accidental as it were to Him in His effects, such as His punishments, and so forth, and in this respect the thought of God can bring sorrow, so that in this way the damned will think of God.

Reply Obj. 1. The damned do not hate God except because He punishes and forbids what is agreeable to their evil will: and consequently they will think of Him only as punishing and forbidding. This suffices for the *Reply* to the *Second Objection*, since conscience will not have remorse for sin except as forbidden by the Divine commandment.

NINTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE DAMNED SEE THE GLORY OF THE
BLESSED ?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the damned do not see the glory of the blessed. For they are more distant from the glory of the blessed than from the happenings of this world. But they do not see what happens in regard to us: hence Gregory commenting on Job. xiv. 21, *Whether his children come to honour* etc. says (*Moral. xii.*): *Even as those who still live know not in what place are the souls of the dead; so the dead who have lived in the body know not the things which regard the life of those who are in the flesh.* Much less, therefore, can they see the glory of the blessed.

Obj. 2. Further, That which is granted as a great favour to the saints in this life is never granted to the damned. Now it was granted as a great favour to Paul to see the life in which the saints live for ever with God (2 Cor. xii.). Therefore the damned will not see the glory of the saints.

On the contrary, It is stated (Luke xvi. 23) that the rich man in the midst of his torments *saw Abraham . . . and Lazarus in his bosom.*

I answer that, The damned, before the judgment day, will see the blessed in glory, in such a way as to know, not what that glory is like, but only that they are in a state of glory that surpasses all thought. This will trouble them, both because they will, through envy, grieve for their happiness, and because they have forfeited that glory. Hence it is written (Wis. v. 2) concerning the wicked: *Seeing it they shall be troubled with terrible fear.* After the judgment day, however; they will be altogether deprived of seeing the blessed: nor will this lessen their punishment, but will increase it; because they will bear in remembrance the glory of the blessed which they saw at or before the judgment: and this will torment them. Moreover they will be tormented by finding themselves deemed unworthy even to see the glory which the saints merit to have.

Reply Obj. 1. The happenings of this life would not, if seen, torment the damned in hell as the sight of the glory of the saints; wherefore the things which happen here are not shown to the damned in the same way as the saints' glory; although also of the things that happen here those are shown to them which are capable of causing them sorrow.

Reply Obj. 2. Paul looked upon that life wherein the saints live with God,* by actual experience thereof and by hoping to have it more perfectly in the life to come. Not so the damned; wherefore the comparison fails.

* Cf. II.-II., Q. CLXXXV., A. 3, *ad 2*.

QUESTION XCIX.

OF GOD'S MERCY AND JUSTICE TOWARDS THE DAMNED.

(*In Five Articles.*)

WE must next consider God's justice and mercy towards the damned: under which head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether by Divine justice an eternal punishment is inflicted on sinners? (2) Whether by God's mercy all punishment both of men and of demons comes to an end? (3) Whether at least the punishment of men comes to an end? (4) Whether at least the punishment of Christians has an end? (5) Whether there is an end to the punishment of those who have performed works of mercy?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER BY DIVINE JUSTICE AN ETERNAL PUNISHMENT IS INFLICTED ON SINNERS?*

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that an eternal punishment is not inflicted on sinners by Divine justice. For the punishment should not exceed the fault: *According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be* (Deut. xxv. 2). Now fault is temporal. Therefore the punishment should not be eternal.

Obj. 2. Further, Of two mortal sins one is greater than the other; and therefore one should receive a greater punishment than the other. But no punishment is greater than eternal punishment, since it is infinite. Therefore eternal

* Cf. I.-II., Q. LXXXVII., AA. 3, 4.

punishment is not due to every sin; and if it is not due to one, it is due to none, since they are not infinitely distant from one another.

Obj. 3. Further, A just judge does not punish except in order to correct, wherefore it is stated (*Ethic. ii. 3*) that *punishments are a kind of medicine*. Now, to punish the wicked eternally does not lead to their correction, nor to that of others, since then there will be no one in future who can be corrected thereby. Therefore eternal punishment is not inflicted for sins according to Divine justice.

Obj. 4. Further, No one wishes that which is not desirable for its own sake, except on account of some advantage. Now God does not wish punishment for its own sake, for He delights not in punishments.* Since then no advantage can result from the perpetuity of punishment, it would seem that He ought not to inflict such a punishment for sin.

Obj. 5. Further, Nothing accidental lasts for ever (*De Cælo et Mundo, i.*). But punishment is one of those things that happen accidentally, since it is contrary to nature. Therefore it cannot be everlasting.

Obj. 6. Further, The justice of God would seem to require that sinners should be brought to naught: because on account of ingratitude a person deserves to lose all benefits; and among other benefits of God there is *being* itself. Therefore it would seem just that the sinner who has been ungrateful to God should lose his being. But if sinners be brought to naught, their punishment cannot be everlasting. Therefore it would seem out of keeping with Divine justice that sinners should be punished for ever.

On the contrary, It is written (Matth. xxv. 46): *These, namely the wicked, shall go into everlasting punishment.*

Further, As reward is to merit, so is punishment to guilt. Now, according to Divine justice, an eternal reward is due to temporal merit: *Every one who seeth the Son and believeth in Him hath* (Vulg.,—*that everyone . . . may have*) *life*

* The allusion is to Wis. i. 13, *Neither hath He pleasure in the destruction of the living*, as may be gathered from I.-II., Q. LXXXVII., A. 3, *Obj. 3.*

everlasting. Therefore according to Divine justice an everlasting punishment is due to temporal guilt.

Further, According to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* v. 5), punishment is meted according to the dignity of the person sinned against, so that a person who strikes one in authority receives a greater punishment than one who strikes anyone else. Now whoever sins mortally sins against God, Whose commandments he breaks, and Whose honour he gives another, by placing his end in some one other than God. But God's majesty is infinite. Therefore whoever sins mortally deserves infinite punishment; and consequently it seems just that for a mortal sin a man should be punished for ever.

I answer that, Since punishment is measured in two ways, namely according to the degree of its severity, and according to its length of time, the measure of punishment corresponds to the measure of fault, as regards the degree of severity, so that the more grievously a person sins the more grievously is he punished: *As much as she hath glorified herself and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her* (Apoc. xviii. 7). The duration of the punishment does not, however, correspond with the duration of the fault, as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei*, xxi. 11), for adultery which is committed in a short space of time is not punished with a momentary penalty even according to human laws.* But the duration of punishment regards the disposition of the sinner: for sometimes a person who commits an offence in a city is rendered by his very offence worthy of being cut off entirely from the fellowship of the citizens, either by perpetual exile or even by death: whereas sometimes he is not rendered worthy of being cut off entirely from the fellowship of the citizens; wherefore in order that he may become a fitting member of the State, his punishment is prolonged or curtailed, according as is expedient for his amendment, so that he may live in the city in a becoming and peaceful manner. So too, according to Divine justice, sin renders a person worthy to be altogether cut off from

* Cf. I.-II., Q. LXXXVII., A. 3, *ad* 1.

the fellowship of God's city, and this is the effect of every sin committed against charity, which is the bond uniting this same city together. Consequently, for mortal sin which is contrary to charity a person is expelled for ever from the fellowship of the saints and condemned to everlasting punishment, because as Augustine says (*loc. cit.*), *as men are cut off from this perishable city by the penalty of the first death, so are they excluded from that imperishable city by the punishment of the second death.* That the punishment inflicted by the earthly state is not deemed everlasting is accidental, either because man endures not for ever, or because the state itself comes to an end. Wherefore if man lived for ever, the punishment of exile or slavery, which is pronounced by human law, would remain in him for ever. On the other hand, as regards those who sin in such a way as not to deserve to be entirely cut off from the fellowship of the saints, such as those who sin venially, their punishment will be so much the shorter or longer according as they are more or less fit to be cleansed, through sin clinging to them more or less: this is observed in the punishments of this world and of purgatory according to Divine justice.

We find also other reasons given by the saints why some are justly condemned to everlasting punishment for a temporal sin. One is because they sinned against an eternal good by despising eternal life. This is mentioned by Augustine (*ibid.* 12): *He is become worthy of eternal evil, who destroyed in himself a good which could be eternal.* Another reason is because man sinned in his own eternity;* wherefore Gregory says (*Dial.* iv.), *it belongs to the great justice of the judge that those should never cease to be punished, who in this life never ceased to desire sin.* And if it be objected that some who sin mortally propose to amend their life at some time, and that these accordingly are seemingly not deserving of eternal punishment, it must be replied according to some that Gregory speaks of the will that is made manifest by the deed. For he who falls into mortal sin of his own will puts himself in a state whence he cannot

* Cf. I.-II., Q. LXXXVII., A. 3, *ad* 1.

be rescued, except God help him: wherefore from the very fact that he is willing to sin, he is willing to remain in sin for ever. For man is *a wind that goeth*, namely to sin, *and returneth not* by his own power (Ps. lxxvii., 39). Thus if a man were to throw himself into a pit whence he could not get out without help, one might say that he wished to remain there for ever, whatever else he may have thought himself. Another and a better answer is that from the very fact that he commits a mortal sin, he places his end in a creature; and since the whole of life is directed to its end, it follows that for this very reason he directs the whole of his life to that sin, and is willing to remain in sin for ever, if he could do so with impunity. This is what Gregory says on Job xli. 23, *He shall esteem the deep as growing old* (*Moral. xxxiv.*): *The wicked only put an end to sinning because their life came to an end: they would indeed have wished to live for ever, that they might continue in sin for ever, for they desire rather to sin than to live.* Still another reason may be given why the punishment of mortal sin is eternal: because thereby one offends God Who is infinite. Wherefore since punishment cannot be infinite in intensity, because the creature is incapable of an infinite quality, it must needs be infinite at least in duration. And again there is a fourth reason for the same: because guilt remains for ever, since it cannot be remitted without grace, and men cannot receive grace after death; nor should punishment cease so long as guilt remains.

Reply Obj. 1. Punishment has not to be equal to fault as to the amount of duration, as is seen to be the case also with human laws. We may also reply with Gregory (*Dial. xliv.*) that although sin is temporal in act, it is eternal in will.

Reply Obj. 2. The degree of intensity in the punishment corresponds to the degree of gravity in the sin; wherefore mortal sins unequal in gravity will receive a punishment unequal in intensity but equal in duration.

Reply Obj. 3. The punishments inflicted on those who are not altogether expelled from the society of their fellow-citizens are intended for their correction: whereas those

punishments, whereby certain persons are wholly banished from the society of their fellow-citizens, are not intended for their correction; although they may be intended for the correction and tranquillity of the others who remain in the state. Accordingly the damnation of the wicked is for the correction of those who are now in the Church; for punishments are intended for correction, not only when they are being inflicted, but also when they are decreed.

Reply Obj. 4. The everlasting punishment of the wicked will not be altogether useless. For they are useful for two purposes. First, because thereby the Divine justice is safeguarded which is acceptable to God for its own sake. Hence Gregory says (*Dial. iv.*): *Almighty God on account of His lovingkindness delights not in the torments of the unhappy, but on account of His justice. He is for ever unappeased by the punishment of the wicked.* Secondly, they are useful, because the elect rejoice therein, when they see God's justice in them, and realize that they have escaped them. Hence it is written (*Ps. lvii. 12*): *The just shall rejoice when he shall see the revenge, etc.*, and (*Isa. lxvi. 24*): *They, namely the wicked, shall be a loathsome sight* to all flesh, namely to the saints, as a gloss says.* Gregory expresses himself in the same sense (*Dial. iv*): *The wicked are all condemned to eternal punishment, and are punished for their own wickedness. Yet they will burn to some purpose, namely that the just may all both see in God the joys they receive, and perceive in them the torments they have escaped: for which reason they will acknowledge themselves for ever the debtors of Divine grace, the more that they will see how the evils which they overcame by its assistance are punished eternally.*

Reply Obj. 5. Although the punishment relates to the soul accidentally, it relates essentially to the soul infected with guilt. And since guilt will remain in the soul for ever, its punishment also will be everlasting.

Reply Obj. 6. Punishment corresponds to fault, properly speaking, in respect of the inordinateness in the fault, and

* *Ad satietatem visionis*, which S. Thomas takes to signify being satiated with joy. Cf. Q. XCIV., A. 3.

not of the dignity in the person offended: for if the latter were the case, a punishment of infinite intensity would correspond to every sin. Accordingly, although a man deserves to lose his being from the fact that he has sinned against God the author of his being, yet, in view of the inordinateness of the act itself, loss of being is not due to him, since being is presupposed to merit and demerit, nor is being lost or corrupted by the inordinateness of sin:* and consequently privation of being cannot be the punishment due to any sin.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER BY GOD'S MERCY ALL PUNISHMENT OF THE DAMNED, BOTH MEN AND DEMONS, COMES TO AN END?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that by God's mercy all punishment of the damned, both men and demons, comes to an end. For it is written (Wis. xi. 24): *Thou hast mercy upon all, O Lord, because Thou canst do all things.* But among all things the demons also are included, since they are God's creatures. Therefore also their punishment will come to an end.

Obj. 2. Further, *God hath concluded all in sin* (Vulg.,—*unbelief*), *that He may have mercy on all* (Rom. xi. 32). Now God has concluded the demons under sin, that is to say, He permitted them to be concluded. Therefore it would seem that in time He has mercy even on the demons.

Obj. 3. Further, As Anselm says (*Cur Deus Homo* ii.), *it is not just that God should permit the utter loss of a creature which He made for happiness.* Therefore, since every rational creature was created for happiness, it would seem unjust for it to be allowed to perish altogether.

On the contrary, It is written (Matth. xxv. 41): *Depart from Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire, which is prepared for the devil and his angels.* Therefore they will be punished eternally.

* Cf. I.-II., Q. LXXXV., A. 1.

Further, Just as the good angels were made happy through turning to God, so the bad angels were made unhappy through turning away from God. Therefore if the unhappiness of the wicked angels comes at length to an end, the happiness of the good will also come to an end, which is inadmissible.

I answer that, As Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei*, xxi.) Origen* erred in maintaining that the demons will at length, through God's mercy, be delivered from their punishment. But this error has been condemned by the Church for two reasons. First because it is clearly contrary to the authority of Holy Writ (Apoc. xx. 9, 10): *The devil who seduced them was cast into the pool of fire and brimstone, where both the beasts and the false prophets† shall be tormented day and night for ever and ever*, which is the Scriptural expression for eternity. Secondly, because this opinion exaggerated God's mercy in one direction and depreciated it in another. For it would seem equally reasonable for the good angels to remain in eternal happiness, and for the wicked angels to be eternally punished. Wherefore just as he maintained that the demons and the souls of the damned are to be delivered at length from their sufferings, so he maintained that the angels and the souls of the blessed will at length pass from their happy state to the unhappiness of this life.

Reply Obj. 1. God, for His own part, has mercy on all. Since, however, His mercy is ruled by the order of His wisdom, the result is that it does not reach to certain people who render themselves unworthy of that mercy, as do the demons and the damned who are obstinate in wickedness. And yet we may say that even in them His mercy finds a place, in so far as they are punished less than they deserve condignly, but not that they are entirely delivered from punishment.

Reply Obj. 2. In the words quoted the distribution (of the predicate) regards the genera and not the individuals: so that the statement applies to men in the state of way-

* Cf. P. I., Q. LXIV., A. 2.

† Vulg.,—*the beast and false prophet*, etc.

farer, inasmuch as He had mercy both on Jews and on Gentiles, but not on every Gentile or every Jew.

Reply Obj. 3. Anselm means that it is not just with regard to becomingness to God's goodness, and is speaking of the creature generically. For it becomes not the Divine goodness that a whole genus of creature fail of the end for which it was made: wherefore it is unbecoming for all men or all angels to be damned. But there is no reason why some men or some angels should perish for ever, because the intention of the Divine will is fulfilled in the others who are saved.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD'S MERCY SUFFERS AT LEAST MEN TO
BE PUNISHED ETERNALLY ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that God's mercy does not suffer at least men to be punished eternally. For it is written (Gen. vi. 3): *My spirit shall not remain in man for ever, because he is flesh*; where *spirit* denotes indignation, as a gloss observes. Therefore, since God's indignation is not distinct from His punishment, man will not be punished eternally.

Obj. 2. Further, The charity of the saints in this life makes them pray for their enemies. Now they will have more perfect charity in that life. Therefore they will pray then for their enemies who are damned. But the prayers of the saints cannot be in vain, since they are most acceptable to God. Therefore at the saints' prayers the Divine mercy will in time deliver the damned from their punishment.

Obj. 3. Further, God's foretelling of the punishment of the damned belongs to the prophecy of commination. Now the prophecy of commination is not always fulfilled: as appears from what was said of the destruction of Nineve (Jonas iii.); and yet it was not destroyed as foretold by the prophet, who also was troubled for that very reason (iv. 1). Therefore it would seem that much more will the threat of eternal punishment be commuted by God's mercy for

a more lenient punishment, when this will be able to give sorrow to none but joy to all.

Obj. 4. Further, The words of Ps. lxxvi. 8 are to the point, where it is said: *Will God then be angry for ever ?** But God's anger is His punishment. Therefore, etc.

Obj. 5. Further, A gloss on Isa. xiv. 19, *But thou art cast out*, etc., says: *Even though all souls shall have rest at last, thou never shalt*: and it refers to the devil. Therefore it would seem that all human souls shall at length have rest from their pains.

On the contrary, It is written (Matth. xxv. 46) of the elect conjointly with the damned: *These shall go into everlasting punishment: but the just, into life everlasting*. But it is inadmissible that the life of the just will ever have an end. Therefore it is inadmissible that the punishment of the damned will ever come to an end.

Further, As Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* ii.) *death is to men what their fall was to the angels*. Now after their fall the angels could not be restored.† Therefore neither can man after death: and thus the punishment of the damned will have no end.

I answer that, As Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei*, xxi. 17, 18), some evaded the error of Origen by asserting that the demons are punished everlastingly, while holding that all men, even unbelievers, are at length set free from punishment. But this statement is altogether unreasonable. For just as the demons are obstinate in wickedness and therefore have to be punished for ever, so too are the souls of men who die without charity, since *death is to men what their fall was to the angels*, as Damascene says.

Reply Obj. 1. This saying refers to man generically, because God's indignation was at length removed from the human race by the coming of Christ. But those who were unwilling to be included or to remain in this reconciliation effected by Christ, perpetuated the Divine anger in them-

* Vulg.,—*Will God then cast off for ever ?*

† Cf. P. I., Q. LXIV., A. 2.

selves, since no other way of reconciliation is given to us save that which is through Christ.

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine (*De Civ. Dei*, xxi. 24) and Gregory (*Moral.* xxxiv.) say, the saints in this life pray for their enemies, that they may be converted to God, while it is yet possible for them to be converted. For if we knew that they were foreknown to death, we should no more pray for them than for the demons. And since for those who depart this life without grace there will be no further time for conversion, no prayer will be offered for them, neither by the Church militant, nor by the Church triumphant. For that which we have to pray for them is, as the Apostle says (2 Tim. ii. 25, 26), that *God may give them repentance to know the truth, and they may recover themselves from the snares of the devil.*

Reply Obj. 3. A punishment threatened prophetically is only then commuted when there is a change in the merits of the person threatened. Hence: *I will suddenly speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out and to pull down and to destroy it. If that nation . . . shall repent of their evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do to them* (Jer. xviii. 7). Therefore, since the merits of the damned cannot be changed, the threatened punishment will ever be fulfilled in them. Nevertheless the prophecy of commination is always fulfilled in a certain sense, because as Augustine says (*ibid.*): *Nineve has been overthrown, that was evil, and a good Nineve is built up, that was not: for while the walls and the houses remained standing, the city was overthrown in its wicked ways.*

Reply Obj. 4. These words of the Psalm refer to the vessels of mercy, which have not made themselves unworthy of mercy, because in this life (which may be called God's anger on account of its unhappiness) He changes vessels of mercy into something better. Hence the Psalm continues (*verse 11*): *This is the change of the right hand of the most High.* We may also reply that they refer to mercy as granting a relaxation but not setting free altogether if it be referred also to the damned. Hence the Psalm does not say: *Will He*

from His anger shut up His mercies? but in His anger, because the punishment will not be done away entirely; but His mercy will have effect by diminishing the punishment while it continues.

Reply Obj. 5. This gloss is speaking not absolutely but on an impossible supposition in order to throw into relief the greatness of the devil's sin, or of Nabuchodonosor's.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE PUNISHMENT OF CHRISTIANS IS BROUGHT
TO AN END BY THE MERCY OF GOD?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that at least the punishment of Christians is brought to an end by the mercy of God. *For he that believeth and is baptized shall be saved* (Mark xvi. 16). Now this applies to every Christian. Therefore all Christians will at length be saved.

Obj. 2. Further, It is written (Jo. vi. 55): *He that eateth My body and drinketh My blood hath eternal life.* Now this is the meat and drink whereof Christians partake in common. Therefore all Christians will be saved at length.

Obj. 3. Further, *If any man's work burn, he shall suffer loss: but he himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire* (1 Cor. iii. 15), where it is a question of those who have the foundation of the Christian faith. Therefore all such persons will be saved in the end.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. vi. 9): *The unjust shall not possess the kingdom of God.* Now some Christians are unjust. Therefore Christians will not all come to the kingdom of God, and consequently they will be punished for ever.

Further, It is written (2 Pet. ii. 21): *It had been better for them not to have known the way of justice, than after they have known it, to turn back from that holy commandment which was delivered to them.* Now those who know not the way of truth will be punished for ever. Therefore Christians who have turned back after knowing it will also be punished for ever.

I answer that, According to Augustine (*De Civ. Dei*, xxi. 20, 21), there have been some who predicted a delivery from eternal punishment not for all men, but only for Christians; although they stated the matter in different ways. For some said that whoever received the sacraments of faith would be immune from eternal punishment. But this is contrary to the truth, since some receive the sacraments of faith, and yet have not faith, without which *it is impossible to please God* (Heb. xi. 6). Wherefore others said that those alone will be exempt from eternal punishment who have received the sacraments of faith, and professed the Catholic faith. But against this it would seem to be that at one time some people profess the Catholic faith, and afterwards abandon it, and these are deserving not of a lesser but of a greater punishment, since according to 2 Pet. ii. 21, *it had been better for them not to have known the way of justice than, after they have known it, to turn back*. Moreover it is clear that heresiarchs who renounce the Catholic faith and invent new heresies sin more grievously than those who have conformed to some heresy from the first. And therefore some have maintained that those alone are exempt from eternal punishment, who persevere to the end in the Catholic faith, however guilty they may have been of other crimes. But this is clearly contrary to Holy Writ, for it is written (James ii. 20): *Faith without works is dead*, and (Matth. vii. 21) *Not every one that saith to Me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven: but he that doth the will of My Father Who is in heaven*: and in many other passages Holy Scripture threatens sinners with eternal punishment. Consequently those who persevere in the faith unto the end will not all be exempt from eternal punishment, unless in the end they prove to be free from other crimes.

Reply Obj. 1. Our Lord speaks there of formed faith* *that worketh by love* (Vulg.,—*charity*, Gal. v. 6): wherein whosoever dieth shall be saved. But to this faith not only is the error of unbelief opposed, but also any mortal sin whatsoever.

* Cf. II.-II., Q. IV., A. 3.

Reply Obj. 2. The saying of our Lord refers not to those who partake only sacramentally, and who sometimes by receiving unworthily *eat and drink judgment* to themselves (1 Cor. xi. 29), but to those who eat spiritually and are incorporated with Him by charity, which incorporation is the effect of the sacramental eating, in those who approach worthily.* Wherefore, so far as the power of the sacrament is concerned, it brings us to eternal life, although sin may deprive us of that fruit, even after we have received worthily.

Reply Obj. 3. In this passage of the Apostle the foundation denotes formed faith, upon which whosoever shall build venial sins† *shall suffer loss*, because he will be punished for them by God; yet *he himself shall be saved* in the end *by fire*, either of temporal tribulation, or of the punishment of purgatory which will be after death:

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL THOSE WHO PERFORM WORKS OF MERCY
WILL BE PUNISHED ETERNALLY?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that all who perform works of mercy will not be punished eternally, but only those who neglect those works. For it is written (James ii. 13): *Judgment without mercy to him that hath not done mercy*; and (Matth. v. 7): *Blessed are the merciful for they shall obtain mercy*.

Obj. 2. Further, (Matth. xxv. 35-46) we find a description of our Lord's discussion with the damned and the elect. But this discussion is only about works of mercy. Therefore eternal punishment will be awarded only to such as have omitted to practise works of mercy: and consequently the same conclusion follows as before.

Obj. 3. Further, It is written (Matth. vi. 12): *Forgive us our debts, as we also forgive our debtors*, and further on (verse 14): *For if you will forgive men their offences, your*

* Cf. P. III., Q. LXXX., AA. 1, 2, 3.

† Cf. I.-II., Q. LXXXIX., A. 2.

heavenly Father will forgive you also your offences. Therefore it would seem that the merciful, who forgive others their offences, will themselves obtain the forgiveness of their sins, and consequently will not be punished eternally.

Obj. 4. Further, A gloss of Ambrose on 1 Tim. iv. 8, *Godliness is profitable to all things*, says: *The sum total of a Christian's rule of life consists in mercy and godliness. Let a man follow this, and though he should suffer from the inconstancy of the flesh, without doubt he will be scourged, but he will not perish: whereas he who can boast of no other exercise but that of the body will suffer everlasting punishment.* Therefore those who persevere in works of mercy, though they be shackled with fleshly sins, will not be punished eternally: and thus the same conclusion follows as before.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. vi. 9, 10): *Neither fornicators, . . . nor adulterers, etc., shall possess the kingdom of God.* Yet many are such who practise works of mercy. Therefore the merciful will not all come to the eternal kingdom: and consequently some of them will be punished eternally.

Further, It is written (James ii. 10): *Whosoever shall keep the whole law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all.* Therefore whoever keeps the law as regards the works of mercy and omits other works, is guilty of transgressing the law, and consequently will be punished eternally.

I answer that, As Augustine says in the book quoted above (*De Civ. Dei*, xxi. 22), some have maintained that not all who have professed the Catholic faith will be freed from eternal punishment, but only those who persevere in works of mercy, although they be guilty of other crimes. But this cannot stand, because without charity nothing can be acceptable to God, nor does anything profit unto eternal life in the absence of charity. Now it happens that certain persons persevere in works of mercy without having charity. Wherefore nothing profits them to the meriting of eternal life, or to exemption from eternal punishment, as may be gathered from 1 Cor. xiii. 3. Most evident is this in the case of those who lay hands on other people's property, for after

seizing on many things, they nevertheless spend something in works of mercy. We must therefore conclude that all whosoever die in mortal sin, neither faith nor works of mercy will free them from eternal punishment, not even after any length of time whatever.

Reply Obj. 1. Those will obtain mercy who show mercy in an ordinate manner. But those who while merciful to others are neglectful of themselves do not show mercy ordinately, rather do they strike at themselves by their evil actions. Wherefore such persons will not obtain the mercy that sets free altogether, even if they obtain that mercy which rebates somewhat their due punishment.

Reply Obj. 2. The reason why the discussion refers only to the works of mercy is not because eternal punishment will be inflicted on none but those who omit those works, but because eternal punishment will be remitted to those who after sinning have obtained forgiveness by their works of mercy, making unto themselves *friends of the mammon of iniquity* (Luke xvi. 9).

Reply Obj. 3. Our Lord said this to those who ask that their debt be forgiven, but not to those who persist in sin. Wherefore the repentant alone will obtain by their works of mercy the forgiveness that sets them free altogether.

Reply Obj. 4. The gloss of Ambrose speaks of the inconstancy that consists in venial sin, from which a man will be freed through the works of mercy after the punishment of purgatory, which he calls a scourging. Or, if he speaks of the inconstancy of mortal sin, the sense is that those who while yet in this life fall into sins of the flesh through frailty are disposed to repentance by works of mercy. Wherefore such a one will not perish, that is to say, he will be disposed by those works not to perish, through grace bestowed on him by our Lord, Who is blessed for evermore. Amen.

APPENDIX I

THE following two questions were compiled by Nicolai from St. Thomas's commentary on the Sentences, and by him included in the supplement between Questions LXX. and LXXI.

QUESTION I

OF THE QUALITY OF THOSE SOULS WHO DEPART
THIS LIFE WITH ORIGINAL SIN ONLY.

(*In Two Articles.*)

WE must next consider the various qualities of souls that are stripped of their bodies, according to their respective states; and first we shall treat of the souls which depart this life with original sin only.

Under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether these souls suffer from a bodily fire, and are inflicted with punishment by fire? (2) Whether these souls suffer from a spiritual torment within themselves?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THOSE SOULS WHICH DEPART WITH ORIGINAL SIN
ALONE, SUFFER FROM A BODILY FIRE, AND ARE PUNISHED
BY FIRE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that souls which depart with none but original sin, suffer from a bodily fire and are punished by fire. For Augustine* says: *Hold firmly and doubt not that children who depart this life without the sacrament of*

* Fulgentius, *De Fide ad Petrum*, xxvii.

Baptism will be punished everlastingly. Now punishment denotes sensible pain. Therefore souls which depart this life with original sin alone, suffer from a bodily fire and are tormented with the pain of fire.

Obj. 2. Further, A greater fault deserves a greater punishment. Now original sin is greater than venial, because it contains more aversion, since it deprives its subject of grace, whereas venial sin is compatible with grace; and again because original sin is punished eternally, whereas venial sin is punished temporally. Seeing then that venial sin is deserving of the punishment of fire, much more so is original sin.

Obj. 3. Further, Sins are more severely punished after this life than during lifetime, for in this life there is room for mercy. Now, sensible punishment corresponds to original sin in this life, for children who have only original sin are justly subject to many sensible punishments. Therefore sensible punishment is due to it after this life.

Obj. 4. Further, Even as in actual sin there is aversion and conversion, so in original sin there is something corresponding to aversion, namely the privation of original justice, and something corresponding to conversion, namely concupiscence. Now the punishment of fire is due to actual sin by reason of the conversion. Therefore it is also due to original sin by reason of concupiscence.

Obj. 5. Further, After the resurrection the bodies of children will be either passible or impassible. If they be impassible—and no human body can be impassible except either on account of the gift of impassibility (as in the blessed) or by reason of original justice (as in the state of innocence)—it follows that the bodies of children will either have the gift of impassibility, and thus will be glorious, so that there will be no difference between baptized and non-baptized children, which is heretical, or else they will have original justice, and thus will be without original sin, and will not be punished for original sin, which is likewise heretical. If, on the other hand, they be passible, since everything passible suffers of necessity in the presence of

the active, it follows that in the presence of active sensible bodies they will suffer sensible punishment.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Enchir.* xxiii.) that the mildest punishment of all will be for those who are burdened with original sin only. But this would not be so, if they were tormented with sensible punishment, because the pain of hell fire is most grievous. Therefore they will not suffer sensible punishment.

Further, The grief of sensible punishment corresponds to the pleasure of sin (*Apoc.* xviii. 7): *As much as she hath glorified herself and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her.* But there is no pleasure in original sin, as neither is there operation, for pleasure follows operation, as stated in *Ethic.* x. 4. Therefore punishment by fire is not due to original sin.

Further, Gregory Nazianzen in his fortieth sermon, which is entitled *On Holy Baptism*, distinguishes three classes of unbaptized persons: those namely who refuse to be baptized, those who through neglect have put off being baptized until the end of life and have been surprised by sudden death, and those who, like infants, have failed to receive it through no fault of theirs. Of the first he says that they will be punished not only for their other sins, but also for their contempt of Baptism; of the second, that they will be punished, though less severely than the first, for having neglected it; and of the last he says that *a just and eternal Judge will consign them neither to heavenly glory nor to the eternal pains of hell, for although they have not been signed with Baptism, they are without wickedness and malice, and have suffered rather than caused their loss of Baptism.* He also gives the reason why, although they do not reach the glory of heaven, they do not therefore suffer the eternal punishment suffered by the damned: *Because there is a mean between the two, since he who deserves not honour and glory is not for that reason worthy of punishment, and on the other hand he who is not deserving of punishment is not for that reason worthy of glory and honour.*

I answer that, Punishment should be proportionate to

fault, according to the saying of Isaias xxvii. 8, *In measure against measure, when it shall be cast off, thou shalt judge it.* Now the defect transmitted to us through our origin, and having the character of a sin does not result from the withdrawal or corruption of a good consequent upon human nature by virtue of its principles, but from the withdrawal or corruption of something that had been superadded to nature. Nor does this sin belong to this particular man, except in so far as he has such a nature, that is deprived of this good, which in the ordinary course of things he would have had and would have been able to keep. Wherefore no further punishment is due to him, besides the privation of that end to which the gift withdrawn destined him, which gift human nature is unable of itself to obtain. Now this is the divine vision; and consequently the loss of this vision is the proper and only punishment of original sin after death: because, if any other sensible punishment were inflicted after death for original sin, a man would be punished out of proportion to his guilt, for sensible punishment is inflicted for that which is proper to the person, since a man undergoes sensible punishment in so far as he suffers in his person. Hence, as his guilt did not result from an action of his own, even so neither should he be punished by suffering himself, but only by losing that which his nature was unable to obtain. On the other hand, those who are under sentence for original sin will suffer no loss whatever in other kinds of perfection and goodness which are consequent upon human nature by virtue of its principles.

Reply Obj. 1. In the authority quoted punishment denotes, not pain of sense, but only pain of loss, which is the privation of the divine vision, even as in Scripture the word *fire* is often wont to signify any kind of punishment.

Reply Obj. 2. Of all sins original sin is the least, because it is the least voluntary; for it is voluntary not by the will of the person, but only by the will of the origin of our nature. But actual sin, even venial, is voluntary by the will of the person in which it is; wherefore a lighter punishment is due to original than to venial sin. Nor does it

matter that original sin is incompatible with grace; because privation of grace has the character, not of sin, but of punishment, except in so far as it is voluntary: for which reason that which is less voluntary is less sinful. Again it matters not that actual venial sin is deserving of temporal punishment, since this is accidental, for as much as he who falls venially has sufficient grace to attenuate the punishment. For if venial sin were in a person without grace, it would be punished eternally.

Reply Obj. 3. There is no parity between pain of sense before and after death, since before death the pain of sense results from the power of the natural agent, whether the pain of sense be interior as fever or the like, or exterior as burning and so forth. Whereas after death nothing will act by natural power, but only according to the order of divine justice, whether the object of such action be the separate soul, on which it is clear that fire cannot act naturally, or the body after resurrection, since then all natural action will cease, through the cessation of the first movable which is the cause of all bodily movement and alteration.

Reply Obj. 4. Sensible pain corresponds to sensible pleasure, which is in the conversion of actual sin: whereas habitual concupiscence, which is in original sin, has no pleasure. Hence, sensible pain does not correspond thereto as punishment.

Reply Obj. 5. The bodies of children will be impassible, not through their being unable in themselves to suffer, but through the lack of an external agent to act upon them: because, after the resurrection, no body will act on another, least of all so as to induce corruption by the action of nature, but there will only be action to the effect of punishing them by order of the divine justice. Wherefore those bodies to which pain of sense is not due by divine justice will not suffer punishment. On the other hand, the bodies of the saints will be impassible, because they will lack the capability of suffering; hence impassibility in them will be a gift, but not in children.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THESE SAME SOULS SUFFER SPIRITUAL AFFLICTION
ON ACCOUNT OF THE STATE IN WHICH THEY ARE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the souls in question suffer spiritual affliction on account of the state wherein they are, because as Chrysostom says (*Hom. xxiii. in Matth.*), the punishment of God in that they will be deprived of seeing God will be more painful than their being burnt in hell fire. Now these souls will be deprived of seeing God. Therefore they will suffer spiritual affliction thereby.

Obj. 2. Further, One cannot, without suffering, lack what one wishes to have. But these souls would wish to have the divine vision, else their will would be actually perverse. Therefore since they are deprived of it, seemingly they also suffer.

Obj. 3. Further, If it be said that they do not suffer, because they know that through no fault of theirs they are deprived thereof, on the contrary:—Freedom from fault does not lessen but increases the pain of punishment: for a man does not grieve less for that he is disinherited or deprived of a limb through no fault of his. Therefore these souls likewise, albeit deprived of so great a good through no fault of theirs, suffer none the less.

Obj. 4. Further, As baptized children are in relation to the merit of Christ, so are unbaptized children to the demerit of Adam. But baptized children receive the reward of eternal life by virtue of Christ's merit. Therefore the unbaptized suffer pain through being deprived of eternal life on account of Adam's demerit.

Obj. 5. Further, Separation from what we love cannot be without pain. But these children will have natural knowledge of God, and for that very reason will love Him naturally. Therefore since they are separated from Him forever, seemingly they cannot undergo this separation without pain.

On the contrary, If unbaptized children have interior sorrow after death, they will grieve either for their sin or for their punishment. If for their sin, since they cannot be further cleansed from that sin, their sorrow will lead them to despair. Now sorrow of this kind in the damned is the worm of conscience. Therefore these children will have the worm of conscience, and consequently theirs would not be the mildest punishment, as Augustine says it is.* If, on the other hand, they grieve for their punishment, it follows, since their punishment is justly inflicted by God, that their will opposes itself to divine justice, and thus would be actually inordinate, which is not to be granted. Therefore they will feel no sorrow.

Further, Right reason does not allow one to be disturbed on account of what one was unable to avoid; hence Seneca proves (Ep. lxxxv., and *De ira* ii. 6) that *a wise man is not disturbed*. Now in these children there is right reason deflected by no actual sin. Therefore they will not be disturbed for that they undergo this punishment which they could nowise avoid.

I answer that, On this question there are three opinions. Some say that these children will suffer no pain, because their reason will be so much in the dark that they will not know that they lack what they have lost. It, however, seems improbable that the soul freed from its bodily burden should ignore things which, to say the least, reason is able to explore, and many more besides. Hence others say that they have perfect knowledge of things subject to natural reason, and know God, and that they are deprived of seeing Him, and that they feel some kind of sorrow on this account but that their sorrow will be mitigated, in so far as it was not by their will that they incurred the sin for which they are condemned. Yet this again would seem improbable, because this sorrow cannot be little for the loss of so great a good, especially without the hope of recovery: wherefore their punishment would not be the mildest. Moreover the very same reason that impugns their being punished with

* Cf. Art. 1, *On the contrary*, . . .

pain of sense, as afflicting them from without, argues against their feeling sorrow within, because the pain of punishment corresponds to the pleasure of sin; wherefore, since original sin is void of pleasure, its punishment is free of all pain. Consequently others say that they will know perfectly things subject to natural knowledge, and both the fact of their being deprived of eternal life and the reason for this privation, and that nevertheless this knowledge will not cause any sorrow in them. How this may be possible we must explore.

Accordingly, it must be observed that if one is guided by right reason one does not grieve through being deprived of what is beyond one's power to obtain, but only through lack of that which, in some way, one is capable of obtaining. Thus no wise man grieves for being unable to fly like a bird, or for that he is not a king or an emperor, since these things are not due to him; whereas he would grieve if he lacked that to which he had some kind of claim. I say, then, that every man who has the use of free-will is adapted to obtain eternal life, because he can prepare himself for grace whereby to merit eternal life;* so that if he fail in this, his grief will be very great, since he has lost what he was able to possess. But children were never adapted to possess eternal life, since neither was this due to them by virtue of their natural principles, for it surpasses the entire faculty of nature, nor could they perform acts of their own whereby to obtain so great a good. Hence they will nowise grieve for being deprived of the divine vision; nay, rather will they rejoice for that they will have a large share of God's goodness and their own natural perfections. Nor can it be said that they were adapted to obtain eternal life, not indeed by their own action, but by the actions of others around them, since they could be baptized by others, like other children of the same condition who have been baptized and obtained eternal life: for this is of superabundant grace that one should be rewarded without any act of one's own. Wherefore the lack of such a grace will not cause sorrow in children

* Cf. I.-II., Q. CIX., AA. 5, 6.

who die without Baptism, any more than the lack of many graces accorded to others of the same condition makes a wise man to grieve.

Reply Obj. 1. In those who, having the use of free-will, are damned for actual sin, there was aptitude to obtain eternal life, but not in children, as stated above. Consequently there is no parity between the two.

Reply Obj. 2. Although the will may be directed both to the possible and to the impossible as stated in *Ethic.* iii. 5, an ordinate and complete will is only of things which in some way are proportionate to our capability; and we grieve if we fail to obtain this will, but not if we fail in the will that is of impossibilities, and which should be called *velleity** rather than *will*; for one does not will such things absolutely, but one would if they were possible.

Reply Obj. 3. Everyone has a claim to his own inheritance or bodily members, wherefore it is not strange that he should grieve at their loss, whether this be through his own or another's fault: hence it is clear that the argument is not based on a true comparison.

Reply Obj. 4. The gift of Christ surpasses the sin of Adam, as stated in Rom. v. 15 *seqq.* Hence it does not follow that unbaptized children have as much of evil as the baptized have of good.

Reply Obj. 5. Although unbaptized children are separated from God as regards the union of glory, they are not utterly separated from Him: in fact they are united to Him by their share of natural goods, and so will also be able to rejoice in Him by their natural knowledge and love.

* Cf. I.-II., Q. XIII., A. 5 *ad* 1; III., Q. XXI., A. 4.

QUESTION II

OF THE QUALITY OF SOULS WHO EXPIATE ACTUAL SIN
OR ITS PUNISHMENT IN PURGATORY.

(*In Six Articles.*)

WE must next treat of the souls which after this life expiate the punishment of their actual sins in the fire of Purgatory.

Under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether the pain of Purgatory surpasses all the temporal pains of this life? (2) Whether that punishment is voluntary? (3) Whether the souls in Purgatory are punished by the demons? (4) Whether venial sin as regards its guilt is expiated by the pains of Purgatory? (5) Whether the fire of Purgatory frees from the debt of punishment? (6) Whether one is freed from that punishment sooner than another?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE PAINS OF PURGATORY SURPASS ALL THE
TEMPORAL PAINS OF THIS LIFE?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the pains of Purgatory do not surpass all the temporal pains of this life. Because the more passive a thing is the more it suffers if it has the sense of being hurt. Now the body is more passive than the separate soul, both because it has contrariety to a fiery agent, and because it has matter which is susceptible of the agent's quality: and this cannot be said of the soul. Therefore the pain which the body suffers in this world is greater than the pain whereby the soul is cleansed after this life.

Obj. 2. Further, The pains of Purgatory are directly ordained against venial sins. Now since venial sins are the least grievous, the lightest punishment is due to them, if the measure of the stripes is according to the measure of

the fault. Therefore the pain of Purgatory is the lightest of all.

Obj. 3. Further, Since the debt of punishment is an effect of sin, it does not increase unless the sin increases. Now sin cannot increase in one whose sin is already remitted. Therefore if a mortal sin has been remitted in a man who has not fully paid the debt of punishment, this debt does not increase when he dies. But while he lived he was not in debt to the extent of the most grievous punishment. Therefore the pain that he will suffer after this life will not be more grievous to him than all other pains of this life.

On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon (xli. *de Sanctis*): *This fire of Purgatory will be more severe than any pain that can be felt, seen or conceived in this world.*

Further, The more universal a pain is the greater it is. Now the whole separate soul is punished, since it is simple: which is not the case with the body. Therefore this, being the punishment of the separate soul, is greater than any pain suffered by the body.

I answer that, In Purgatory there will be a twofold pain; one will be the pain of loss, namely the delay of the divine vision, and the pain of sense, namely punishment by corporeal fire. With regard to both the least pain of Purgatory surpasses the greatest pain of this life. For the more a thing is desired the more painful is its absence. And since after this life the holy souls desire the Sovereign Good with the most intense longing,—both because their longing is not held back by the weight of the body, and because, had there been no obstacle, they would already have gained the goal of enjoying the Sovereign Good,—it follows that they grieve exceedingly for their delay. Again, since pain is not hurt, but the sense of hurt, the more sensitive a thing is, the greater the pain caused by that which hurts it: wherefore hurts inflicted on the more sensible parts cause the greatest pain. And, because all bodily sensation is from the soul, it follows of necessity that the soul feels the greatest pain when a hurt is inflicted on the soul itself. That the soul suffers pain from the bodily fire

is at present taken for granted, for we shall treat of this matter further on.* Therefore it follows that the pain of Purgatory, both of loss and of sense, surpasses all the pains of this life.

Some, however, prove this from the fact that the whole soul is punished, and not the body. But this is to no purpose, since in that case the punishment of the damned would be milder after the resurrection than before, which is false.

Reply Obj. 1. Although the soul is less passive than the body, it is more cognizant of actual suffering (*passionis*): and where the sense of suffering is greater, there is the greater pain, though the suffering be less.

Reply Obj. 2. The severity of that punishment is not so much a consequence of the degree of sin, as of the disposition of the person punished, because the same sin is more severely punished then than now. Even so a person who has a better temperament is punished more severely by the same sentence than another; and yet the judge acts justly in condemning both for the same crimes to the same punishment.

This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS PUNISHMENT IS VOLUNTARY?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that this punishment is voluntary. For those who are in Purgatory are upright in heart. Now uprightness in heart is to conform one's will to God's, as Augustine says (*Serm. i. in Ps. xxxii.*). Therefore, since it is God's will that they be punished, they will suffer that punishment voluntarily.

Obj. 2. Further, Every wise man wills that without which he cannot obtain the end he has in view. Now those who are in Purgatory know that they cannot obtain glory, unless they be punished first. Therefore they are punished willingly.

* Cf. Suppl., Q. LXX., A. 3.

On the contrary, No one asks to be freed from a punishment that he suffers willingly. Now those who are in Purgatory ask to be set free, as appears from many incidents related in the *Dialogue* of Gregory (iv. 40, 65). Therefore they will not undergo that punishment voluntarily.

I answer that, A thing is said to be voluntary in two ways. First, by an absolute act of the will; and thus no punishment is voluntary, because the very notion of punishment is that it be contrary to the will. Secondly, a thing is said to be voluntary by a conditional act of the will: thus cautery is voluntary for the sake of regaining health. Hence a punishment may be voluntary in two ways. First, because by being punished we obtain some good, and thus the will itself undertakes a punishment, as instanced in satisfaction, or when a man accepts a punishment gladly, and would not have it not to be, as in the case of martyrdom. Secondly, when, although we gain no good by the punishment, we cannot obtain a good without being punished, as in the case of natural death: and then the will does not undertake the punishment, and would be delivered from it; but it submits to it, and in this respect the punishment is said to be voluntary. In this latter sense the punishment of Purgatory is said to be voluntary.

Some, however, say that it is not voluntary in any way, because the souls in Purgatory are so replete with suffering, that they know not that they are being cleansed by their pains, and deem themselves damned. But this is false, for did they not know that they will be set free, they would not ask for prayers, as they often do.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SOULS IN PURGATORY ARE PUNISHED
BY THE DEMONS?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the souls in Purgatory are punished by the demons. For, according to the Master,

they will have for torturers in their pains, those who were their tempters in sin. Now the demons tempt us to sin, not only mortal, but also venial when they fail in the former. Therefore in Purgatory also they will torture souls on account of venial sins.

Obj. 2. Further, The just are competent to be cleansed from sin both in this life and afterwards. Now, in this life, they are cleansed by pains inflicted by the devil, as was the case with Job. Therefore after this life also, those who have to be cleansed will be punished by the demons.

On the contrary, It were unjust that he who has triumphed over someone, should be subjected to him after victory. Now those who are in Purgatory have triumphed over the demons, since they died without mortal sin. Therefore they will not be subjected to them through being punished by them.

I answer that, As after the Judgment day the Divine justice will kindle the fire with which the damned will be punished for ever, even so now the elect are cleansed after this life by the Divine justice alone, and neither by the ministry of the demons whom they have vanquished, nor by the ministry of the angels who would not inflict such tortures on their fellow-citizens. It is, however, possible that they take them to the place of punishment: also that even the demons, who rejoice in the punishment of man, accompany them and stand by while they are being cleansed, both that they may be sated with their pains, and that when these leave their bodies, they may find something of their own in them. But in this life, while there is yet time for the combat, men are punished both by the wicked angels as foes, as instanced in Job, and by the good angels, as instanced in Jacob, the sinew of whose thigh shrank at the angel's touch.* Moreover, Dionysius says explicitly that the good angels sometimes inflict punishment.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

* Gen. xxxii. 25.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER VENIAL SIN IS EXPIATED BY THE PAINS OF
PURGATORY AS REGARDS THE GUILT ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that venial sin is not expiated by the pains of Purgatory as regards the guilt. For a gloss* on 1 John v. 16, *There is a sin unto death*, etc., says: *It is vain to ask pardon after death for what was not amended in this life.* Therefore no sin is remitted as to guilt after this life.

Obj. 2. Further, The same subject is freed from sin as falls into sin. But after death the soul cannot sin venially. Therefore neither can it be loosed from venial sin.

Obj. 3. Further, Gregory says† that every man will be at the judgment as he was when he left the body, because *the tree . . . wheresoever it shall fall, there shall it be.*‡ If, then, a man go forth from this life with venial sin, he will be with venial sin at the judgment: and consequently one does not atone for venial sin in Purgatory.

Obj. 4. Further, It has been stated (Suppl. ii. 3) that actual sin is not blotted out save by contrition. But there will be no contrition after this life, because it is a meritorious act. For then there will be neither merit nor demerit since, according to the Damascene,§ *death is to men what the fall was to the angels.* Therefore, after this life, venial sin is not remitted in Purgatory as to its guilt.

Obj. 5. Further, Venial sin is not in us except on account of the fomes. Wherefore in the original state Adam would not have sinned venially, as was stated (2 Sent. xxi. 2). Now after this life there will be no sensuality; because the fomes will cease when the soul is separated, since it is called the *law of the flesh* (Rom. vii.). Hence there will be no venial sin then, and consequently it cannot be expiated by the fire of Purgatory.

* St. Gregory (*Moral.* xvi. 28).

† Eccles. xi. 3.

‡ *Dial.* iv. 39.

§ *De Fide Orthod.* ii. 4.

On the contrary, Gregory* and Augustine¹ say that certain slight sins will be remitted in the life to come. Nor can this be understood of the punishment: because thus all sins, however grave they be, are expiated by the fire of Purgatory, as regards the debt of punishment. Therefore venial sins are cleansed by the fire of Purgatory as to their guilt.

Further, Wood, hay, stubble (1 Cor. iii. 12) denote venial sins, as we have said (I.-II., Q. LXXXIX., A. 2). Now wood, hay, stubble are consumed in Purgatory. Therefore venial sins are remitted after this life.

I answer that, Some have asserted that no sin is remitted after this life, as regards the guilt: that if a man die with mortal sin, he is damned and incapable of being forgiven; and that it is not possible for a man to die with a venial sin and without mortal sin, since the final grace washes the venial sin away. They assign as reason for this that venial sin is excessive love of a temporal thing, in one who has his foundation in Christ, which excess results from the corruption of concupiscence. Wherefore if grace entirely overcome the corruption of concupiscence, as in the Blessed Virgin, there is no room for venial sin. Hence, since this concupiscence is altogether abated and removed, the powers of the soul are wholly subject to grace, and venial sin is cast out. But this opinion is nonsensical in itself and in its proof. In itself, because it is opposed to the statements of holy men and of the Gospel, which cannot be expounded as referring to the remission of venial sins as to their punishment, as the Master says in the text,† because in this way both light and grave sins are remitted in the life to come: while Gregory§ declares that light sins alone are remitted after this life. Nor does it suffice for them to say, that this is said expressly of light sins, lest we should think that we shall suffer nothing grievous on their account: because the remission of sin diminishes punishment rather than aggravates it. As to the proof, it is shown to be worthless, since

* *Dial.* iv. 39.

† *De vera et falsa pœnit.* iv., xviii. by some other author.

‡ 4 *Sent. D.* xxi.

§ *l. c.*

bodily defect, such as obtains at the last moment of life, does not remove the corruption of concupiscence; nor does it diminish it in its root but in its act, as instanced in those who lie dangerously ill; nor again does it calm the powers of the soul, so as to subject them to grace, because tranquillity of the powers, and their subjection to grace, is effected when the lower powers obey the higher which delight together in God's law. But this cannot happen in that state, since the acts of both kinds of powers are impeded; unless tranquillity denote the absence of combat, as occurs even in those who are asleep; and yet sleep is not said, for this reason, to diminish concupiscence, or to calm the powers of the soul, or to subject them to grace. Moreover, granted that the aforesaid defect diminish concupiscence radically, and that it subject the powers to grace, it would still be insufficient to wash away venial sin already committed, although it would suffice in order to avoid it in the future. Because actual sin, even if it be venial, is not remitted without an actual movement of contrition, as stated above (Suppl., Q. II., A. 3), however much the latter be in the habitual intention. Now it happens sometimes that a man dies in his sleep, being in a state of grace and yet having a venial sin when he went to sleep: and such a man cannot make an act of contrition for his venial sin before he dies. Nor may we say, as they do, that if he repented neither by act nor by intention, neither in general nor in particular, his venial sin becomes mortal, for that "venial becomes mortal when it is an object of complacency"; because not all complacency in venial sin makes it mortal (else all venial sin would be mortal, since every venial sin pleases for as much as it is voluntary), but only that complacency which amounts to enjoyment, wherein all human wickedness consists, in that *we enjoy what we should use*, as Augustine says.* Hence the complacency which makes a sin mortal is actual complacency, for every mortal sin consists in an act. Now it may happen that a man, after committing a venial sin, has no actual thought of being

* *De Trin.* x. 10.

forgiven or of remaining in that sin, but thinks perhaps about a triangle having its three angles equal to two right angles, and while engaged in this thought falls asleep, and dies.

It is therefore clear that this opinion is utterly unreasonable: and consequently we must say with others that venial sin in one who dies in a state of grace, is remitted after this life by the fire of Purgatory: because this punishment so far as it is voluntary, will have the power, by virtue of grace, to expiate all such guilt as is compatible with grace.*

Reply Obj. 1. The gloss refers to mortal sin. Or it may be replied that although, in this life, it is not amended in itself, it is amended in merits, because a man merited here that his punishment should be meritorious to him there.

Reply Obj. 2. Venial sin arises from the corruption of the fomes, which will no longer be in the separate soul that is in Purgatory, wherefore this soul cannot sin venially. On the other hand, the remission of venial sin proceeds from the will informed by grace, which will be in the separate soul in Purgatory. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 3. Venial sins do not alter a man's state, for they neither destroy nor diminish charity, according to which the amount of the soul's gratuitous goodness is measured. Hence the soul remains such as it was before, notwithstanding the remission or commission of venial sins.

Reply Obj. 4. After this life there can be no merit in respect of the essential reward, but there can be in respect of some accidental reward, so long as man remains in the state of the way, in a sense. Consequently in Purgatory there can be a meritorious act in respect of the remission of venial sin.

Reply Obj. 5. Although venial sin arises from the proneness of the fomes, sin results in the mind; wherefore even when the fomes is no more, sin can still remain.

* St. Thomas expresses himself differently, *De Malo*, Q. VII., A. 2 *ad* 9 and *ad* 17: *Guilt is not remitted by punishment, but venial sin as to its guilt is remitted in Purgatory by virtue of grace, not only as existing in the habit, but also as proceeding to the act of charity in detestation of venial sin.*

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE FIRE OF PURGATORY DELIVERS FROM THE
DEBT OF PUNISHMENT ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the fire of Purgatory does not deliver from the debt of punishment. For every cleansing is in respect of some uncleanness. But punishment does not imply uncleanness. Therefore the fire of Purgatory does not deliver from punishment.

Obj. 2. Further, A contrary is not cleansed save by its contrary. But punishment is not contrary to punishment. Therefore one is not cleansed from the debt of punishment by the punishment of Purgatory.

Obj. 3. Further, A gloss on 1 Cor. iii. 15, *He shall be saved, yet so, etc.*, says: *This fire is the trial of tribulation, of which it is written* (Ecclus. xxvii. 6): *The furnace tries the potter's vessels, etc.* Therefore man expiates every punishment by the pains of this world, at least by death, which is the greatest punishment of all, and not by the fire of Purgatory.

On the contrary, The pains of Purgatory are more grievous than all the pains of this world, as stated above (A. 3). Now the satisfactory punishment which one undergoes in this life atones for the debt of punishment. Much more therefore is this effected by the punishment of Purgatory.

I answer that, Whosoever is another's debtor, is freed from his indebtedness by paying the debt. And, since the obligation incurred by guilt is nothing else than the debt of punishment, a person is freed from that obligation by undergoing the punishment which he owed. Accordingly the punishment of Purgatory cleanses from the debt of punishment.

Reply Obj. 1. Although the debt of punishment does not in itself imply uncleanness, it bears a relation to uncleanness by reason of its cause.

Reply Obj. 2. Although punishment is not contrary to punishment, it is opposed to the debt of punishment,

because the obligation to punishment remains from the fact that one has not undergone the punishment that was due.

Reply Obj. 3. Many meanings underlie the same words of Holy Writ. Hence this fire may denote both the present tribulation and the punishment to come, and venial sins can be cleansed from both of these. That natural death is not sufficient for this, has been stated above (4 *Sent.* D. xx.).

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ONE PERSON IS DELIVERED FROM THIS PUNISHMENT SOONER THAN ANOTHER ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that one person is not delivered from this punishment sooner than another. For the more grievous the sin, and the greater the debt, the more severely is it punished in Purgatory. Now there is the same proportion between severer punishment and graver fault, as between lighter punishment and less grievous fault. Therefore one is delivered from this punishment as soon as another.

Obj. 2. Further, In point of duration unequal merits receive equal retribution both in heaven and in hell. Therefore seemingly it is the same in Purgatory.

On the contrary is the comparison of the Apostle, who denotes the differences of venial sins by wood, hay, and stubble. Now it is clear that wood remains longer in the fire than hay and stubble. Therefore one venial sin is punished longer in Purgatory than another.

I answer that, Some venial sins cling more persistently than others, according as the affections are more inclined to them, and more firmly fixed in them. And since that which clings more persistently is more slowly cleansed, it follows that some are tormented in Purgatory longer than others, for as much as their affections were steeped in venial sins.

Reply Obj. 1. Severity of punishment corresponds properly speaking to the amount of guilt: whereas the length cor-

responds to the firmness with which sin has taken root in its subject. Hence it may happen that one may be delayed longer who is tormented less, and *vice versa*.

Reply Obj. 2. Mortal sin which deserves the punishment of hell, and charity which deserves the reward of heaven, will, after this life, be immovably rooted in their subject. Hence as to all there is the same duration in either case. It is otherwise with venial sin which is punished in Purgatory, as stated above (A. 6).

APPENDIX II

TWO ARTICLES ON PURGATORY.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS A PURGATORY AFTER THIS LIFE?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that there is not a Purgatory after this life. For it is said (Apoc. xiv. 13): *Blessed are the dead who die in the Lord. From henceforth now, saith the Spirit, that they may rest from their labours.* Therefore after this life no cleansing labour awaits those who die in the Lord, nor those who do not die in the Lord, since they cannot be cleansed. Therefore there is no Purgatory after this life.

Obj. 2. Further, As charity is to an eternal reward, so is mortal sin to eternal punishment. Now those who die in mortal sin are forthwith consigned to eternal punishment. Therefore those who die in charity go at once to their reward; and consequently no Purgatory awaits them after this life.

Obj. 3. Further, God Who is supremely merciful is more inclined to reward good than to punish evil. Now just as those who are in the state of charity, do certain evil things which are not deserving of eternal punishment, so those who are in mortal sin, at times perform actions, generically good, which are not deserving of an eternal reward. Therefore since these good actions are not rewarded after this life in those who will be damned, neither should those evil actions be punished after this life. Hence the same conclusion follows.

On the contrary, It is said (2 Machab. xii. 46): *It is a holy and wholesome thought to pray for the dead, that they*

may be loosed from sins. Now there is no need to pray for the dead who are in heaven, for they are in no need; nor again for those who are in hell, because they cannot be loosed from sins. Therefore after this life, there are some not yet loosed from sins, who can be loosed therefrom; and the like have charity, without which sins cannot be loosed, for *charity covereth all sins.** Hence they will not be consigned to everlasting death, since *he that liveth and believeth in Me, shall not die for ever :†* nor will they obtain glory without being cleansed, because nothing unclean shall obtain it, as stated in the last chapter of the Apocalypse (*verse 14*). Therefore some kind of cleansing remains after this life.

Further, Gregory of Nyssa‡ says: *If one who loves and believes in Christ, has failed to wash away his sins in this life, he is set free after death by the fire of Purgatory.* Therefore there remains some kind of cleansing after this life.

I answer that, From the conclusions we have drawn above (III., Q. LXXXVI., AA. 4, 5: Suppl., Q. XII., A. 1) it is sufficiently clear that there is a Purgatory after this life. For if the debt of punishment is not paid in full after the stain of sin has been washed away by contrition, nor again are venial sins always removed when mortal sins are remitted, and if justice demands that sin be set in order by due punishment, it follows that one who after contrition for his fault and after being absolved, dies before making due satisfaction, is punished after this life. Wherefore those who deny Purgatory speak against the justice of God: for which reason such a statement is erroneous and contrary to faith. Hence Gregory of Nyssa, after the words quoted above, adds: *This we preach, holding to the teaching of truth, and this is our belief; this the universal Church holds, by praying for the dead that they may be loosed from sins.* This cannot be understood except as referring to Purgatory: and whosoever resists the authority of the Church, incurs the note of heresy.

Reply Obj. 1. The authority quoted is speaking of the

* Prov. x. 12. † John xi. 26. ‡ *De iis qui in fide dormiunt.*

labour of working for merit, and not of the labour of suffering to be cleansed.

Reply Obj. 2. Evil has not a perfect cause, but results from each single defect: whereas good arises from one perfect cause, as Dionysius asserts.* Hence each defect is an obstacle to the perfection of good; while not every good hinders some consummation of evil, since there is never evil without some good. Consequently venial sin prevents one who has charity from obtaining the perfect good, namely eternal life, until he be cleansed; whereas mortal sin cannot be hindered by some conjoined good from bringing a man forthwith to the extreme of evils.

Reply Obj. 3. He that falls into mortal sin, deadens all the good he has done before, and what he does, while in mortal sin, is dead: since by offending God he deserves to lose all the good he has from God. Wherefore no reward after this life awaits him who dies in mortal sin, whereas sometimes punishment awaits him who dies in charity, which does not always wash away the sin which it finds, but only that which is contrary to it.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS THE SAME PLACE WHERE SOULS ARE
CLEANSED, AND THE DAMNED PUNISHED?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that it is not the same place where souls are cleansed and the damned punished. For the punishment of the damned is eternal, according to Matth. xxv. 46, *These shall go into everlasting punishment* (Vulg.,—*fire*). But the fire of Purgatory is temporary, as the Master says (4 *Sent. D.* xxi.). Therefore the former and the latter are not punished together in the same place: and consequently these places must needs be distinct.

Obj. 2. The punishment of hell is called by various names, as in Ps. x. 7, *Fire, and brimstone, and storms of winds*, etc., whereas the punishment of Purgatory is called by one name

* *Div. Nom.* iv. 4.

only, namely fire. Therefore they are not punished with the same fire and in the same place.

Obj. 3. Further, Hugh of St. Victor says (*De Sacram.* ii. 16): *It is probable that they are punished in the very places where they sinned.* And Gregory relates (*Dial.* iv. 40) that Germanus, Bishop of Capua, found Paschasius being cleansed in the baths. Therefore they are not cleansed in the same place as hell, but in this world.

On the contrary, Gregory says:* *Even as in the same fire gold glistens and straw smokes, so in the same fire the sinner burns and the elect is cleansed.* Therefore the fire of Purgatory is the same as the fire of hell: and hence they are in the same place.

Further, The holy fathers, before the coming of Christ, were in a more worthy place than that wherein souls are now cleansed after death, since there was no pain of sense there. Yet that place was joined to hell, or the same as hell: otherwise Christ when descending into Limbo would not be said to have descended into hell. Therefore Purgatory is either close to, or the same place as, hell.

I answer that, Nothing is clearly stated in Scripture about the situation of Purgatory, nor is it possible to offer convincing arguments on this question. It is probable, however, and more in keeping with the statements of holy men and the revelations made to many, that there is a twofold place of Purgatory. One, according to the common law; and thus the place of Purgatory is situated below and in proximity to hell, so that it is the same fire which torments the damned in hell and cleanses the just in Purgatory; although the damned being lower in merit, are to be consigned to a lower place. Another place of Purgatory is according to dispensation: and thus sometimes, as we read, some are punished in various places, either that the living may learn, or that the dead may be succoured, seeing that their punishment being made known to the living may be mitigated through the prayers of the Church.

Some say, however, that according to the common law

* The quotation is from St. Augustine (*De Civ. Dei* i. 8).

the place of Purgatory is where man sins. This does not seem probable, since a man may be punished at the same time for sins committed in various places. And others say that according to the common law they are punished above us, because they are between us and God, as regards their state. But this is of no account, for they are not punished for being above us, but for that which is lowest in them, namely sin.

Reply Obj. 1. The fire of Purgatory is eternal in its substance, but temporary in its cleansing effect.

Reply Obj. 2. The punishment of hell is for the purpose of affliction, wherefore it is called by the names of things that are wont to afflict us here. But the chief purpose of the punishment of Purgatory is to cleanse us from the remains of sin; and consequently the pain of fire only is ascribed to Purgatory, because fire cleanses and consumes.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument considers the point of special dispensation and not that of the common law.

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